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 This phenomenological study explores the lived experience of life writing the 
Holocaust.  Life writing is the term used to describe personal biographical and 
autobiographical accounts in many genres (Jolly, 2001). As research concerned with how 
personal writing of the Holocaust is experienced by the writers themselves, this work 
explores the ways in which memory, narrative and history intersect in the writing 
processes of each writer.  What insights might we gain about personal writing as a tool 
for helping to understand the past?  What might we learn about historical events, such as 
the Holocaust, from crafted writing made by eyewitnesses?  What does it mean for these 
writers to do this work?  What may we learn about personal writing as a mode of 
learning?  
This research is done in the tradition of hermeneutic phenomenology and draws 
on the work of philosophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, and 
particularly Levinas, as foundational grounding for this study.  The work of David Carr, 
who describes our understanding of experience and history as narrative in nature helped 
to guide this research as well.  Van Manen provides a systematic process by which 
research employing hermeneutic phenomenological philosophy can be done.    
Through engagement with the literature surrounding the existential phenomenon; 
research on writing after trauma; literature and research on survivor testimony; 
philosophical and psychological research concerning the nature of memory and critical 
analysis of historical consciousness and historiology, I formed questions that guided my 
conversations with participants.   
I recruited twelve participants, members of The Memory Project, a writing group 
of Holocaust survivors at The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum for this study.  
My phenomenological data suggests that life writing the Holocaust acts as a mode of 
seeking coherence for these writers.  The narrative structure of memory, as pre-writing 
for life writing, is employed as a tool for greater self understanding and communication 
of a self by these writers.  In addition, multiple communities are called upon by these 
writers as they craft and revise the texts they make.  Conversations with historians of the 
Holocaust, dialogue with family members and the interactions within our group guide the 
remembering and writing of these writers and help add to a sense of their own “narrative 
coherence” described by Carr (1986).  
Drawing from insights gained from my participants, I suggest that the lived 
experience of life writing the Holocaust is a pedagogical process.  This process is one in 
which narrative memory, expanding historical consciousness and writing as impetus and 
mode of questioning engage these survivors in ongoing discovery and communication of 
their own life stories.  Additionally, I offer an understanding of life writing, memory and 
history conceived differently than in an objectivist tradition as transformative to a 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE PROJECT OF BUILDING: LAYING THE DOORSILL 
The Project 
Monthly, for more than ten years now, I leave my home and travel to meet with 
Holocaust survivors.  These survivors are members of The Memory Project, a writing  
program at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, begun through the Office of 
Survivor Affairs for Holocaust survivors who volunteer at the museum.  The Memory 
Project was the idea of the then Assistant Director, Betsy Anthony, and evolved from a 
program at Drew University called Leave a Legacy.  
It began in the first decade of the 21st century during a time that experienced a 
renewed sense of urgency to collect the testimonies of survivors of the Holocaust.  
Projects to record testimony, like University of Southern California’s Shoah Foundation, 
begun in 1995, collected 52,000 first-hand accounts from survivors and witnesses of the 
Holocaust.  I was hired as a writing instructor, ostensibly to complete a similar mission, 
to allow survivors to recount their testimony (USC Shoah Foundation: The Institute for 
Visual History and Education, 2014, "Collecting Testimonies" ¶ 1).  In 2001, my work 
with The Memory Project began.  
I have called myself teacher, facilitator, and workshop leader and over the years, I 
have thought of the written works made in connection with our monthly meetings in 
various ways as well.  I wondered, as the work seemed to move through and beyond what 
could be called testimony, what was being made through the writing done in our group.  I 
wondered what the survivors got out of doing the writing that seemed to be more than 
simply a chronicle of their Holocaust experience.  I wondered if the work was 
	   2 
therapeutic, if the group discussions were.  I wondered about the written work’s 
relationship to historical writing.  I wondered what meaning the writers made from the 
work they did and was surprised that so many wanted to continue writing after that first 
year. 
The Context of Questions 
As I read scholarly work about writing to learn, about Holocaust literature, about 
writing testimony, I began to think about how to approach the questions I was forming 
about our group, about their writing.  I am influenced by scholars like Langer (1991), 
who approach the writing and testimony of the Holocaust as a body of literature, some 
calling Holocaust testimony an entirely new literary genre with unique generic traits 
(Eaglestone, 2004).  Others, like Felman and Laub (1992), approach the testimony of 
survivors apart from literature, and describe it as “a long process of witnessing” (p. 79).  
Related to this is the work of those who describe the act of testifying, or the work of 
telling, and the psychological impact that work has on child survivors especially (R. 
Krell, 2007).   
My questions about the phenomenon of writing after the Holocaust are informed 
by the work of these scholars.  But my own study, coming as it does from my work as a 
teacher and education researcher must begin with the survivor’s own experience of 
crafting personal writing, in a writing group, long after the Holocaust.  What is this work 
they are making?  What does it mean for each of them to be in the making?   
Even after deciding this focus, my approach was not straightforward.  I didn’t at 
first know if I would approach researching the group as an ethnographer, hoping to 
describe the shared culture we made gathered there at the table.  Would I try to describe 
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the genre of the texts made by members of the group, the things each text has in common, 
studying the text as separate from each writer?  I was interested, even at first, in how the 
work of writing and remembering was approached by the writers, what it was like for 
them.  But, as year after year, many of the Memory Project writers expressed a desire to 
keep writing, my curiosity grew.         
These contexts are important, integral even; they situate the phenomenon, and in 
doing so, structure the phenomenon itself.  But more than that, they make up the life-
world which encompasses the questions I have, the work I do and the care I feel for each 
member of the group.  In addition, I am in the room with survivors of a genocide that 
began nearly forty years before I was born, attached in this way to the personal histories, 
knowledge and memories they share.  These contexts comprise the life-world in which I 
work with survivors who craft memory into writing.  The contexts form the group, inform 
the writing of these texts and make the phenomenon what it is.  
Possessing the Questions    
As a human scientist in education, as a pedagogue, I ask here what it means to 
these Holocaust survivors who write their personal experiences, nearly seventy years 
after Victory in Europe, to be engaged in writing.  It is a question touched by these 
countless contexts and seems fully openable only through the ontological questions able 
to be asked through hermeneutic phenomenology.  The challenge for me as a researcher 
has been, and continues to be, to name these questions, which Felman and Laub (1992) 
describe as “questions that we do not know, that we do not as yet possess as questions” 
(p. xv).  Through this work, I have begun to articulate and inquire into my own 
understandings “which nonetheless compellingly address” (p. xvi) me, which bring me to 
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this study through my work as teacher and researcher. These questions come by way also 
of my own interest in writing’s processes, and with an ever-growing sense of the 
complicated relationship of the processes of knowing, memory and writing. 
As a methodology, hermeneutic phenomenology approaches questions of being 
and seeks to describe lived experience.  Only through asking, “What is the lived 
experience of life-writing the Holocaust?” am I able to attempt the daunting task of 
describing the phenomenon of writing and remembering personal experience as I seek to 
do here.  Notice too, that these questions do not focus on having written, which would 
cause me to place an emphasis on the finished texts made by these writers.  Instead my 
focus is on what it means to this group of survivors to be in the making of these texts.  
These questions come directly from my own interest in process and in the multiple 
processes required for learning, remembering and writing.  
In asking these questions of lived experience, the survivors themselves provide 
their insights for interpretation.  It is their descriptions of the phenomenon that guide this 
work, to describe their own lived experience.  I work within texts from multiple 
disciplines, culled from the staggering breadth of work, both scholarly and artistic, on all 
aspects of the Holocaust.  I turn to these multiple texts in order to help name and question 
actively the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust. 
Throughout years of research, several of my own ways of understanding the work 
done by the survivor writers of the Memory Project have developed and evolved.  As a 
phenomenological account, as interpretation, it seems necessary to describe, as best I can, 
the process too, of my own thinking through the phenomenon.  I have come to a 
temporary understanding that I describe through this study.  I have no belief that this is 
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my final word, my final thought on this topic, and I hope that I never stop thinking and 
learning about the work made by these survivors.  I understand the process of the 
survivors’ writing as the thing I hope to open. The finished texts created by survivors, the 
completed writing, will be named and assumed by others as literature, testimony, memoir 
or as some other genre yet to be named.  But the process itself, the writing process, the 
being-in, the phenomenon of being engaged in this writing is the work I seek to open 
here.  
I understand this making by my group participants as something that encompasses 
the historical.  I see the writers engaged in the making of testimony, but a testimony that 
is personal and specific, and not the final word for their knowing of the past or future.  I 
see the phenomenon as one that exists within the relationships of the people who 
encompass it, those in the group, and those outside of it, both before and after it.  Most 
importantly, I see the work done through this writing as pedagogical work, as learning 
and dwelling in questioning. 
My work here is to question within and beyond these understandings, to open the 
phenomenon, the lived time, lived space, lived body and lived relationship of the 
experience, to dwell in the questions, to describe as fully as I am able, the lived 
experience of life writing the Holocaust.  I am overwhelmed by the impossibility of doing 
so.  As van Manen (2002) describes, and I feel acutely: 
These writings do not yield absolute truths, or objective observation. The writer at 
best gains an occasional glimpse of the meaning of human existence. . . In point 
of fact, all interpretive phenomenological inquiry is cognizant of the realization 
that no interpretation is ever complete, no explication of meaning is ever final, no 
insight is beyond challenge. (p. 7) 
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This work, questioning lived experience as it does, hopes to provide that glimpse into the 
meaning that is ascribed by the survivors to their work of writing.  In doing so, I turn 
toward this group of writing survivors, and hope they might teach me, along with all they 
have already taught, what being in the writing means to them. 
The Possibility of a Project 
The Gift 
In 1945, when the keepers cried kaput 
Josef Stein, poet, came out of Dachau 
Like half a resurrection, his other half 
eighty pounds still in their invisible grave. 
Slowly then the mouth opened at first  
a broth, and then a medication, and then 
a diet, and all in time and the knitting mercies, 
the showing bones were buried back in flesh, 
and the miracle was finished.  Josef Stein 
man and poet, rose, walked, and could even 
beget, and did, and later died of other causes 
only partly traceable to his first death. 
He noted - with some surprise at first - 
that strangers could not tell he had died once. 
He returned to his post in the library, drank his beer, 
published three poems in a French magazine,  
and was very kind to the son who at last was his. 
In the spent of one night he wrote three propositions: 
That hell is the denial of the ordinary.  That nothing lasts. 
That clean white paper waiting under a pen 
is the gift beyond history and hurt and heaven. 
(Ciardi, 1997, p. 225) 
Ciardi's poem helps to articulate more clearly questions I have had since 
beginning my work with Holocaust survivors in 2001.  As the facilitator of this group 
since its inception, I am drawn to describe the experience of our group, to unfold the 
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phenomenon by exploring it through and in writing.  Through many readings of Ciardi's 
poem, more evocative questions begin to emerge that help me to open the phenomenon of 
life writing the Holocaust.  
Joseph Stein, a fictional poet, is described through Ciardi's poem as "half a 
resurrection" though the other half remains in a grave.  Then through the propositions at 
the end of the poem, there is a gift described that seems to cast writing after the 
Holocaust as a healing act.  Originally, maybe momentarily, I wondered if life writing the 
Holocaust might, in some way, be this healing act, whether a kind of closure was the gift 
referred to in the title.  Initially it seemed to me that the third proposition described in 
Ciardi's poem where Stein writes, "that clean white paper waiting under a pen/ is the gift 
beyond history and hurt and heaven" cast writing after the Holocaust as a mode of 
therapy, of resurrecting that half-death the poem describes.  These first thoughts led me to 
wonder in what ways writing about the Holocaust might become a mode for survivor 
writers to work through traumatic past events.  I wondered in what ways writing might be 
a way to leave the past behind. 
Over time, both my questions about healing as a process that may be finished, as 
well as my questions about writing's therapeutic nature have changed.  Ciardi (1997) 
initially seems to describe a "miracle" that might be "finished" through the recovery that 
writing brings about in the poem; but later he describes the "project" of writing as being 
"beyond" "hurt."  "Beyond" is not the same as separate or apart from experience, but 
simply after it.  Still, the finality described in the poem suggests that a Holocaust 
survivor/writer might, at some point be finished with approaching memory, be finished 
with describing it, that the "miracle" might somehow be "finished." 
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I now wonder how memory is approached and re-approached by these survivors 
as “historical beings” (Gadamer, 1975/2006)  For "historical beings," aware of histories 
through which they've lived, who "return" through memory to these experiences again 
and again in order to make sense of them, what might "recovery" be?  This recursive 
memory, as I describe it, may allow for emerging understanding, but is memory ever 
"finished"?  Is "healing" ever a separation from traumatic experience?  Is there any sort of 
return that will allow resolution, through memory, through writing?  I wonder further 
what this recursive memory means for all of our “historical consciousness” and for an 
understanding of what the Holocaust was and is? 
The world's "historical consciousness" was changed by the Holocaust, as Langer 
(1995) writes, “We are still wrestling with the loss of stature that a disaster like the 
Holocaust imposes on our ideal of civilization” (p. 5).  This leads to more and more 
questions about life writing for its survivors.  If there is never a final thought, discovered 
and communicated through writing and remembering, what is it that we (readers, writers, 
our historical consciousness) might learn from life writing the Holocaust?  In what ways 
do Holocaust survivor writers conceive of the work they choose to do of writing and 
remembering? How does this affect what we know of memory, history and writing?  Most 
plainly, how is the writing experienced by survivors? In what ways does their work affect 
our understanding of what it means to be a survivor?  How does it affect the “wrestling” 
Langer describes? 
I approach this study believing that the gift the poem references, is the project 
itself of the "clean white paper waiting under a pen."  The poem asks us to consider that 
the constantly renewed gift, as blank space for writing stretches before us, is a metaphor 
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for what surviving is.  Survival is the possibility of projects, the projecting of oneself into 
a future, as well as the projecting of a changed world into a possible future.  As Levinas 
(1981/1987) writes, "Death is the impossibility of having a project" (p. 74).  In this way, 
project is a moving forward, as survival is a moving forward, as writing is a moving 
forward through a project.  The gift of the "clean white paper" it seems, is the projection 
of a surviving self into a future.  The gift is the possibility of a project.  So, if "The Gift" 
Ciardi describes is this possibility, the gift is one that also may never be totally complete.  
This, too, is no finished miracle; it is instead the possibility of continuation.  The gift is 
rebuilt, is ever re-approached and is renewed through time.  Still, is this projection into the 
future, this "gift" as Ciardi describes it, one that is beyond "history and hurt and heaven"?  
And if so, how do the survivors who write about their memories of the Holocaust 
experience this “gift” of clean white paper waiting under a pen?  Is the "paper" a place to 
record, restate, reinterpret, project, make meaning?  Is it a welcome gift?  In what sense 
does this project, this possibility, exist for survivors both literally (in their writing) and 
metaphorically (in their lives)?  
The Clean White Paper: A Building Site 
In modern building practices, a building would begin on "clean white paper."  The 
drafting tools of my own father and mother are familiar to me; the plastic rulers that help 
translate the scale of a house on paper to the scale of a house on the earth, sit on the big 
drafting table in their office.  In vernacular architecture though, the land, the natural 
features on the land chosen for building would dictate how a house would be sited, 
situated and constructed.  What the builder had seen, and experienced would guide the 
building.  This way of building uses what is available, in the available space, to make a 
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dwelling that will fit the always temporary needs of those who inhabit the structure.  
When the dwellers outgrow the house, a room is added.  If the creek rises, the house is 
moved back from it.  The materials used for a house of this type are what exist within the 
horizon, or what can be made from the land.  This helps to describe my understanding of 
how the clean white paper, in this case the land for building, is a metaphor for what may 
be made of memory, or for what memory might make.  This "gift" is the gift of possibility, 
the project of building a future.  
There is another way that vernacular architecture helps me to understand the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, and that is in the use of raw materials.  The 
materials of a vernacular architecture, as the material for writing, are made or found by the 
builder/writer.  They are intimately known because these materials shape the context as 
well as the horizon of the builder/writer.  The writer, as it is expressed by the survivor 
writers who are the participants of this study, write what they know,  feel compelled to tell 
regarding their personal, situated, perspectival history – living and writing as they do, 
within their own context. 
The Past We Can Know  
Another way that I initially saw life writing the Holocaust as "a gift," was as a gift 
to history.  I believed that first person accounts of the Holocaust would be seen as reliable 
accounts of history as they were primary sources for historians.  My understanding has 
been complicated by descriptions of the ways in which we can know the Holocaust.  
Franklin (2011) describes two prominent views of the Holocaust, one calls the Holocaust 
“knowable” through a “realist” approach, examined through historical methods of the 
Holocaust as another historical event.  The other approach, the “popular approach” she 
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describes as “mystical,” a way of seeing the Holocaust as “not knowable” by any but those 
who survived it (p. 5).  But, the Holocaust seen in either of these opposing aspects makes 
life writing of the Holocaust an impossible task.  In the one conception, a survivor writer 
must represent the facts of the Holocaust separate from the personal narrative and 
subjective meaning making that those events evoke.  In the other, she must try to express 
the “unknowable” in a way that communicates only the personal experience, separate from 
“historical” facts.  Inherent in both conceptions is a troubling notion that the Holocaust 
experience is one experience, understood by those who lived it uniformly, and that every 
understanding of the Holocaust should fall into either the category of historical or 
“mystical” (p. 5).  A knowledge of the Holocaust as either “objective” or “not knowable” 
is addressed through Gadamer’s understanding of history. 
What Gadamer (1976/2006) calls an "objectivist history" seeks to describe an 
objective past that is sought by history in the documents and accounts, archives and 
records of past events.  A “historical” description of an objective past makes for an 
account that describes beings separate from being.  This separation of beings from being 
creates a myth of an objective past as "a place" in history that may somehow be recreated 
accurately through dates and documents, what Franklin (2011) calls a “realist” approach 
(p. 5). 
In Gadamer’s conception, a historical past as all "things," reveals itself as a "thing" 
from and through time, from and through bodies.  Because of this, while historians might 
build a case for an interpretation of history sometimes using first hand accounts, first hand 
accounts, even from survivors and witnesses, are not historically valid on their own 
according to what Heidegger (1962/2008) calls “Historie,” “the science of history,” or 
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“historiological inquiry” (p. 30).  But life writing, which is autobiographical and 
biographical writing in many genres, is certainly historical in Gadamer's sense (Jolly, 
2001) and aligns also with Heidegger’s sense of “Geschicte” or events that “happen in a 
historical way” or “the kinds of ‘history’ that actually happens” (Macquarrie & Robinson, 
2008, p. 30). 
For my work, asking here about the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust, 
the "historical consciousness" of the Holocaust writer is necessary to discern (Gadamer, 
1976/2006). "Historical consciousness" describes our sense of our past, present and future 
interacting to form our perception.  It is this history that is explored individually and 
recursively through memory and through the writing and remembering of the survivor 
writers.  "Historical consciousness" describes our placement within a time, as being 
shaped by time and as shaping time as we move through it.  These survivors, "historical 
beings," describe through life writing the Holocaust, their own "historical consciousness" 
(Gadamer, 1976/2006).  Heidegger (1962/2008) also describes “Geshicte” as a historical 
sense “which ‘historizes’ out of its future on each occasion” (p. 41).  Drawing this 
distinction between historiology and a historical knowing that allows us to better 
understand the future, helps me to know the kinds of questions that may be asked of the 
“historical consciousness” of these survivor writers. 
This understanding of the questions that a “science of history” may ask, and those 
that may be asked through "historical consciousness," provides a way to describe the 
distinction between life writing as one "interpretation" that may add to themes discerned 
by historians and instead consider it "continuation" of experience (Carr, 1986).  Historians 
apply an interpretive lens to historical events, and through gathering of evidence, make an 
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interpretation of the past, seeking themes that help to explain.  But might life writing, 
autobiographical and biographical writing in varied forms, move closer to being a 
description or "continuation" of lived experience and a way to communicate the lived 
experience specifically of the Holocaust which can not be known generally? 
Initially, I saw the interpretation of “historical conscienceness” as a powerful truth 
that was made in story, in O'Brien's (1990) conception a "story truth."  This sense of life 
writing moves it beyond interpretation of lived experience, though it may imply that there 
is a truth that is not a "story truth."  Carr (1986) describes life story, our constantly 
emerging narrative of perceiving, as "continuation" of our knowing, not as interpretation 
of experience.  So while interpretation implies a separation of beings from their knowing, 
"continuation" implies a constant meaning making of experience as lived experience 
emerges constantly, through narrative.  Carr (1986) describes perception as being 
experienced through narrative, and because of this, lived experience might be described as 
a sort of pre-writing for life writing. 
Being On The Doorsill 
Ciardi's poem helps me to begin to articulate the questions I turn to study.  
Through my turning to open the phenomenon, new ways into the phenomenon like 
doorways into a structure, have shown themselves.  On the doorsill here, I begin to 
describe the process of moving in to the phenomenon, the experience of building and 
dwelling.  Like the walls of a house, which help to hold one another in place, the structural 
beams, the guiding themes of this phenomenon, are part and structure of the phenomenon.  
These guiding themes (memory, history, narrative and writing) inform my questioning of 
the phenomenon.  
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Memory, its project and its role in life writing is an important element of the 
phenomenon I turn to study: What is the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust? 
History and the approach of historical beings toward memory is another of the elements 
structuring this phenomenon.  Memory as a narrative process and humans as narrative 
beings are elements describing the structure of the phenomenon.  Writing, and the role it 
plays in memory and history, structure the lived experience of the phenomenon also.  
These components structure and become the structure of the phenomenon.  The questions 
I have surrounding memory, history, writing and narrative call me to the phenomenon of 
life writing the Holocaust.  I turn to this phenomenon through hermeneutic 
phenomenology in order to render the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust and in 
order to see the structure that makes and is made of that work. 
Being In Questioning, Dwelling In 
Hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to describe being, seeks to look closely at the 
nature of experience.  Heidegger (1927/1962) describes being as "the most universal 
concept . . . indefinable . . . (and) self-evident" (pp. 22-23).  And in hermeneutic 
phenomenology the researcher calls to question the nature of lived experience, the 
question of what being is.  Because of our condition of being always in being, we take for 
granted the nature of our experience.  So through questioning, through research, through 
writing we seek to define "that which is closest," our being (p. 36).  In looking into the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, this research seeks to address the ontological 
questions that open what it means to be in the phenomenon. In Heidegger's (1954/1971) 
conception, the researcher's turn to question is part of the nature of "building" and 
"dwelling" in the phenomenon (p. 347). 
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However, before I can describe Heidegger’s understanding of “being,” I have to 
describe the ways in which Heidegger’s philosophy exists within the frame of his actions 
during and after the Holocaust.  For my own work, to describe and open lived-experience 
it is necessary for me to use Heidegger’s philosophy.  Though I have employed 
Heidegger’s philosophy, it is tempered with the ethical lens brought by the philosophy of 
Levinas and by an understanding of the body as medium of experience brought by 
Merleau-Ponty.  Heidegger’s work is not merely impossible to ignore; it has shaped my 
own understanding of what can be known and understood.  To explicate the phenomenon, 
to come to a description of the making of writing by these survivors without describing his 
actions as a member of the Nazi party, calls into question my own understanding of the 
ways in which his philosophy and his actions may be intertwined. 
The Master’s House 
Through all of the ways I have thought and wondered about Heidegger and his 
connection to the Nazi party, I have tried to redeem Heidegger the philosopher as 
extricable from his actions as a Nazi.  Heidegger never publically expressed feelings of 
regret for having been a member of the National Socialist party and faithfully paid his 
dues and assessments right up to the end of the war (Rubenstein, 1991).  I sought to find a 
solution to my own unease in understanding my work as an extension of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology.  I considered referring only to those philosophers who came after or 
furthered Heidegger’s philosophy toward an ethical higher ground, Levinas, for instance.  
In my desire to look beyond Heidegger’s Nazism, I searched his philosophy for the taint 
of anti-Semitism ascribed to his work by some, including Rubenstein (1991) and Farias 
(1989).  
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Through each strategy, I sought to hear that Heidegger, as philosopher, might in 
some way be redeemed from his Nazism, and that his philosophy could be a source for 
this study.  But, the philosopher Karl Löwith, a student of Heidegger's, expressed that 
Heidegger’s connection to National Socialism was an intrinsic expression of his 
philosophy (1993).  
In fact, the answer that I got when asking several participants of this study was 
similar to all those who seek to separate Heidegger the Nazi, from Heidegger the 
philosopher.  A survivor and writer, Gideon, suggested that Heidegger may simply have 
been a “fachidiot” which translates literally as “subject idiot,” meaning a person who is 
without the ability to see or think outside of his or her own field of study (google 
translator, retrieved January 8, 2014).  At first that seemed a way to use Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, separate from him.  Later though, it angered me to think that I might 
somehow remove Heidegger’s Nazi affiliation from his philosophy through arguing that 
the man himself was so single-minded in his pursuit of philosophical understanding that 
he could not be bothered to understand the systematic annihilation of European Jewry.  
What kind of a terrible philosophy would it be, coming, as it would have to, from such a 
“fachidiot?” 
Herbert Marcuse (1991), Heidegger’s student and a philosopher, identified this 
problem when he wrote to Heidegger in 1947: 
A philosopher can be deceived regarding political matters; in which case he will 
openly acknowledge his error.  But he cannot be deceived about a regime that has 
killed millions of Jews – merely because they were Jews – that made terror into 
an everyday phenomenon, and that turned everything that pertains to the ideas of 
spirit, freedom, and truth into its bloody opposite; a regime that in every respect 
imaginable was the deadly caricature of the Western tradition that you yourself so 
forcefully explicated and justified. (p. 29)  
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As Marcuse sees it, there is no redeeming Heidegger the Nazi separate from Heidegger 
the philosopher, the exercise itself runs counter to Heidegger’s own philosophy.  
Heidegger was not so distracted by his thinking that he was unable to acknowledge the 
actions of the National Socialists he aligned himself with.  Even Heidegger the 
philosopher could not be excused for this lapse. 
Marcuse lists many accusations against Heidegger and asks for Heidegger to 
apologize.  Finally, he writes the kind of plea that any who value Heidegger’s philosophy 
would want to write. The plea itself is moving in that in it Marcuse articulates an almost 
naive wish that Heidegger will just say he is sorry.  Marcuse, Heidegger’s student, is not 
alone in his hope that Heidegger will save his legacy by trying to excuse his actions. 
Several of Heidegger’s former students, including Hannah Arendt, exhorted him to 
publically repudiate Nazism (Wolin, 2001).  Heidegger, though, seems to see that even 
that will be pointless, or at the very least beside the point, though he does not seem 
remorseless.  Heidegger responds to Marcuse (1991) by writing, in part: 
You are entirely correct that I failed to provide a public, readily-comprehensible 
counter-declaration.  It would have been the end of both me and my family. On 
this point Jaspers said: that we remain alive is our guilt.  
And 
An avowal after 1945 was, for me, impossible: the Nazi supporters announced 
their change of allegiance in the most loathsome way, I, however had nothing in 
common with them. (p. 30)  
Marcuse, Heidegger’s student, is unable to give up his teacher, the philosopher, and fears 
that his actions will undermine the philosophy Heidegger made.  Marcuse doesn’t just 
want to save the public face of Heidegger.  He needs to see the philosophy that he, along 
with Arendt, Löwith, Jonas, and so very many others, worked both from and against, as 
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existing distinctly from Heidegger’s Nazism.  And Marcuse is right to worry that 
Heidegger the philosopher will forever be attached to his Nazism.  But the philosophy 
itself moves from Heidegger, lives through Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Levin, Gadamer and 
many others I consult in this study. This living philosophy is not encumbered by what 
Heidegger merely thought or did.  It is Heidegger’s philosophy, in its departure from 
everything that had come before it, which stands and lives apart from the actions or even 
the conceiving of by Heidegger, the man or philosopher. 
The Master’s Tools 
The gale that blows through Heidegger’s thinking . . . is not of our century.  It 
comes from the primordial, and what it leaves behind is something perfect which, 
like everything perfect, falls back to the primordial. (Arendt, as cited in Safranski 
1989, p.184)  
As Heidegger (as cited in Safranski 1989) describes the possibility of philosophy 
as “existence’s alert awareness of itself” (p. 124) it is possible to see how scholars after 
Heidegger have expanded on Heidegger’s work, but have not refuted it.  For how could 
Heidegger’s focus on questioning, his call to attend to being, what amounted to a seismic 
shift in philosophical thinking, be reversed or ignored (Safranski, 1998)? What Arendt 
describes of Heidegger’s philosophy is also closely related to the pedagogy that I discuss 
in Chapter Five.  Pedagogy as a process of uncovering our own being as Heidegger’s 
philosophy illustrates, guides this work.  It is in this way, through the questioning, that 
the philosophy remains “primordial.”  Heidegger wrote also that the goal of philosophy 
was to illuminate existence “where it avoids itself” (Safranski, p. 125).  Constant 
questioning of being is the basis for Heidegger’s philosophy, making the philosophy 
itself, which moves out from Heidegger a philosophy of questioning. 
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In calling Heidegger’s philosophy “primordial,” Arendt evokes the dual meaning 
of his philosophy being both ancient and an “original, or fundamental thing; a beginning 
or origin; a first principle” (“primordial,” 2013).  In this case, it is a philosophy that is 
derived as questioning and made in beginning.  This questioning aspect as the heart of 
Heidegger’s philosophy means that dwelling in questioning is not a philosophy, as we 
have known it before Heidegger.  It can only, by the nature of questioning, as Heidegger 
describes it, lead us to more questions, questions that focus us on our being.  Levinas 
wanted, too, to “leave ‘the climate’ of Heidegger’s philosophy for a philosophy that 
would not be pre-Heideggarian” (Bernasconi, 1978, p.16), in that he wanted to begin 
again with the questions that are a part of Heidegger’s philosophy without Heidegger. 
Within this questioning, Heidegger sought to understand the questions 
surrounding our being, as we are in the world, with others, with things, with ourselves.  
Heidegger (1927/1962) describes the type of question that allows us to perceive our being 
more fully as “that which is to be found out by the asking” (p. 25).   He writes, “The 
question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated,” describing how in the asking 
we are already finding (p. 25).  He writes: 
However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already 
available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance 
with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to 
be clarified. (p. 25) 
Heidegger sees our relationship with being as something worth questioning and requiring 
of questioning again and again.  These questions and Heidegger’s view of questioning as 
an opening of being, make the philosophy he created ever open, and in this way beyond 
Heidegger, separable from him.  This means that in asking the questions concerning the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, ontological questions of lived experience, it is 
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Heidegger’s formulation of questioning that guides me.  His questioning is in many ways 
a systematic remembering of being in that it brings being to question, and it is this that 
guides my work as building and re-building.  
Re-Membering Our Dwelling 
For building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling – to build is in 
itself already to dwell. (Heidegger, 1954/1971, p. 348)  
Heidegger's (1954/1971) building is always described by both the verb and the 
noun.  His building is dwelling in how a thing, an idea, was built and how it might be 
built – it is a questioning thinking.  I am attracted to the metaphor of un-ending building, 
tearing down and rebuilding as a way of describing memory, life writing, narrative and 
history because of my sense of my own knowing, as I describe throughout, being 
constantly built, torn down and rebuilt from experience, through perception.  Merleau-
Ponty (1964) describes, "The ideas to which we recur are valid only for a period of our 
lives or for a period in the history of our culture.  Evidence is never apodictic, nor is 
thought timeless" (p. 13).   
This description of thoughts that are mutable and able to be useful, for a time, and 
then torn down when they don't serve any longer and rebuilt into newer, more useful 
forms applies to my own learning, my always emerging description of my own 
understanding and the metaphor I’ve employed of vernacular architecture.  I draw from 
Heidegger (1954/1971) for my own writing and metaphorical choice of building (both 
lived in and lived).  He writes, "All planning remains grounded on this responding, and 
planning in turn opens up to the designer for the precincts suitable for the designs" (p. 
361).  In this way, the call of stories from the Holocaust survivors I work with is a 
gathering of members, the structural supports that I rely on for the dwelling I build, that 
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build my understanding again and again.  So the stories call me and I hear them, or I 
listen and hear the call to wonder what they are; the end is the same.  The call becomes 
"the design" and opens "the precincts" for that design.  Heidegger (1954/1971) writes 
further: 
1. Building is really dwelling.
2. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth.
3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and
the building that erects buildings. (p. 350)
What does this mean for the phenomenon I turn to study?  What does it mean for my 
study of it, when building becomes re-membering? 
Remembering means "To recollect; to think about, reflect on (in some uses 
without the idea of recollection)" ("remember," 2011).  I spend time in Chapter Two 
discussing memory (problematic for a discussion of the Holocaust) and its relationship 
with forgetting, but for now I turn to a less common usage - the related, re-membering 
which means to "put together again, to reverse the dismembering of," or in an obsolete 
usage, "to provide with a new member or load-bearing component" in building ("re-
member," 2011).  This usage allows for the kind of building and rebuilding that memory 
and perception do for and with one another.  It allows for a sense of bringing "members" 
the structural beams that hold up a building to the discussion of how memory structures 
us, as we perceive and create its structure.  This kind of re-membering becomes most 
fully situated in the body, as the opposite of dismembering, tearing a body asunder.  It is 
situated in the body (a group) as in bringing all of a group's members to the conversation. 
It also brings us back to the building, here again as both noun and verb.  Re-membering 
moves toward the future; it is a rebuilding of a stronger structure that houses us all, better 
and more fully.  It is a remaking of the house to fit our changing bodies, our experiences, 
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and as dwelling in is questioning, it is a mindful remaking. My re-membering is the life-
story I build and tear down and re-build as I exist in the constantly moving space between 
past and future.  This place between past and future is also the place where the Holocaust 
is re-membered, held in its constant presencing and re-presencing through memory, 
history and writing.  
Bachelard (1954/1994) describes "the poetics of the house" (p. xxxvi).  His belief 
that "All really inhabited space bears the notion of home" makes this work of describing 
the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, a homecoming, a building and a dwelling.  
The homecoming aspect of this work, for me, comes from the home made at the table 
where the survivors and I meet each month.  In that place, over time, because of our 
relationships with one another, I have been moved to wonder what life writing the 
Holocaust means.  Questions begun in wonder are the nature of dwelling thinking.  And 
in all dwelling there must also be a troubling of the house.  
In the play, “Inherit The Wind” by Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee (1955), 
Proverbs 11 from the King James Bible is quoted: “He that troubleth his own house, shall 
inherit the wind.”  I have thought of that quote often, wondering if a “house” as in a 
structure, a paradigm, that stands “untroubled” is a “house” worth inhabiting, and it has 
informed my use of the metaphor of building and re-building. 
Heidegger's sense of dwelling as building is also an un-building, a troubling and 
tearing down and re-building.  So Heidegger's building and dwelling tears down and re-
builds, troubles the house and dwells.  Dwelling thinking requires this un-building and re-
building.  The wind we “inherit” is the wind of change that brings fresh air to stagnant 
rooms.  As much as the wind may be a storm, the wind is a necessary troubling for 
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learning around a phenomenon.  This building and tearing down and re-building echo 
also the dual meaning of the word "rendering," the root of which means to cut, and "to 
boil down."  In its most common usage it means "to represent something artistically," and 
a rendering in light of all of these definitions becomes a better, more truthful description 
of the phenomenon, a well-built house ("rendering," 2011). 
The Life Writing 
Life writing, too, is a rendering, and requires the troubling of the house, the 
building and demolishing required of all writing and of memory.  The literary term life 
writing has come to describe the large body of writing that encompasses biography and 
autobiography, as well as memoir, testimony, and other work that did not originate in 
written forms, including "artifacts, reminiscence, personal narrative, visual arts, 
photography, film, oral history, and so forth" (Jolly, 2001). 
I choose to use the term life writing because of the fact that the written works of 
the survivor writers I work with at the museum do not fit neatly into more traditional 
generic descriptions, but are described by the term life writing in that they are life stories, 
and come from lived experience.  The writing done by the survivor writers is not only 
autobiographical, but includes biographical writing about the lives of others connected to 
them.  The term life writing encompasses this.  More importantly, Jolly (2001) describes 
life writing in this way: 
But in the postmodern era the story of a life has seemed to demand explanation in 
a new way.  As the individualism unleashed by capitalism cracks and reshapes in 
the fire of globalization and the communications revolution, a literature that 
foregrounds the shape of a single life and its span seems to focus the anxieties of 
the age.  Life writing is now being explored in literary criticism, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, history, theology, cultural studies, and even the biological 
sciences in order to explain an apparent dissolution of life into story.  Just as busy 
is the investigation into our continuing need for stories that confirm or reinvent a 
24 
reference to lived experience.  The academic imagination has been galvanized by 
the challenges this has offered to its own epistemological traditions and by the 
democratizing of knowledge that life writing so charismatically represent. 
(Editor's Note, ¶ 1) 
Life writing is a term that has in it the word play of writing a life, as in crafting 
life, during and from experience.  It may also be read as the sense of life writing itself – 
life itself authoring a text, a crafted plot that unfolds as I, the writer and protagonist, 
move through it.  We understand the term in this dual way.  In it is the description of the 
processes that life, learning and writing share, the constant tearing down and rebuilding, 
the drafting and revision, the ever emerging, constantly changing understandings.  
The other meaning that exists in the term is the sense of what it means to write 
throughout a life, over the span of time.  All of us are composing through memory and 
perception in constant composition, maybe without the production of an actual written 
text.  But through life writing the composition may be drafted and revised into an actual 
text, poem, memoir, biography etc. These differing "texts" exist as both product and 
process and begin in the pre-conceptual place we encounter (in) story.  
In Being 
The place where the deciphering of lived experience begins is at the exact moment 
a being perceives in and through story (Carr, 1986).  In this way, continuation through 
life writing may be the articulation, the revision of lived experience for communication, 
shared understanding.   
In another work of poetry that has helped to guide my turning toward the 
phenomenon, I see the process I've described above through the lines written by Jacob 
Glatstein (1987), a survivor of the Holocaust: 
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I Have Never Been Here Before 
I always thought  
I had been here before. 
Each year of my patched-up life 
I mended the fabrics 
of my decrepit, tattered world. 
In memory I recognized  
faces and smiles, 
even my father and mother reappeared  
as longed-for frescoes of the past. 
I have traveled old and squalid paths, 
maneuvered my sails  
between the shores of history. 
I have continually come across the wonder 
of memory inscribing itself, 
and the agitated past  
quietly welling up in the present. 
I thought  
I had always been here. 
Only these last ragged years - 
shreds of hair- 
inventive deaths- 
are my days and nights. 
My warped destiny  
I have lived to see. 
The frozen reverie, 
burnt fields,  
cartography of cemeteries, 
stony silence, 
emblems of vicious joy - 
I don't recall them. 
I have never seen them before. 
I have never been here before. 
Be still, dead world. 
Be silent, in your ruin. 
Blasted ornaments will bloom again. 
We shall rebuild your foundations 
out of the blood that was spilled. 
And yet the dead will still cry midnight prayers – 
each corpse, a trickling voice. 
Like a tiny candle over each grave,  
a cry will burn,  
each one for itself. 
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"I am I" – 
thousands of slaughtered I's  
will cry in the night: 
"I am dead, unrecognized, 
my blood still unredeemed." 
Such a wealth of gravestones –  
I have never seen them before. 
Day and night I shall mourn the names. 
I have never been here before. 
(Glatstein, 1987, p. 111) 
Glatstein's poem, like Ciardi's previously, expresses the constant presence of the 
Holocaust in the life of survivors.  It expresses the recurring, recursive, healing and 
rending that memory and its crafting through writing causes.  There is nothing complete 
in the survival described here, nothing final, and as in Ciardi's poem, the processes of 
healing, writing, and memory are constant and constantly emerging.  
Glatstein's poem's shifting tense, helps us to see the way that past, present and 
future hold the Holocaust and cause it to be present in ways that can never allow it to 
reach "the shores of history."  This echoes the sentiment of the novelist Pat Barker 
(1999), who upon accepting the Booker Prize for her novel The Ghost Road, describes 
the Holocaust in this way: "It revealed things about mankind that we cannot come to 
terms with and cannot forget.  It can never become the past" (p. 54). 
This constant presencing and re-presencing of the Holocaust occurs in the life 
writing done by Holocaust survivors even now, nearly seven decades after the Holocaust.  
Being engaged in the writing process, another process that in its own way causes the 
writer to "continually come across the wonder/ of memory inscribing itself, /and the 
agitated past/ quietly welling up in the present," is the work of life writing the Holocaust.  
This phenomenon I turn to study questions story, memory, history and writing and how 
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they connect and intersect.  Through hermeneutic phenomenology the questions open a 
way to explore these intersections. 
David Krell (1990) wonders whether "writing is a metaphor for memory or 
memory a metaphor for writing" (p. 4).  This parallel is expressed also in the poem 
through the lines, "I had been here before," "I had always been here," "I have never been 
here before."  Through the twisting tenses of the similar lines a portrait of writing and 
memory are made.  The lines describe a return to the haunting "here" of the poem as 
being impossible.  When he "had" been "here" and had "always been here" there is a tone 
of desperation, of loss, of being lost.  The description here is of memory as a process, of 
writing as a process.  And both are processes that return us almost to our remembered 
sense of the past, in this case, without the speaker wanting to be returned.  
Memory and writing both are the casting back that moves us forward, though the 
speaker in the poem describes a more complicated path.  Each process is experienced 
within the moving frame of a lived life.  Both memory and writing are experienced 
through beings who are ever changed through memory and experience.  So the poem's 
narrator can never escape memory; each remembering brings him to a new "place" where 
this new "he" has never been before.  Both memory and "rememberer" are changed 
through the process. This sense of writing and memoir is at the heart of life writing - 
writing that has as its material lived-experience, as its topic life story (Jolly, 2001).  What 
may be perceived and understood by the writer, through remembering, through crafting 
that remembrance into writing?  What can we understand about the quality of the 
experience of memory and life writing?  In what ways are the texts created understood by 
the readers, by historical beings – by us all? 
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Sistering the Beams: Re-Membering Our Dwelling
Whenever I am very, very cold, when I stand in a frigid wind, possibly without 
gloves, but rarely without a coat, I try to imagine something of the cold described in the 
writing of Holocaust survivors.  I recall Primo Levi (1986) who writes:  
Just as our hunger is not that feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being cold 
has need of a new word. We say “hunger,” we say “tiredness,” “fear,” “pain,” we 
say “winter” and they are different things. They are free words, created and used 
by free men who lived in comfort and suffering in their homes. If the Lagers had 
lasted longer, a new, harsh language would have been born; and only this language 
could express what it means to toil the whole day in the wind, with the temperature 
below freezing, wearing only a shirt, underpants, cloth jacket and trousers and in 
one's body nothing but weakness, hunger and knowledge of the end drawing 
nearer. (p. 123) 
I cannot feel that cold.  I can't even remember the cold I have felt when I am in my warm 
house, even though I could describe it.  And while you read about me being cold, you 
don’t feel it.  I can use words to help you think of cold.  I could even make a metaphor of 
wind that tries to wear me away, sculpt me to bones.  But where we know cold is where 
we feel it.  What we read just reaches out to the part of ourselves that has felt it before, 
our remembrance of cold.  We do not feel it even through the best, most poignant written 
descriptions.  This is the impossibility of language, and Elie Wiesel (1977) says it is the 
impossibility of describing the Holocaust.  He writes, that those "who did not live 
through the event will never know it . . . between our memory and its reflection there 
stands a wall that cannot be pierced" (p. 7).  
While it seems impossible to describe that kind of cold, those experiences, writers 
attempted it even as the Holocaust was happening (Langer, 1995).  I attempt to 
approximate the feeling when I walk in cold wind because of those writers.  The only 
breach possible in the wall that Wiesel describes happens through language; it is the 
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closest we may come.  Any understanding of the Holocaust may happen only through 
story, only with language – the communication of telling, the communion of hearing.  
Levinas (1981/1997) writes this of the "saying" that "Antecedent to the verbal signs it 
conjugates, to the linguistic systems and semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding 
languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one 
for the other, the very signifyingness of signification" (p. 5, italics added).    
 The cold I have felt is not the cold of the Hunger Winter, as the winter of 1942 
was called.  So what does my attempt to imagine it mean? What does it mean that Elie 
Weisel, Primo Levi, Charlotte Delbo and countless other survivor writers attempt to 
describe it, amidst other horrors readers can’t imagine, in their writing?  What do I learn 
when I try to recreate the feelings of others when I am feeling the cold of winter?  
Through this felt sense as I experience intense cold I try often to imagine how I might 
have proceeded had I lived in that time.  I try to imagine how I would have acted if I'd 
lived through the Holocaust.  The exercise is futile and problematic.   
But isn't this desire, on the part of a reader, to hear and feel, the survivors' desire 
to tell and to be understood, the point?  Is "identification" of a reader with a Holocaust 
writer, with all the problems inherent in it, not also a rehearsal of justness (Eaglestone, 
2004)?  Can the life story crafted through life writing by the survivors be a calling out for 
identification, even as we who hear are unable to ever do so completely?  Is our attempt 
to imagine, tied to our intention? Is it a practice that informs our sense of justice? The 
survivors do write about the lives they lived before, during and after the Holocaust.  I 
read and try to see a window to that experience.  Isn't even the "approach" a breach in the 
wall between our experiences, a move closer toward justness? 
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But what if the work made by survivors is not merely a representation or an 
interpretation?  What if we see memory not in "Humean fashion as giving us merely the 
weakened presence of the object" (Carr, 1986, p. 21)?  And what if we consider Jerome 
Bruner's (1993) claim, "There is no such thing as a 'life as lived' to be referred to . . . a 
life is created or constructed by the act of autobiography" (p. 38)? Then our problematic 
"identification" with the life writing, with the experience of a Holocaust survivor 
becomes something more than "identification."  Our identification becomes a movement 
away from a singular object - an I, toward a look at our connectivity - a we.  Isn't this 
action the necessary first step toward justice?  
David Carr (1986) describes narrative as not "representation" of life but 
"continuity" (p. 16).  Barbara Hardy (1987/1968) writes, "Narrative, like lyric or dance, is 
not to be regarded as an aesthetic invention used by artists to control, manipulate or order 
experience, but as a primary act of mind transferred from art to life" (p. 1).  She writes 
further that we encounter narrative "in a pre-aesthetic state in routine acts of human 
consciousness" (p. 1).  This "sistering" of art (here crafting of life story) and life, as 
beams of a house may be "sistered" in order to make them stronger, turns the questions 
about the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust into questions about the communion 
of listening. These questions ask whether hearing this particular gathering of voices 
might move us toward a more just life-world for us all. They interrogate whether 
"identification" might be that which can only "represent" an other, whether it moves too 
far from the experience of resonance - our movement derived from and moving toward an 
other. 
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The Ring of the Hammer: Re-Membering Our Dwelling Through Resonance 
Resonance is a drawing toward intersubjectivity.  It lies in that moment when we 
give what Buytendijk calls "the phenomenological nod" (van Manen, 1997, p. 27).   That 
nod is the physical manifestation of resonance with what we have read or heard.  There is 
no better indication of resonance with an intersubjective truth than the quiet "mm hmm" 
that escapes our throats when we hear or read what we perceive to be an important human 
truth. 
Bachelard (1994) writes of resonance: 
Through the brilliance of an image, the distant past resounds with echoes, and it is 
hard to know at what depth these echoes will reverberate and die away.  Because 
of its novelty and its action, the poetic image has an entity and a dynamism of its 
own; it is referable to a direct ontology. (p. xvi)   
"Resonance" is defined as "intensification and prolongation of sound, especially of 
musical tone, produced by sympathetic vibration" (“resonance”, 2011).  In "sympathetic 
vibration" we move closer to an understanding of another.  This move is a move toward 
justness, as the moving toward another brings us into greater contact with ourselves, our 
own being.  As Steeves (2006) describes it, "If I do not begin with the acknowledgement 
that you and I are equals, there will be no conversation . . . If I assume otherwise, I will 
never hear you" (p. 4).  The move toward communication with another gives us a fuller 
knowledge of our self (our selves). This movement outward is a move toward the world.  
In moving closer toward the world, this is the questioning thought, "the dwelling" 
Heidegger describes.  This questioning thought is the work of life writing.  And then in 
life writing, through the "poetic image" Bachelard describes, there is a prolongation of 
the sound, the vibration. Through the poetic image there is continuous movement, 
continuing.  In this way resonance is intersubjectivity through a written work.  This 
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circling of call and response and response and call is intersubjectivity.  Intersubjectivity 
happens in real dialogue with another.  As Steeves describes it, "Ideas can arise in 
conversation that are neither yours nor mine, but rather are ours. . . the result is always an 
intersubjective, aesthetic joint accomplishment" (p. 4).  
When this dialogue occurs through the life writing of a Holocaust survivor, what 
is the continuous movement?  I believe resonance and a sharing for intersubjectivity are 
the reasons writers write, but what vibration moves out from the life writing of Holocaust 
survivors?  It is the questioning aspect that begins in learning about our self from another, 
moving in vibration toward that other, toward intersubjectivity.      
The poem that follows is one that describes my own experience of resonance 
upon hearing poetry read by Lucille Clifton.      
Lucille Means Light 
Your storied voice lives in the room 
where I heard you first,  
when I was young. 
My bare feet swung over parquet floors 
white mullioned doors, propped open  
the light, your voice 
spilling out, 
pouring into the grass, the river below 
bio-luminescence aswim, awash in the liquid churning of your voice 
glass winged mosquitoes in swarm, the silvered fish as one reflex, one flash 
the shining throat of every tree frog pulsed 
along with you.  The starred night throbbed in time,  
each strummed chord in me 
hummed with possible poetry. 
What occured to me through the writing and re-writing of this poem is the strongest 
memory I have of Lucille Clifton, who was my teacher at St. Mary's College of 
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Maryland: her beautiful and powerful voice.  I imagine it as light and vibration through 
nature on the rural campus where I heard her read for the first time.  It is also a reference 
to The Book of Light (1993), a collection of her poems.  The sound of her voice, the 
vibration of it, its timbre as it embodied the poems she had written, made me want to 
write and read my own poetry.  Her poetry made me want to be like her - moved me 
closer to myself and simultaneously closer to the world.  In my memory, it moved me 
closer to the natural world of the insects and fish, the tree frogs that vibrate the night in 
the swampy Maryland summers I grew up in, and closer to a questioning aspect, closer to 
wonder.  This is an example of intersubjectivity caused by resonance.  
  I understand intersubjectivity to mean the movement toward an other as an 
understanding of the shared life-world, and I understand that as Carr (1986) points out, 
intersubjectivity is not only for shared work, but is a part of all conflict, where concepts 
of shared senses of meanings are hammered out – sometimes violently.  Still, I see 
intersubjectivity that comes from true resonance as more of a move toward shared 
understanding, a dis-othering of others, a move again not merely toward intersubjectivity 
but toward justice, by way of resonance.  Steeves (2006) describes it in this way: 
This is the path to truth, reason, logos as the Greeks understood it - logos that is 
fundamentally communal; reason that is intersubjective, a project of making 
rounds to various perspectives in the community to see what the world looks like 
from there and then attempting to forge a description that does justice to them all; 
truth that calls art its handmaiden. (pp. 99-100, italics added)   
So intersubjectivity that can move toward justness is not possible first without the 
acknowledgement of another.  We can think of this as conceiving of an audience, making 
art, which always seeks communication.  Without the voice of the other, which often 
happens through “truth that calls art its handmaiden,” there can be no experience of 
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resonance, no vibration from one toward another, and no vibration from one toward the 
world.  
  Further, intersubjectivity is informed by the past I’ve come through, as well as 
my sense of the future I am moving toward.   We are told about the time before we are 
born by those who lived through it.  They tell of those times as they move through the 
times in which we live, as well.  We experience time as a conversation between past and 
future.  This conversation is made through the voices of others - voices from literature, 
from history, seemingly quiet voices of culture and voices heard explicitly through shared 
life story and through life writing.  The processes of memory, life story, and life writing 
are recursive, constantly building and rebuilt.  
In this way, memory and remembering are not simply casting back to a past time. 
The self that does the search looks back through all of the intervening years, with the 
eyes of the person who has lived through each year.  The life writer writes of the past 
with the experience of one who has seen it unfolding and as one who must clarify that 
past, its unfolding and what it all may mean these many years later. Thomas Larson 
(2009) writes, "It’s as if we never quite live in the house of the self because we’re 
constantly building it" (p. 3).  The story of a lived life is told and understood through 
many, many rememberings. 
Bachelard (1994) describes it in this way: “Our childhood memory contains only 
worn coins. It is on the plane of the daydream and not that of facts that childhood remains 
alive and poetically useful within us” (p. 43).  Bachelard's sense of "poetic usefulness" is 
one that when applied to life writing helps to define it as a place of meaning-making for 
oneself first.  In this meaning making, life writing and memory help construct a past that 
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is necessary to the constant making and remaking of the current moment.  This current 
moment is constructed from our perception and through our understanding of our self 
(selves) through past events.  The current moment informs this newly reconstructed self 
as we travel with each passing second into a newly forming future - within the world and 
with others.  
Larson (2009), writes, "Remember may mean to be mindful of the past and to put 
the parts of a past circumstance together through repetitious recall— that ever-recurring 
now in which we brood over past events again and again" (p. 3).  This constructing and 
reconstructing of a self, always within a new time, a changed place and in an ever-
changing body, may even mirror the process that occurs in our brains as well. 
Stanislawski (2004) writes, “In general, neuroscientists now argue, autobiographical 
memory works by extracting the meaning of what we encounter, not by retaining and 
then accessing a literal record of it” (p. 17).  So, if we refute the idea of an "objective 
past," then we must also reject memory as a literal record, and in this way, see memory as 
recollection/perception, another of our meaning making processes.  
This interplay between a mythical literal record and intersubjective truths made 
from experiences, may be an important part of how we can begin to open the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  If life writing acts as both a continuation of a 
life lived and as the place where that continuation can be interpreted, intersubjectivity 
may move onto the page through "the poetic image" that calls out for resonance.  If life 
writing acts as a place where the actions and events that shaped that life are able to be 
examined by both writer and reader, and in some cases by generations of readers that 
come after, then resonance calls out for intersubjectivity.  
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But does the fact of a written text stop the process of conversation necessary for 
intersubjectivity?  Does it as Steeves (2006) describes it, put "too much me in the we" (p. 
4)?  Or is it the opposite as Barthes (1977) describes?  Barthes' sense is an effectual 
transformation of the I that writes for resonance with an other.  He writes, that the "I 
which writes the text . . . is never more than a paper-I" (p. 161).  Isn't it possible though 
that true conversation can happen as readers read and revive the writer through reading, 
even a "paper-I"?  Isn't it also possible that the deciphering done by the writer, the 
meaning made by description of a self does not become one sided, that it might remain 
intersubjective?  If life writing is the making of a life story, structuring, for a purpose, a 
lived life's events, if it is a meaning making process, then meaning remains an 
intersubjective meaning in reading.  If we see life writing as a lived life, perceived in 
narrative, isn't it possible that the narrative itself is intersubjective, as well as our 
understanding of it?  If we can see life writing as a meaning making tool for better 
understanding the random events of a life lived, in order to communicate them to others, 
might we not also see life writing as moving reader and writer toward intersubjective 
knowing? 
Questioning another's experience is the position of dwelling thinking; it is the root 
of research and it allows us to be open to resonance.  To return to resonance for a 
moment, the children's author William Steig describes his work, in his acceptance speech 
for the Caldecott medal in 1970, in this way: 
Art, including juvenile literature, has the power to make any spot on earth the 
living center of the universe, and unlike science, which often gives us the illusion 
of understanding things we really do not understand, it helps us to know life in a 
way that still keeps before us the mystery of things.  It enhances the sense of 
wonder.  And wonder  is respect for life.  Art also stimulates the adventurousness 
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and the playfulness that keeps us moving in a lively way and that lead us to useful 
discovery. (Usher, 2010, ¶ 5)  
Research into the world and questions about another, which Steig says is "respect 
for life" is the aspect that most causes an openness for resonance.  Resonance, the 
movement out from our self that brings us closer to others and toward intersubjectivity, 
toward an understanding of the world, fosters justness.  Steeves (2006) describes it this 
way: 
Objectivity is not to be distinguished from subjectivity, but is derived from it.  
Objective truth is a matter of making the rounds in the community, coming to see 
the public world as clearly as possible from the perspective of each Other, and 
doing one's best to forge a perspective that does justice to the whole.  The notion 
of the generality is built in to the notion of the individual.  Intersubjective truth is 
the meaning of objective truth.  And the world is one that is shared by many 
creatures, each with a point of view that needs to be  considered when making the 
rounds. (p. 7) 
Is life writing, then, a communicated understanding of a self and a calling out for 
recognition to others?  Do survivors life writing the Holocaust write for/from resonance?  
Is life writing one mode of asking for reception, with the goal of greater justness in any 
who respond?  These questions are ontological and wonder about the nature of life 
writing.  They seek to understand more fully the lived experience of the survivor writers, 
and in that way, seek to understand the living world we inhabit together. 
Constructing the Self: From Life Story and Lived Experience to Life Writing 
Autobiography(’s) real subject is, or should be, the development of the inner and 
outer self, and attending properly to that task can only plunge the author into the 
abyss of self. The successful memoirist is the one who explores self in ways in 
which others can see perhaps a glimmer of their own selves. (Yardley, 2004, ¶ 7) 
The construction of a self is the subject matter of the life writer. That self is 
always also a reflection, analysis or representation of the historical, psychological or 
religious world in which the author herself writes, and in the case of a Holocaust survivor 
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writer, that world in which the Holocaust is ever present.  Bruner (2001) describes how 
"Eventually the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-
telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organise 
memory, to segment and purpose-build the very ‘events’ of a life” (¶ 4).  
Life writing, as a creation of a self, acts as a unifying convention running through 
St. Augustine's confessions to current works.  Augustine's "identity" was formed and 
questioned through his relationship with God, and each vignette he included is for 
explicating that relationship (1960).  Josephus, a Roman Jew who predates Augustine's 
writing by 300 years, is taken to task by Stanislawski (2004) for what he calls "overt and 
covert autobiographical details and agendas" (p. 18).  These "agendas" include Josephus' 
consideration of his contemporary Roman audience in the drafting and redrafting of his 
autobiography.  Stanislawski (2004) rails against the form: 
What the novelist and literary scholar A.S. Byatt has aptly termed 'that most 
evasive and self-indulgent of forms' – is to attempt to unravel the conscious from 
the unconscious distortions in these texts, to regard autobiographies as artifacts of 
individuals’ quests, tempered by the constraints of our all-too-human embodiment, 
to make sense of their lives first and foremost for themselves and then, if possible, 
for their readers. (p. 17) 
While the problem he describes of teasing the "actual" from the "perceived" may be 
problematic, according to his own commitments, his description goes to the heart of the 
rhetorical purpose of life writing and helps to define it further as a collection of genres 
focusing on the writer's making meaning for self in the world.  What he describes as “all-
too-human” seems to hope for something other than a human way to describe human 
experience. 
Zinsser (1998) describes memory in life writing this way, "Memoir is the best 
search mechanism that writers are given.  Memoir is how we try to make sense of who 
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we are, who we once were, and what values and heritage shaped us" (p. 6).  Life writing 
becomes a text for searching, a canvas for making new knowledge in a clearly situated 
and perspectival way.  The writer is of and in a time, a place, living in a body and living 
in shared relationships with others who are also shaped by time, place and embodiment.  
These contextual truths are personal truths tied closely to the lived-world in which she 
writes and lives, a call for resonance, a move toward intersubjectivity.  
The description of life writing as a place where a writer may begin to survey and 
come to understand her own lived life through writing is clearly articulated by Nancy 
Miller (2008): 
I could write down what I remembered; or I could craft a memoir.  One might be 
the truth; the other, a good story . . . When I sit down to reconstruct my past, I call 
on memory, but when memory fails, I let language lead . . . As a writer, the answer 
to the question, what 'really' happened is literary – or at least textual.  I will know 
it when I write it.  When I write it, the truth will be in the writing.  But the writing 
may not be the truth; it may only look like it.  To me.  (p. 44) 
Miller's description casts life writing as personal and self-referential - as a meaning-
making act for the writer because the written work made is one of the author's own life, 
imbued with elements of storytelling, as we perceive life story as narrative, and so it 
remains in the crafting.  Her description, in which she eschews an "objective" truth, is 
one that describes life writing as continuation of meaning making and not simply as 
interpretation of memory.  This suggests that life writing works at interrogating, 
continuing a meaning making self in the world for the survivor writers of The Memory 
Project.  Life writing seeks to place "the self" within the context of a larger world.  
Miller (2008), referring to autobiography, writes that it, like life, exists "in human 
solidarity, all of us 'inextricably bound up with one another' so too . . . does the genre" (p. 
42).  Life writing's purpose is struggling to describe a being in the world, which employs 
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the necessary tools of literary device and narrative structure to communicate that being, 
to make that being resonate with readers (Jolly, 2001).  It employs life story and lived 
experience and memory of lived experience as material for writing.  It seeks to describe 
memory through communicable themes, and as it exists, in story.  The work of life 
writing the Holocaust is in some sense, the work of translating the past into the future, a 
self to others.    
Life Writing, The Structure of Memory and Being in the World 
Life writing is a meaning making process, an exploration of being in the world 
and comes from and through the writer's attempt to describe memory.  Here metaphorical 
language is used to describe events of the past, and writing always a construing act, 
becomes a way of continuing the life story of perception, re-membering it.  Carr (1986) 
writes of consciousness as a construing act as well, "The life of consciousness is 
composed" (p. 27).  This composition begins before text is written, but constantly 
informs the drafting of a self through memory.  Stanislawski (2004) suggests that 
"Retrieval of memory is thus much like perception; it is a constructive process and 
therefore subject to distortion, much as perception is subject to illusion" (p. 16).  But 
while Stanislawski (2004) sees this process of memory retrieval as an obstacle to 
achieving an "objective past," wishing for more exact instruments, Steeves (2006) sees 
this sense-making process as the best way to come to intersubjective truth.  What 
Stanislawski (2004) terms "self-fashioning" in written memoir is inseparable from 
Steeves' (2006) notion of intersubjectivity, and from Carr's description of how we learn 
and know through the life-story of our self and others.   Stanislawski (2004) writes: 
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Memories are unstable and transient, effected or transformed by beliefs and 
emotions, and hence by the contexts and cues that evoke these memories even 
before they are articulated in words and then in writing. (p. 23) 
These "contexts" and "cues" are as much a part of the nature of seeing ourselves 
through memory and showing ourselves through writing as they are the specific lived 
time and place in which we write, recall and reconstruct our story.  Steeves (2006) writes 
that through navigating these "contexts" and "cues" or as he calls it, "making the rounds," 
we are building intersubjective truth.  The "contexts" are the landscapes in which we live 
– the lived time, lived space, lived body and lived relationships of our lives (van Manen,
1997).  The "cues," are the ways in which we come to understand these experiences- the 
ways we make sense of ourselves in the world.  
Casey (2009) points out that "narration" stays true to its origin in "gnarus," 
meaning "to know," and life writing that seeks the resonance of a reader makes narration 
a mode of learning intersubjectively.  This process moves us toward better, and clearer, 
communication of one to another.  In that writing, we learn to understand our self through 
communicating our self to the world; and in that communication we move closer to the 
world, and simultaneously closer to our self.   
The following reflection by Geva (2008) describes how writing gave her a process 
and a place to reflect on her past and how she comes to make meaning from and through 
it. 
Sorrow Follows Laughter 
Whenever my children were having a good time, laughing their heads off, 
not responding even to my warnings to stop, I used to tell them, 'You will see 
that in  the end there will be tears!'  After a while they stopped laughing, but when 
they were older they wondered why - why should they stop? 
Even my grandchildren would ask me,  'Where does this idea come from?' 
I really could not remember why I had gotten so carried away telling them to stop 
42 
laughing.  It scared me to hear wild, uncontrolled laughter.  It was a bad omen for 
me, but I could not explain it.  All I knew was that I myself could not laugh 
anymore as I used to do when I was younger. 
During one of the Museum's writing workshops I was asked to write about 
any event that happened before the war and my thoughts drifted to a day in March 
1944 when I had some friends over to study for upcoming exams.  When we were 
done, we sat around and relaxed, talking, joking and laughing as only young girls 
do.  We were already starting to get out of control when one of the girls, Marian, 
lifted her pinky and repeatedly said, 'little finger, pinky!'  We laughed so hard.  
We begged her to stop, but when she kept quiet and just lifted her pinky it made 
us roll on the floor in hysterical laughter.  We were so happy, so carefree.  We 
loved our life, we loved each other, and we loved our studies.  We were making 
our plans for the summer and discussing where to spend our vacation . . .  
Three months later the entire Jewish population of my hometown of 
Miskole, Hungary was deported to Auschwitz.  All of my girlfriends who I had 
laughed with that day were killed.   
When I thought about that laughter-filled day in the writing workshop, it 
suddenly dawned on me why I could never really laugh since then, why I had told 
my children to stop laughing, why I had thought that sorrow follows laughter. 
It took more than 64 years for me to remember that beautiful day in my 
room with friends, to remember being overwhelmed with youthful carefree 
laughter. 
Now I understand the profound impact the Holocaust has had on me, and 
my family.  Now I understand why I repeatedly warned my children, 'Do not 
laugh so hard. You will see that in the end there will be tears.' (Geva, 2008, pp. 
11-12) 
This reflection informs the writer's sense through time, of herself as a young girl, as a 
mother and as a grandmother.  In this recollection is her children's response to their 
mother's warning, as well.  Further, the final sense we are left with as readers is that Geva 
has not lost her belief that "in the end there will be tears." Her present and future include 
the Holocaust as surely as her past.  Knowing the root of her belief that "sorrow follows 
laughter" does not cause her to change the warning she gives to her family, in fact she 
concludes this piece of writing by repeating this warning.  More importantly, what she is 
able to remember through the writing is the wonderful memory of her friends, though it is 
deeply overshadowed by the murder of these young girls in Auschwitz.  It is their 
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happiness she says it took her "more than 64 years to remember" while their loss has not 
been forgotten for a moment.  
Geva’s piece helps us to understand that the Holocaust is not finished and is not 
living merely as memory for survivors.  The echoes of the Holocaust she describes 
reverberate and ring out like sound in all directions and are not the static memory of a 
static past uncovered.  What is told and recalled is also not static.  It helps to project 
memory into a future and is ever building the project of memory. 
In the Building: Joinery 
When I was offered the job of leading the writing workshop for Holocaust 
Survivors at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I worried that because I was 
younger than the participants they might feel I was not qualified to teach them.  I was 
worried that the survivors would be right in thinking that and I would indeed have 
nothing to teach them.  I suspected, too, that writing could not be taught.  I worried also 
that I couldn't offer advice or give constructive feedback for the writing they would do - 
it seemed impossible then to comment on writing that came from personal experience of 
the Holocaust; what would I say about it?  I felt unequal to the responsibility of being 
witness to personal, individual testimony. I admit all of these fears now because of my 
belief that our understanding is always built, and torn down and rebuilt through 
experience.  The story of my turning toward the phenomenon happens through the way in 
which my understandings have changed during my time working with survivors, working 
with their writing. 
My fears became over time, questions for study.  They are the questions that lead 
me to inquire of these workshop writers about the meaning of life writing the Holocaust.  
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Each of these fears and the outcomes of these imagined expectations have led me to 
wonder about the "presences" of the group.  What and how do the qualities of the group, 
the setting etc. affect the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust?   Merleau-Ponty 
(1955/1964) writes, "Perception does not give me truths like geometry but presences" (p. 
14). 
These "presences" exist in each of the questions I ask about the lived experience 
of life writing the Holocaust.  What is the presence of our group? What is the presence of 
story and memory for the writers?  What is there that is perceived and known before 
understanding and before the "intellectual act" of "deciphering" Merleau-Ponty 
(1955/1964)  describes (p. 15)?  What are the "presences" of history and narrative, story 
and memory for these writers? Finally, Merleau-Ponty describes how our perception is 
"pregnant with its form" (p. 15).  If that form and our perception do not take the form of 
narrative, but instead, in our pre-conception we experience the world as story, then do we 
work both from and more fully toward experience in life writing (Carr, 1986)?  
Merleau-Ponty (1955/1964) writes, "We observe at once that it is impossible, as 
has often been said, to decompose a perception, to make it into a collection of sensations, 
because in it the whole is prior to the parts" (p. 15).  But the relationship between whole 
and parts is ever drafted, emerging and evolving.  As memory is ever drafted, life writing 
is the re-presencing of parts (events, memory of past experiences) to make a whole that is 
constantly emerging and continuing.  Merleau-Ponty writes, "But in perception it is 
‘real’; it is given as the infinite sum of an indefinite series of perspectival views in each 
of which the object is given but in none of which is it given exhaustively" (p. 15).  This 
sense that relationship of the object and subject (a body that takes a "point of view") must 
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be understood as the "real" as the always growing fullness that describes lived-
experience, is a way of describing knowing that does not strip the "meaning" from the 
"sign" or the "form" from the "matter of perception" (p. 15).  This also helps to conceive 
of a way of describing the "setting" of our group and the work we do there as ever 
changing, comprised by its present, past and future.  The "setting" of our group itself is 
ever emerging, comprised of the places we meet and have met, current and past members, 
our evolving purposes etc.  So the ever drafted, constantly revised and rebuilt sense of the 
phenomenon that emerges through each passing moment is meaning making that is, of 
course, never complete. 
The conference table where The Memory Project meets is the place where our 
setting is centered, though this is not the only setting for our group. Writers complete 
their work both in their perceptions, through their thoughts and on paper, or on computer 
screens.  Life writing is made in places both actual and imagined, described and 
unuttered.  They work in places of this time and in past places.  Their work happens in 
train cars, in fields, rivers, barns, lumber yards, at other tables, in barracks, in the Palace 
at Versailles, in city streets and in all the places and times in between and in in-between 
places.  It is only through the ontological questions around "historical consciousness" that 
help to comprise "lived time," that we can describe the multiple and changing place of 
our group (Gadamer, 1975/2006). 
We gather at the table also to eat lunch together.  And while we eat the food 
brought to us by the museum's cafe, the food of our group is from multiple childhoods 
through time or from yesterday's breakfast.  The food of our group is egg salad, or 
chulant and latkes, eggs, and often it is a small bit of bread, never enough soup.  This is 
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the experience of the lived-body that intersects as all bodies do, with lived-time, lived 
place and the relationships as we live them. Time has changed our group, changes it each 
month and will continue to change it.  Some participants have been attending these 
meetings since their beginning in 2001. Some have joined us at different points over time. 
Five members have died and more have come and gone from the group.  
I began working with this group as a newly engaged, high school teacher and 
have become, since knowing the survivors, a wife, a mother of a son, a mother of a 
daughter, a stay-at-home mother and adjunct instructor, a graduate student and teacher.  
All of these shifts in time, space, body and relationship also change the phenomenon, the 
group, the writing and the meeting of us all there.  
For the lived-experience of life writing the Holocaust, Merleau-Ponty's (1964) 
description of "perception" being "pregnant with its form" means that the point of view, 
the perception of history from nearly seven decades later is not a distortion (p. 15).  
Memory is not a shade of the "objective past," but instead is one setting of the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.   This setting that Merleau-Ponty calls the 
"entourage" must be carefully considered and described; the lived-time, lived-space, 
lived-body and lived-relationship of each writer and of the group itself, is necessary to 
the understanding of the phenomenon.  So writing, the group, history, memory, story are 
not separable from the phenomenon, but become part of its fullness (van Manen, 1997). 
 The group's function is for writing and for the writing, but writing is both from 
and of the group as it is from and of the individuals who make up the group. The group is 
made at once from each individual and exists as a whole, reconstituted each time by time, 
by bodies, by space.  There, I teach and learn, learn and teach from and with each 
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participant, from the writing, from writing itself - the act of it, the product I make and the 
product made by others.  These parts and wholes build one another and are built and it is 
this building as both noun and verb to which I turn.  Merleau-Ponty (1964) writes: 
The classical analysis of perception reduces all our experience to the single level 
of what, for good reasons is judged to be true.  But when, on the contrary, I 
consider the whole setting [l'entourage] of my perception, it reveals another 
modality which is neither the  ideal and necessary being of geometry nor the 
simple sensory event, the "percipi" and this is precisely what remains to be 
studied now. (p. 14) 
I turn to study this phenomenon because of my experience with this group.  The impetus 
of this research, as I’ve described, is the experience of being in the room with the 
survivors, knowing each writer, hearing his or her story.  Those feelings lead me to 
wonder further about the experience of life writing the Holocaust.  My desire to know 
more about life writing as a mode of important learning, my interest in writing from and 
about personal history, is built from and of the experience of working with the writers of 
The Memory Project.  
Inhabiting the Questions: Being in the Building 
Why does research take form as a question? How is it that the 'what?' already 
steeped in being so as to open it up the more, becomes a demand and a prayer? 
(Levinas, 1981/1997,  p. 24) 
I traveled to the museum anxiously that first day, feeling uncomfortable and 
nervous in dressy clothes, and now nearly every month since then, I have traveled to the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to meet with The Memory Project writers.  I 
feel transported during my time at the conference table by the stories recounted by the 
survivors.  I might be transported though to times before the war, where families are 
remembered with love and affection, or I might be transported to what Emil Fackenheim 
(1979) describes as "Planet Auschwitz."  Each recollection is colored by and related to 
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each.  The families described with love are, those same ones murdered in the death 
camps.  
This realization makes every account of life before the war, every party, every trip 
to school, a story of foreboding.  I, and all readers of these stories, know what is coming, 
while the people of the story do not.  Every story is tense with this dramatic irony.  Every 
birthday party, or Sabbath dinner recollected, personalizes the Holocaust, protracts the 
scope to a human level – the six million become that person's brother, this person's 
cousin.  The Holocaust heard in this way becomes both more and less comprehensible.  
The collective history becomes personal and the trauma gets closer, more immediate, and 
in that immediacy, more horrible – more difficult to comprehend.   
There are times when the personal stories of the Holocaust I read and hear, are, in 
individual cases, redemptive.  There is the family who saved Marcel and his family, the 
several Belgian families who hid Harry.  I return to think of these stories as a sort of 
antidote, but does hearing the Holocaust told by those who survived it change my 
understanding?  Primo Levi (1986) writes, "Every survivor is an exception" (p. 27) and I, 
hearing the Holocaust told and read to me by the survivors, know it through these 
exceptions.  
Much of what I know of the Holocaust comes through the "exceptions" who share 
the table with me.  This entire study is based on the work made by those who survived.  
Through the stories I read I often can't help but focus on the survival itself.  There are 
times when I wonder what quality caused these people to survive.  What force allowed 
for survival? I wonder, too, what causes these survivors to write their stories of survival.  
What questions are asked (or possibly answered) through life writing the Holocaust?  
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How does the writing affect their sense of themselves, as survivors, as writers and as 
people? And what does it mean for us all? 
Re-Membering: A Narrative Structure  
Emmanuel Levinas (1981/1997) writes, "Thanks to God, I am another for the 
others" (p. 158).  "The passing of God, of whom I can speak only by reference to this aid 
or this grace" (the responsibility of justice from and to the other) "is precisely the 
reverting of the incomparable subject into a member of society" (p. 158).  Many of the 
written pieces about life after the Holocaust describe the sense of "becoming" a "member 
of society" again, of seeking belonging.  Warsinger (2008) writes in her piece entitled 
"Belonging," about an encounter that changed her sense of herself as an outsider: 
For me, that instant was a major turning point in how I felt about myself.   
Even though I had been a citizen of the United States for some time, I wondered 
how a child who had been in the Holocaust could come face-to-face with the 
President of the United States.  There must have been some order and perfection 
in the world after all.  The incident took only a moment.  The guard asked me to 
please wait for the elevator to return, but before the doors closed President 
Truman wished me good luck with my baby. 
I knew then that my child and my future children, my husband, and I would be 
safe and live in a society where we belonged. (p. 41)     
I wonder, though, if Levinas means that the Holocaust itself is "the incomparable 
subject"?  Is "this grace" the intersubjective communication that brings a survivor into the 
conversation in the first place?  Is Warsinger's communication of her own sense of safety 
and approval, her sense of herself as an American, part of her ability to add her voice, to 
move toward intersubjectivity?  These questions and the others I have asked previously 
guide my turning toward the phenomenon, help to render the lived experience of life 
writing the Holocaust.  They seem to me as though they must be asked in the same way 
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that each question helps to move this rendering of the phenomenon toward the action van 
Manen (1997) says is at the heart of researching lived experience. 
If the Holocaust changed victims' and survivors' sense of themselves, it also 
irrevocably changed our sense of the world, and possibly of narrative as well.  While 
there can be no redemption of the Holocaust, writing, memory, narrative and history 
change our understanding of the events continually.  Langer (1995) writes, "We are 
forced to surrender the comforting notion that suffering has meaning – that it strengthens, 
ennobles or redeems the human soul" (p. 5).  But these are the stories of survivors; their 
survival doesn’t mean that suffering has meaning, only that the Holocaust must also be 
understood as encompassing their stories of survival as well. 
 The writing of survivors now, sixty-seven years after the Holocaust, projects these 
writers into a future.  Their writing is not meant to try to redeem the events of the 
Holocaust, but the life-story of these survivors has become one where continuation is 
present, where regeneration, of a kind, occurs.  I believe it doesn't dismiss the enormity of 
the Holocaust's horror or approach the "dubious feat of wresting meaning from the 
murder of 5 to 6 million innocent men, women and children" to see, on this personal 
level, a kind of reclamation for these writers (Langer, 1995, p. 7).  Langer (1995) writes: 
Just as the Holocaust experience crushed the structures of self that usually favored 
survival, forcing victims to find new means for staying alive, so its literature 
sabotages the reader's hopes for a durable affirmation lurking in the dusk of 
atrocity.  Reading and writing about the Holocaust is an experience of unlearning; 
both parties are forced into the Dantean gesture of abandoning all safe props as 
they enter and, without benefit of Virgil, make their uneasy way through its vague 
domain. (pp. 6-7) 
So in turning to study the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust I also make my 
"uneasy way." Still, I focus through these questions about what it means for the survivors 
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to be writing, to continue to experience the events of the Holocaust.  The questions 
around the phenomenon though, move us all toward new understandings of the 
Holocaust, as survivor writers create work that helps us to question further the bounds of 
narrative and writing, memory and history. 
The House Built by Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
The questions I ask about the phenomenon of life-writing the Holocaust are 
phenomenological questions.  They come from (and through) the overarching question 
that guides my study, what is the lived-experience of life writing the Holocaust?  This 
question seeks to dis-cover and explore the experience of the writers, of our group and of 
the life-world in which they write.  It is not a question though that will yield an absolute 
answer.  The questions themselves are important for that fact, and for the implication that 
what I open does not purport to be an answer for all time, for all people or for all places.  
This rendering of the lived-experience of life writing the Holocaust is a rendering, 
through phenomenological habits, that seeks to move beyond a simple naming, 
correlating, or categorizing the experience of the survivor writers.  This work, these 
questions require inquiring of the writers' being in the world.  The phenomenological 
habits van Manen (1997) describes are: 
1. turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commits us to the
world;
2. investigating experience as we live it rather than as we conceptualize it;
3. reflecting on the essential themes which characterize the phenomenon;
4. describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting;
5. maintaining a strong and orientated pedagogical relation to the phenomenon;
6. balancing the research context by considering parts and whole. (pp. 30-31)
These habits help us to see a way in which to make philosophy manifest, to do research 
through the questions of hermeneutic phenomenology in order to help inform a greater 
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sense of being-in-the-world.    
The Doorway Itself: Further in to the Building 
More fully exploring the existentials of our group is part of the work I do in 
Chapter Two.  There I describe further the fundamental themes of history, writing, 
narrative and memory.  Through each of these themes I explore each counterpoint as 
well.  I look at memory's correlate, forgetting.  I examine the relations of writing to 
silence.  I look further into Gadamer's sense of history, and ways that the past may be 
constituted or conceived.  I also look further at the ways in which life writing the 
Holocaust challenges what we know of narrative.  
In Chapter Three I trace the particular hermeneutic phenomenology that guides 
this work – how life story informs themes of resonance, intersubjectivity and justness, 
and how these themes are described through the philosophies of Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Merlaeau-Ponty and Levinas.  I show how these concepts come to be understood, 
particularly as they relate to the Holocaust, in the philosophies of David Carr. 
In Chapter Four, I decipher my conversations with Holocaust survivor writers and 
explore themes around the integral relationship between audience and purpose for these 
writers.  I also explore in Chapter Four the intersections of these writers’ work with the 
work of historians of the Holocaust, among the multiple ways these writers are in 
conversation with history.  In Chapter Four, I consider writing as it is described by the 
survivor writers as an “expanding” and continual process for learning and knowing led by 
their own questioning. 
In Chapter Five, I explore the pedagogical implications for writing as a 
deciphering tool, for viewing memory and writing as meaning making processes and for 
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what it means to remain in questioning, to be engaged in process.  I explore what a 
pedogogy of questions may add to our understanding of writing, memory and history. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
ASSEMBLING THE STRUCTURE: A FRAMEWORK OF MEMBERS 
The Vernacular Architecture of Memory, Narrative, History and Writing 
 War 
 The same ashes will cover all of us: 
 The tulip - a wax candle flickering in the wind, 
The swallow on its flight, sick of too many clouds, 
The child who throws his ball into eternity -  
And only one will remain, a poet - 
A mad Shakespeare, who will sing a song, where might and wit is: 
- My spirit Ariel, bring here the new fate, 
And spit back the dead cities!  
(Sutzkever, 1991, p. 115) 
Perhaps because the disaster is so great there is nothing to be gained by 
expressing in words everything that we feel.  Only if we are capable of tearing out 
by force of our pent-up anguish the greatest of all mountains, a Mount Everest, 
and with all our hatred and strength hurling it down on the heads of the German 
murderers of the young and old - this would be the only fitting reaction on our 
part.  Words are beyond us now.  Our hearts  are empty and made of stone. 
(Lewin, as cited in Langer, 1995, p. 3) 
I begin this chapter with the two perspectives above to describe a central tension 
that exists around life writing the Holocaust.  This tension presents itself as the 
contradiction: words are not enough to describe personal experience of the Holocaust; 
words are all we have to describe personal experience of the Holocaust (Eaglestone, 
2004).  This tension exists in the writing excerpted above as Lewin (1988) produces a 
powerful metaphor through language to imagine a fitting retribution for "German 
murderers" while he simultaneously laments the powerlessness of "words."  Sutzkever 
(1991) imagines not the "Mount Everest" of strength but a Shakespeare to help recreate 
the world.  Though, he imagines that the cities will be "spit back."  Here the verb acts as 
both the harsh action of spitting as well as how the cities must be reinvented by a mouth, 
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through speech.  Still Holocaust writers lament the "linguistic system" as unable to bear, 
unable to truly communicate the Holocaust experience (Levinas, 1981/1997).  Wiesel 
(1990), Levi (1986), Delbo (1995), Améry (1999), and Semprun (1997) all depict the 
inadequacy of language to describe experience.  Améry (1999) writes: 
[It] would be totally senseless to try and describe the pain that was inflicted on 
me. . .  One comparison would only stand for the other, and in the end we would 
be hoaxed by turn in the hopeless merry-go-round of figurative speech.  The pain 
was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to say. (p. 33) 
The literature is filled with similar descriptions, in writing of the ineffability of 
the Holocaust experience.  Semprun (1997) writes: 
Memory was too dense, too pitiless for me to master immediately . . . Whenever I 
awoke  at two in the morning, with the voice of the SS officer in my ear, blinded 
by the orange flame of the crematory, the subtle and sophisticated harmony of 
my project shattered in brutal dissonance.  Only a cry from the depths of the soul, 
only a deathly silence could have expressed that suffering. (p. 159)  
Notice the two opposing responses that Semprun chooses, or rather does not choose, in 
that he modifies each response with "only."  The "deathly silence" and/or the "cry from 
the depths of the soul" are each appropriate, he says.  But nothing else will seem to 
convey the experience.  Semprun's sense of this tension as the only two appropriate 
responses to the Holocaust is communicated in much of the life writing of the Holocaust. 
Related to this sense that "there is nothing to say" or no way to say it, is the 
expression by writers that they cannot say it.  At times language seems unable to contain 
experience; at other times the experience requires a better language, crafted by a better 
writer.  Semprun (1997) writes, "What's at stake here is the exploration of the human soul 
in the horror of evil . . . We'll need a Dostoevsky!" (p. 127).  These expressions that 
language and writing must fail to communicate the experience of the Holocaust become a 
generic trait of the writing that is produced from it. This device acts as a way to be able to 
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express the personal trauma of the experience.  The device is one that emphasizes the 
space between the experience of the Holocaust and shared expression of that experience.  
So the experience and the memory of the experience cause a kind of "void" or "crux" that 
"forces upon the witness both the imperative to speak and the knowledge that to speak the 
experience and to act in the face of that experience is both impossible and impossible to 
avoid" (Bernard-Donals, 2009, p. 4).
This is the space also between Levinas' (1981/1997) description of "the said" and 
"the saying" (p. 5).  Levinas writes, "The correlation of the saying and the said, that is, 
the subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the 
price that manifestation demands" (p. 6).  The utterance of experience creates something 
apart from the experience, "the said."  The "said" is created from the experience, but only 
approaches the actual experience; it is never it.  The "said" allows for "an approach" to 
the experience as well as an approach to an other (Levinas).  Bernard-Donals (2009) 
describes it as "a void that is productive of a positive ethics" (p. 4).  What is told about an 
event stands in for the event but can never be it.  What is described of experience only 
"approaches" experience.  But in this way, might it be that the "hopeless merry go round 
of figurative speech" described by Améry (1999), becomes more of an exchange between 
hearer and speaker, reader and writer?  Might this exchange be the "approach" Levinas 
describes of "one to another"?    
For the Holocaust survivor life writing the Holocaust, in what ways is this 
approach through language a return to the world of others?  By this I mean, can writers 
through language, commune with others, both others of the past and the future?  What 
does this approach mean to survivors whose earliest experiences include "separation" 
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from others, culture, family etc.?  Might this "approach" through language help to 
describe the resonance of a reader?  And what would it mean for this reader through the 
experience of resonance to be moved toward justness?  Is resonance a way in which a 
reader can "approach" experience through written accounts?  Even without any of this, 
Levinas (1981/1997) warns that "the said" is the price "the saying" must pay to be.  In his 
sense of "being," the other is how we are made manifest and how we know it.  
Life writing the Holocaust exists within this tension between the saying and the 
said, between the experience and its utterance, and this tension helps us to understand 
better the members that guide my understanding of this phenomenon: memory, narrative, 
history and writing.  Memory and forgetting, which I explore in the next section, are 
called by Bernard-Donals (2009) "facets of the same phenomenon of understanding" (p. 
3).  And it is with this sense that each of the members that structure the phenomenon are 
composed of these "facets" that I also explore history, writing and narrative.  I explore 
each with the understanding that none of these members can stand on its own in the 
phenomenon.  Memory, narrative, history and writing structure the phenomenon and are 
integral to its structure and to one another.  These guiding themes allow for the "narrative 
elaborations of the lived meaning" of life writing the Holocaust (van Manen, 1997, p. 
109). 
In the section that follows the discussion of memory and forgetting, I explore the 
relationship between event and narrative of an event.  This relationship lies at the heart of 
Carr's (1986) sense of how we perceive as narrative beings and differs from those who see 
narrative making as an after-the-fact intellectualizing of experience.  Next, I trace a 
relationship between history and writing where both must remain open to the present in 
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order to be in Heidegger's expression, "worthy of questioning" and "worthy of thought" (p. 
362).  Through this sense of writing and history, I trace the tension between this history as 
"actual" and Gadamer's (1975/2006) "historicity." The distinction lives in Gadamer's 
description of human knowing as being always situated in history, as we are "historical 
beings."  Exploring each of these themes through the "facets" that build them, allows me 
to describe the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust in its fullness, within the 
contexts that make it and which are made by it.  
The Built and Building Past: Memory and Forgetting 
Full fadom five thy father lies, 
Of his bones are coral made: 
Those are pearls that were his eyes: 
Nothing of him that doth fade, 
But doth suffer a sea-change 
Into something rich and strange. 
Sea nymphs hourly ring his knell: 
Ding-dong. 
Hark now I hear them - ding dong bell. 
(Shakespeare, trans. 1974, 1.1. 397-405) 
Ariel's song from The Tempest may not have been what Sutzkever (1995) had in 
mind when he wrote, in his poem cited in the beginning of this chapter: "My spirit Ariel, 
bring here the new fate, And spit back the dead cities!" (p. 563).  Still the transformation 
through memory, the "sea-change" Ariel describes in his song, makes the act of spitting 
back the "dead cities" emblematic of the problems of recreating the past through memory.  
And "recreation" may be what we wish of memory, but rebuilding seems to describe 
better how what is built again through memory may be "something" that is both "rich and 
strange."  So, while the sea nymphs are ringing the bells, the transformation of "thy 
father" is underway, and in memory the "sea-change" is always ongoing, never 
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completed.  Just as the cities that Sutzkever calls to be returned are "dead" and not the 
living cities they had been, what we recall from the past is never able to be again. 
Sutzkever's (1939) use of Ariel as the spirit able to rebuild cities may be a call to 
God, as Ariel's name means lion of God ("ariel," 2012).  In this way Sutzkever calls for 
an avenging angel; the power of action here is one of recollection, recreation, but power 
is what he calls for.  Ariel is the character charged by Prospero to cause the storm of The 
Tempest that makes Ferdinand cry, "Hell is empty, And all the devils are here" (I.1. 213-
215).  Just as the characteristics Sutzkever asks of his Shakespeare are that he be "mad" 
and that he have "might" (p. 563), his call for power, whether it is a call for retribution or 
recollection both figuratively and literally, is a call for memory.  And memory is survival 
in that it "involves a bodily 'attempt to reopen time, starting from the implication of the 
present'" (Bernard-Donals, 2009, p. 15).  Memory is survival in how it projects us toward 
a future.  Memory places a person within time, allows for a vantage point for moving 
forward.  Memory allows for our "protention" into the future (Carr, 1986).  The casting of 
oneself into a future through rebuilding of a past is self-preservation.  It is survival.  
Carr (1986) writes: 
Life can be regarded as a constant effort, even a struggle to maintain or restore 
narrative coherence in the face of an ever-threatening, impending chaos at all  
levels, from the smallest project to the overall 'coherence of life' spoken of by  
Dilthey. (p. 91) 
This "coherence of life," what Dilthey, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty call "Zusamenhang 
des Lebens, the 'holding together'" of life, happens through memory (Bernard-Donals, 
2009, p. 9).  This is the project of memory - how memory moves us forward through an 
always on-going narrative of events.  This built and building memory adds to coherence.  
This built and building memory guides the building and frames the builder through that 
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building.  Memory's narrative is made from the sense we make of and for ourselves in 
time, space, relationship and body.  Memory, in this sense, becomes a place where 
understanding is discerned and made.  
In translating Merleau-Ponty, Bernard-Donals (2009) describes it in this way: 
To remember is not to restore under the gaze of consciousness a tableau of the  
self-subsistent past; it is to ensconce oneself on the horizon of the past and to  
unfold little by little perspectives contained there until the experiences bounded 
by that horizon are, as it were, lived anew in their temporal place. (p. 30)  
In this way, the experiences of the past bounded by ever-changing time are re-understood 
by ever-changing beings.  Notice Merleau-Ponty does not say that we re-live experiences, 
but that they are "lived anew."  Living experience "anew" means that in each 
"remembering" we are new with re-newed perception and constantly emerging 
understanding – this is another way in which memory is survival.  Within this sense of 
memory, Shakespeare's choice of pearls for eyes and coral for bones to describe the "sea 
change" in Ariel's Song makes for an apt description of remembering.  Coral grows itself 
"little by little" or "step by step," and pearl is secreted layer by layer over a grain of sand.  
These natural sea changes describe the process of memory over time as constantly 
renewed and ever emerging.  
Forgetting: Hammer and Nail 
Pearls and how they form might be even more apt a metaphor for the memory 
making process when we begin to consider how memory is beholden to forgetting.  
Remember and the now rare usage re-member, described in Chapter One, both share the 
idea of recollection, or re-collecting the things of the past.  We can't re collect a thing that 
hasn't been, at the very least, "out of our hands."  So forgetting becomes the impetus for 
re collecting, remembering: the oyster secretes the mother of pearl to smooth over an 
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irritation, a grain of sand.  Forgetting requires remembering to make the past smooth, in 
this sense understandable.  Without the impetus of forgetting, the remembered past 
cannot be "lived anew."  Without living the past anew, there is only Gadamer's 
(1975/2006) unreachable, fictional "objective past" (pp. 300-304), which is to say, that 
without forgetting and the living anew of the experience there is no past at all.  Gadamer 
writes, "To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete" (p. 
301).  And as the pearls as eyes in Ariel's song, to remember is a continual growing 
process of understanding, spurred on by forgetting.  It is a survival of coherence through 
sea change.     
 Forget is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "To omit to mention, leave 
unnoticed, pass over inadvertently" ("forget", 2012).  So if remember is the taking up of 
an event, the past, a memory; forget connotes laying it down.  Forget is defined further as 
"To cease or omit to think of, let slip out of the mind, leave out of sight, take no note of" 
("forget", 2012).  So forget may be both active and passive.  You may "pass over 
inadvertently," or you may "omit to think of."  The latter seems to connote some 
deliberate action of forgetting.    
     And often remember is not active, or at least memory is not always sought.  
Recollection may not require that the past be recalled. This means that recollecting or 
remembering can happen without our calling memories back to the "gaze of 
consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002).  Memories we may wish not to remember 
may be recollected, unbidden.  The writing of Holocaust survivors often describes 
memory coming upon them when they wish not to remember.  The passage above where 
Semprun (1987) describes awaking "with the voice of the SS officer in my ear" is an 
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example of how forgetting may be an action that is actively sought.  So remember means 
also to experience forgotten memory when it is unwanted.  It may be in this case a kind 
of "un-forgetting" that assails a survivor.  
This has implication for the "coherence of life" when we consider how forgetting 
is the action that someone may initiate to foster coherence.  This forgetting, then, is the 
missing element in memory's narrative; it is the silence and wordlessness that Semprun 
describes above as one of the fitting responses to the Holocaust.  This forgetting though 
causes the "crux" the "void" that memory seeks to fill.  Amichai (2000) writes: 
To the confession 'We have sinned, we have betrayed' I would add the words 'We 
have forgotten, we have remembered' – two sins that cannot be atoned for.  They  
ought to cancel each other out but instead they reinforce one another. (p. 45) 
Forget and remember describe one another and without each the other is meaningless.  
But what about when memory becomes ingrained? What about memory that becomes so 
much a part of us that we don't think of it as something we have learned or experienced, 
but as something we are?  
Memory: In the Making 
Remember is also retention of a shape as in how a rubber band has "memory."  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines remember in the case of objects in this way, "Of a 
thing: to retain, or appear to retain, some record of (an event, condition, etc.) in a way 
that affects future action" ("remember," 2012).  So a bowstring springs back to nearly its 
original shape, but retains a measure of slackness from use.  A mattress remembers the 
body that sleeps on it; a pillow remembers the head that lies upon it as a physical imprint.  
To remember, in this sense, when applied to human remembering implies the way 
memory forms each of us.  There is a near return, but never a complete return to a past's 
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state of being, but the return shapes us.  This usage of memory describes a bodily 
remembering, as objects remember in a spatial and physical sense.   
 A further usage of forget relates to being shaped but comes about in an archaic 
expression. "I forget myself" means I have forgotten my manners, lost my decorum, lost 
my sense of myself.  "I forget myself," means I am no longer coherent to myself.  This 
expression shows how we are made, by remembering.  Memory, which we make, makes 
us in each remembering.  Our sense making selves are able to place ourselves within 
time, within the narrative of perception and we are shaped by the experience. Winterson 
(2011) writes:    
 It is the fossil record, the imprint of another life, and although you can never have  
 that life, your fingers trace the space where it might have been, and your fingers  
 learn a kind of Braille. (p. 5) 
 
This Braille of the past becomes a manual; it allows for survival in that it is learning. 
Through remembering and its impetus, forgetting, we are constantly learning how and 
who to be.  In Heidegger's (1937) description, "The human being is who he is precisely in 
the making [Bezeugung] of his own being" (as cited in Levin, 1971, p. 36).  In the 
making, is the project of memory.   
Memory: Both Form and Function 
 Memory truly is on the verge: the past can make itself bear painfully on the  
 present but it can't be brought into the present in representation or mimetically.   
 What this means is that the only vehicle for memory is the body, as it is inscribed  
 by the event and calls for its inscription – its indication – but that doesn't quite  
 have the tools for it.  Memory is indexical insofar as it is a convergence of  
 collected, collective memories, and of histories, that provide a way to know a  
 memory's environs, but it is indexical in that it allows you to read only that which  
 is concealed by its own shorthand, in its breathlessness.  We should think of  
 memory as a kind of writing, in that events may be indicated rather than   
 recollected, indicated from one body onto another. (Bernard-Donals, 2009, p. 15) 
  
64 
Bernard-Donals (2009) describes memory as indicative and rejects the notion of 
memory as "representation" of the past.  That troublesome descriptor "representation" 
means that memory stands in fully for the event itself, while not being it.  Representation 
is a pretender, a costumed version of the event, of experience.  And of course, the 
relationship between event and memory is more complicated than that.  Memory and 
event "approach" one another.  Memory is given breath in the body, "breathless" though 
it may be.  The metaphor implies a person who has just run, trying to tell you about the 
experience of running, when they are not quite yet able to use their breath to do so.  Your 
experience of hearing is tied with the fact that some of the words are unutterable in that 
time, from that body.  Still, you are able to understand.  Memory is embodied and is from 
and of the body.  Those we "approach" have bodies as well and understanding happens 
from one to another, through the nature of indicating experience.  This verb, indication, 
means also a gesture that points to experience.  So the gesture, comprised of speech and 
silence is a showing of oneself as much as a sharing of experience.  It shows far more 
than it tells.   
Memory is also embodied in that even without utterance, without the recollection 
of memory to thinking, memory shapes us.  In the writing of Holocaust survivor Frank 
Ephraim (2003), the memory of the Holocaust is enacted in a routine he describes in 
"Sardines."  He writes: 
'We have to eat the sardines,' my mother said.  She always bought the ones  
canned in tomato sauce.  I did not like the combination; I preferred oil.   
'Why can't you get the ones in olive oil?' I asked. 
'No, oil is not good for you.  Tomatoes are much better – they are a  
vegetable, ' she answered with a stern look at me.  It was no use to argue.  I knew 
she would never buy the sardines I liked. 
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We had sardines every few weeks from the stock of a dozen cans stacked   
in the linen closet.  The idea was simple.  The canned sardines served as the 
escape  provisions for the family.   
My father put it this way: 'In case we have to run, small cans of sardines  
are easy to slip into one's pockets, or pack in a bag.  They do not spoil and 
provide a meal that is nourishing.' 
To keep them edible, even though they were canned, this emergency food  
was opened and eaten periodically and then replenished for 'fresh' cans of  
sardines.   
This was in 1960.  World War II was long over.  Our wartime experiences  
were a memory, but to my parents they were a lesson never to be forgotten. 
(Ephraim, 2003, p. 6) 
The memory expressed through Ephraim's story is embodied: it recalls hunger, that most 
embodied experience and fear.  Though it does not directly describe either, it indicates 
both.  The description of anticipation of the past repeating itself and the desire never 
again to be caught off guard are something we are able to connect ourselves with in the 
story, bodily.  The remembered hunger is all the more present in the story as the family 
members do not discuss it.  The tenseness of being caught, the remembrance of how to 
avoid it in the future, are the Braille that Winterson (2011) refers to in the end of the last 
section.  Winterson's image is of memory being written on the body. Certainly the 
memory of hunger that compels a mother to move bodily to protect her family is both 
written on the body and written anew by the body through the action of memory.  Even 
the repeated eating of the canned sardines produces a bodily change, the protein of the 
fish changes the structure of the body - memory is literally shaping the body, in this way. 
Doesn't memory always shape the body?  We describe a person as "beaten down 
by life" and the image is of a person stooped as though to receive the next blow.  
Expectancy, fear, even the physical choice to run or fight are all shaped by memory, all 
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made in experience.  Memory physically shapes the body, and as memory, is experienced 
as perception, by our lived bodies.        
Embodied memory presents itself also in the way that memory is often bidden to 
return, or comes unbidden, through the senses.  The senses call back memory and are 
often found in the expressions of memory, such as: I can see her face like it was 
yesterday, I can hear her voice in my head.  But, senses are not just a way to recall 
experience, a vehicle for memory.  The body is "our general medium for having a world" 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) writes, and it is through the body that we sense and make the 
world we interact with (p. 169). 
But our body is not merely one expressive space among the rest, for that is simply 
the constituted body.  It is the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, that 
which causes them to begin to exist as things, under our hands and eyes. 
(Merleau-Ponty, p. 169)   
Remembering does not consist of recalling an objective faded memory of senses, or of 
senses calling back memory as thoughts, or as Merleau-Ponty calls it "mental activity" 
(p. 24).  Memory is sense memory, since all memory is embodied, as all perception is.  
Merleau-Ponty (1964) says that "the body is history," and in this way we experience past, 
present and future through our historical body, always moving through experience with 
our ever-emerging understanding written on/through the body (p. 23).  It is both the 
corpus of our knowing and how we know it; it is form and function. 
In the case of the sardines in the story above, the sardines act on our body's 
knowledge.  We imagine the density of a can of sardines in our hand, the sound of the 
key separating from the tin.  We might experience the smell of the fish in oil, the feel of 
revulsion or hunger that accompanies “seeing” the fish with their heads still on.  We 
might visualize the order of the sardines in the can.  We might think of the expression, 
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"like sardines in a can."  We come to the sardines with meaning, with contexts, and the 
sardines we might encounter after are imbued with further meaning through our reading 
of this story.  After reading this story, after hearing of Ephraim's experience, the meaning 
of sardines has changed.  These are not simply cans of sardines in a closet.  The sardines 
are safety, escape, sustenance.  They signify the lingering fear Ephraim's parents felt 
nearly 20 years after their Holocaust experience.  And while that family's fear is 
something we did not experience, it is something we can feel through reading the story.  
This is how symbols work in memory too.  There are never simply sardines.  Just 
as there is never memory separate from meaning.  The symbol of the sardines is how we 
are able to connect with the story.  Our own body's need for food, our experience of 
fearing a future is how the story forges a connection with us.  It is how the story can 
produce resonance in us.  Our understanding of how we might not like to eat sardines and 
our imagination of what might make us happy to eat them is how we come to feel 
Ephraim's family's situation.  We feel the importance of the stashed food, of being 
prepared, of fearing hunger even without experiencing a flight from home ahead of the 
Nazis.  This feeling is the approach Levinas (1981/1997) describes.  Even Ephraim can 
never get exactly to the event, back to the experience.  In memory, through writing, he 
approaches also. 
If memory is writing, as Bernard-Donals (2009) writes, symbols are one way that 
reader and writer interact "from one body onto another."  Symbols are the concrete 
object, the sensible thing, that allow the sharing of meaning from one to another.  
Symbols are the writer's tools to forge connection through the story and out to the world.  
They provide the journey back to what Moran, in referencing Merleau-Ponty, describes 
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as "the perceptual, pre-conceptual experience of the child" (p. 402).  It is a return to 
feeling.  
The symbol as concrete object helps us to share meaning from body to body.  
Abram (1996) writes, "Perception is . . . reciprocity, the ongoing exchange between my 
body and the entities that surround it.  It is a sort of silent conversation that I carry on 
with things" (p. 52).  This "conversation" is one that allows for a shared approach to 
"things." Approaching these "things" there is made a meeting place; the symbol is the 
place where we may meet one another.  But narrative is the symbol's surroundings, the 
context that makes symbols comprehensible, just as humans give them meaning.  
The Reconstructed Past: How To Tell a "True Story" 
"So you want another story?" 
"Uhh . . . no.  We would like to know what really happened." 
"Doesn't the telling of something always become a story?" 
"Uhh . . . perhaps in English.  In Japanese a story would have an   
element of invention in it.  We don't want any invention.  We want the  
'straight facts,' as you say in English." 
"Isn't telling about something - using words, English or Japanese -   
already something of an invention?  Isn't just looking upon this world  
already something of an invention?" 
"Uhh . . ." 
"The world isn't just the way it is.  It is how we understand it, no? 
And in understanding something, we bring something to it, no?  Doesn't that make 
life a story?" (Martel, 2001, p. 302) 
Martel's character Pi Patel, the first speaker in the passage, describes the world as 
existing in relationship to our understanding of it.  He describes even the seemingly 
objective act of "looking" as invention and casts telling about anything as story.  The 
exchange in the passage above describes a further tension in telling about the Holocaust 
through writing.  In the first tension I described the prevalence of the expression in 
Holocaust writing that words are not enough to describe the Holocaust, yet they are all 
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we have.  This second tension, which I explore in this section, is one that wonders how to 
tell a "true story" about the Holocaust.  The experience is described by Holocaust writers 
and is typified in Delbo's (1978) account of surviving Auschwitz.  She writes, "Today I 
am not sure that what I have written is true (vrai). But I am sure that it happened that way 
(veridique)" (p. 128).  This thoughtful approach to crafting story around actual events 
describes, too, how Delbo approaches memory through language and relives experience 
through that telling.  She writes: 
I stand in the midst of my comrades and I think that if I return one day and want  
to explain this inexplicable thing.  I will say: 'I used to say to myself: You must  
stand again today.  It is because you will have stood again today that you will  
return, if you do return one day.' And this will be false.  I did not say anything to 
myself.  I did not think anything.  The will to resist no doubt lay in a much  
deeper and more secret mechanism, which has since broken; I shall never know.  
(p. 72) 
The description highlights the space between event and memory of the event, but 
it also casts a further distinction between description of an event and the event itself.  Just 
as we are never able to access an event as actual through memory, no event can be 
remade exactly through description.  This desire to recreate the experience, to 
communicate "the straight facts" is also a desire to return to an "objective past."  Even 
Delbo here casts "story" as being separate and too far from "what really happened."  The 
Holocaust itself seems to defy description, as Langer (1995) writes: 
In an odd sense, it invites us to share the aura of the new arrival at Auschwitz and 
Treblinka – disoriented, hesitant, fearful, hoping for the best – until he or she  
grew acquainted with the worst, and then had to find a vacant chamber in the  
imagination for the unthinkable. (p. 7) 
The describing of such experience seems to defy language, let alone objectivity.  Still as 
though memoir or testimony could or should be written under this belief in a false 
objectivity, many have described how to get at this mythical "true story."  Benzion Dinur 
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(1957) warns Yad Vashem about the use of Holocaust memoir for historical research: 
These memoirs must be treated in the same way as any other testimony and must,  
of course, be properly examined. The plain and unvarnished character of the  
narration and presence of the narrator on the spot at the time constitute in   
themselves no guarantee of the authenticity of such memoirs.  The reasons need  
not be any desire to 'amend' or 'improve' upon actual events for any ulterior  
purpose.  It is difficult for the individual to liberate himself from his own   
personality.  He has a propensity to see the past and his own past experiences  
from the vantage point of the present.  In such evidence every effort must be made 
to establish all the facts relating to the narrator, his location and status during the  
period of the catastrophe, and his subsequent career.  We must keep in mind that  
one of the requisite qualities for writing reminiscences is that of recreating the  
'climate' existing at the time and thereby to reconstruct the past. (p. 18) 
How could a writer telling about experience "reconstruct the past" as actual for a 
reader?  What would it mean for a writer to "liberate himself from his own personality?"  
This proposed separation of observer from experience removes the element that makes 
testimony valuable in the first place.  Even if it were possible to do so, separating the 
human aspects of the "eye witness" account, the "first person account," renders testimony 
pointless.  If there is no seeing without the body, no knowing without experience, no past 
without our historical sensibility, then testimony without the personal can never be.  And 
how could we, why would we want to, separate time from those beings that experience 
time?  How could we separate trauma from those bodies that experience trauma?  What 
would the value of a record be, without the experience of seeing and feeling?  Impersonal 
testimony of lived experience pretends to be truth; it furthers the myth that the "objective 
past" may somehow be reached (Gadamer, 1975/2006).  The mythical impersonal 
retelling of a reconstructed past can never be a past that helps to build a moving forward, 
a future.  This pretend past is one that is dead and static.  It is a past that tells no tales. 
Holding Together: Narrative Coherence   
Attempting objectivity may not be how a writer gets to truth.  The author Tim 
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O'Brien (1990) describes the problems encountered in trying to shape narrative out of the 
chaos of war.  These are the problems, he contends, of anyone trying to write about real 
life.  He writes, "It wasn't a war story.  It was a love story.  It was a ghost story.  But you 
can't say that.  All you can do is tell it one more time, patiently, adding and subtracting 
and making up a few things to get at the real truth" (p. 565).  O'Brien's own work, so 
often based on his actual life as a soldier, purposefully blurred the imaginary line 
between fiction and memoir, and sought to tell truths through story (Meyer, 2005).  
O'Brien inverts the expression, and describes a "story-truth."  He writes, "I want you to 
feel what I felt. I want you to know why story-truth is truer sometimes than happening 
truth" (p. 179).  O'Brien here names the description of the event as possibly "truer" than 
the event itself.  Delbo's (1978) account above is an example of this.  She uses language 
to allow the reader to see how she might revise and question her revision of the past; her 
reliving of experience through description is her desire to be "truer."  And in Delbo's 
case, her "happening truth" may not be communicable, while her "story truth" is told and 
in that telling, evokes response in a reader.  
Van Manen (1997), too, sees the description of an event, writing about the event 
as central to communicating and understanding human experience.  He writes, "But 
poetizing is not 'merely' a type of poetry, a making of verses.  Poetizing is thinking on 
original experience and is thus speaking in a more primal sense" (p. 13).  So "story truth" 
does not attempt to attach to an objective and static past; it instead attempts to 
communicate the truth of a human experience, seeking resonance with the listener.  It 
seeks to be most personal and, in that way, most understandable to others.  Resonance 
through "story truth" is resonance from personal description of lived experience, and it 
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moves outward toward others.  
In preliminary conversations with participants I asked in what ways writing 
opened experience for a writer.  Esther Starobin (2009) responds:  
A lot of writing brings out things that I wouldn’t say to people, because I don’t  
talk to people about what is going on in my mind or remembrance.  . . When I  
speak (give a speech), you try to get an idea across to different people and you  
sort of gear it to whoever you think they are.  But it is a very public kind of thing,  
which is very different from the writing.  I think in the writing, often things come  
up that I didn’t realize I’m saying, I might not say it if I knew I was saying it.  But 
I think it (writing) does make you examine things differently, see them  
differently. 
Esther's sense is that writing allows her to examine experience.  She perceives her writing 
as coming from a more personal place than when she speaks.  This personal place, the 
"examining" she describes is the impetus of resonance.  And resonance is what makes a 
"story truth" truer.  It is in the connection through writer and reader that true story 
becomes "story truth" and moves away from "the congeries of 'facts,' which, in their 
unprocessed form," make "no sense at all" (White, 1974, p. 397).  This distinction 
between "true story" and "story truth" is one that informs the tension of how to tell a 
human truth about the Holocaust, how to move forward in meaning making around the 
catastrophe.  Since it is within the lens of "story," through perception, that we look upon 
"this world." 
Here Heidegger (1962/1927) describes how perception is 'true': 
This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers  
sounds.  Pure noein is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being  
which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them.  
This noein is what is 'true' in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say it 
discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. (p. 34) 
Heidegger does not translate noein as "thinking," as it has often been translated before, 
but as "In-die-Acht-nehman which in English could be rendered as 'taking in, facing up 
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to, respectful perceiving" (Burik, 2009, p. 19).  In Heidegger's sense, facts are not 
discrete "entities" but are enmeshed with our perception, our seeing of things.  Our seeing 
can never be more or less "factual;" it can discover, as there is no fact without our seeing.  
Just as "story truth" can be a truer truth, in that it describes what we are able to know, our 
own constantly remade sense of experience. 
It is even in this seeing that story exists.  In seeing, through our "historical being," 
story is simultaneously made.  We perceive as we encounter all things, as they connect to 
us and to one another.  We perceive not "facts," such as they are, but immediately and 
imperceptibly in story.  Steeves (2001) writes, “But perhaps being human is best 
understood as being a particular character in the intertwining stories of the living world” 
(p. 28).  His notion here, that we are enmeshed in stories, highlights the relationship 
between beings as story-tellers.  Story is described by Boyd (2009) as an evolutionary 
adaptation, and by Gotschall (2011) as being part of our brains' "wiring."  But whether 
we see story as biologically imperative or not, story is part and parcel of human 
perception (Carr, 1986, p. 75). 
The First Story: Narrative As Human Structure 
They (stories) are told in being lived and lived in being told. The actions and  
sufferings of life can be viewed as a process of telling ourselves stories, listening  
to those stories, and acting them out or living them through. . . Sometimes we  
must change the story to accommodate the events, sometimes we change the  
events, by acting, to accommodate the story.  It is not the case, as Mink seems to  
suggest, that we first live and act and then afterward, seated around the fire as it  
were, tell about what we have done, thereby creating something entirely new  
thanks to a new perspective.  The retrospective view of the narrator, with its  
capacity for seeing the whole in all its irony, is not an irreconcilable opposition to 
the agent's view but is an extension and refinement of a viewpoint inherent in  
action itself. (Carr, 1986, p. 61)   
Story is not simply the structure we lay on top of experience to understand it after 
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the fact.  Carr's sense of narrative as perception goes further than a belief that sequence, 
or narrative structure alone is at the heart of how we understand our lives retrospectively.  
He describes how our actions are inherently narrative and how our sense of the past is 
even more so.  Carr's description of narrative as knowing or perceiving as action is 
central to opening the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  This sense is at the 
heart of how writing is a further step in drafting, revising, writing a life that is already 
"being written" through perception. 
 Narrate means "To relate, recount; to give an account of, tell as a narrative" 
("narrate," 2012).  This definition is one that implies that in order to narrate something 
we may simply give an account, what Carr calls a "chronicle" and compares to a play by 
play in a baseball game.  But then when we notice that in narrating, we are creating a 
narrative then something else is being made.  The definition of narrative is given as "A 
thing narrated or recounted; a story, an account" ("narrative," 2012).  The difference 
between a "chronicle" and narrative is highlighted in that what is told, whatever is 
recounted becomes a story.  Carr describes it in this way, "Narrative requires narration: 
and this activity is not just a recounting of events but a recounting informed by a certain 
kind of superior knowledge" (p. 59).  This superior knowledge comes from Carr's sense 
that in our life's narrative we are author, character and audience.  He posits, "I (the 
narrator) tell or remind or explain to myself (the hearer) what I (the character) am doing.  
None of this requires that I literally talk, even silently, to myself" (p. 63).  In this sense 
narrative is not simply the structure we impose on events and experience, nor is it the 
way we understand events after the fact; it presupposes all action and revises accordingly 
as we live in story.  This way of knowing means that narrative is not conceptual after the 
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fact theorizing.  It is lived. 
 Esther Starobin compares her memory to a text.  Her sense is that she is able to 
perceive events, or things, from her past, as symbols.  She says, "I think one of the things 
that I have found so helpful (through working with our group) is realizing that you can 
look at a little small thing, for instance my boots, and think about it and realize that it’s a 
symbol."  In this sense memory has decipherability, interpretable meanings that are both 
found and ascribed to our emerging sense of the past.     
   What does this mean, then, for history, our sense of ourselves as historical 
beings living in story?  What does it mean for writing, the further steps of revision and 
crafting to put down lived story as life story? 
The Slide of the Lock: History as Opening 
 Enlightenment is not the same as clarification.  I had no clarity when I was  
 writing this little book, I do not have it today, and I hope I never will.    
 Clarification would also amount to disposal, settlement of the case, which can  
 then be placed in the files of history.  My book is meant to aid in preventing  
 precisely this.  For nothing is resolved, no conflict is settled.  No remembering  
 has become a mere memory. (Améry, 1976, p. xi) 
 
 In the 1976 introduction to his memoir, Améry (the pen name for Hans Maier) 
proclaims that he does not want his Holocaust experience filed away as history.  His 
sense that history allows for the "settling" of something, for "clarification" leads us back 
to explore my early sense, described in Chapter One, that writing about the Holocaust 
might bring "closure" to the writer.  Bachelard (1958/1994) explores closing and opening: 
 In the domain of values, on the other hand, a key closes more often than it opens,  
 whereas the door-knob opens more often than it closes.  And the gesture of  
 closing is always sharper, firmer and briefer than that of opening. (p. 73)   
 
Past experience when it is to be "enlightened" and not "clarified" in Améry's sense must 
be opened and not closed.  Bachelard conceives of opening as an inhabiting, a dwelling.  
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He writes, “‘A knob on the door; people go in the house, they live there.’  It is not merely 
a constructed house, it is also a house that is 'lived-in’” (p. 73).  So an opening history 
allows for dwelling thinking; it is a history that cannot be "settled" but can be lived in.  
Gadamer (1975/2006) writes, “historical understanding include the relative closure of a 
historical event” (p. 297).  He writes further, “the implicit presupposition of historical 
method, then, is that the permanent significance of something can first be known 
objectively only when it belongs to a closed context – in other words, when it is dead 
enough to have only historical interest” (p. 297).  What would it mean, then, for history to 
be "opened?" to remain alive?  What would it mean to remove history from the file that 
Améry envisions and reverse the "disposal" he describes of experience to history? 
 Gadamer (1975/2006) describes how the effort to recreate the conditions of seeing 
anything of the past as it was in its own "world" would produce nothing more than a 
"dead meaning" (p. 160).  And further, "The essential nature of the historical spirit 
consists not in the restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with contemporary 
life" (p. 161).  Esther Startobin (2009) describes the experience of her writing, as one that 
enables great connection to her family, in the present:    
It is sort of like a spider web.  I’m finding out things, but I’m connecting with my 
siblings . . . and with the grandkids and the connections to Germany, because I 
don’t have any connection to Adelsheim (her hometown in Germany) otherwise.  
Which (researching in order to write) has brought that about.  So maybe I  write 
to make those connections.  
    
Might this description of a past that must interact with the present mean, for the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, that life writing may act as this "thoughtful 
mediation?"  Can we see and make meaning of the past through writing about it in the 
present, for the future?  Is this also how story is lived?   
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 In her story, "The Table," Louise Lawrence-Israëls (2008) describes a table that 
stands through history and means differently through each usage.  Still the table's 
accumulated meanings may be understood from the vantage point of the present, with an 
eye toward the future.  The table becomes a symbol that in Lawrence-Israëls' description, 
adds to her sense of her family through history.  She begins:   
The old family table now stands in the dining area of our house in Bethesda.  The 
table was made in 1907 when my grandparents got married.  It was made of solid 
mahogany wood in Holland.  It was our custom to gather around it for big meals 
at birthdays, holidays and any other excuse to be with family and friends.  The 
table was made to seat 24. (p. 22)   
 
Her choice to focus on the table as a meeting and gathering spot for family allows her to 
describe the table through its presence in her family, in the many settings her family 
inhabits, through war, survival of the Holocaust, and after.  While her actual family is 
displaced into hiding, the table remains in her grandparent's house.  She writes:   
This routine was abruptly halted when the Nazis invaded Holland.  German 
officers confiscated the house and my grandparents went into hiding.  What 
happened to the table?  I wish the table could tell the story. 
    
The house was pretty comfortable and had many rooms filled with  beautiful 
furnishings.  Did these Nazi officers have nice banquets?  Did they enjoy sitting at 
such a beautiful table?  What did they discuss?  Did they talk there  about 
strategies to murder Jews?  Did they realize that many Shabbat dinners were 
enjoyed at the same table they were using for meeting to plot the removal of all 
Jews in Holland?  They must have had very good food, while we were always 
hungry in hiding. 
    
After we were liberated, it took a while before my grandparents went back to their 
home – they were afraid of what they would find.  They were very surprised.  The 
house seemed cared for and it seemed that most of their furnishings were still 
there, including the table that could seat 24. (p. 23) 
 
 Now Lawrence-Israëls is able to describe the table through the changes that time 
and events have caused, and the table reflects back these new meanings.  Through the 
Nazi's use of her grandparent's table, the table's meaning expands to also become territory 
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that must be retaken.  The Nazi's use can never be removed from the table; the story of 
the table changes, grows. The meaning expands again through the description of the loss 
of those who used to gather at the table.  This, too, expands the meaning of the table.   
She realized though that a lot of her friends and family members would not enjoy 
her cooking anymore, would not be singing Shabbat songs, would not help her 
celebrate birthdays.  They were no more; they had been put on transports and 
were brutally murdered.  My grandmother was a strong person and she made up 
her mind to continue with her gatherings.  It was not easy.  For many years, food 
was rationed and it was difficult to get the right ingredients for her recipes. (p. 23) 
 
The table itself, is not what it was without the gathering of people, the food upon it.  This 
changed meaning of the table is one we understand; we feel it, even if we have never 
experienced it.  At the Passover Seder a glass of wine is poured for the prophet Elijah. 
The tradition has expanded to sometimes include leaving one chair empty at the table, to 
symbolize those who are lost from the gathering, those absent from the table.  In this 
telling, the table as symbol of the family grows again; the table expands its meaning.   
The table was extended again to all its glory.  We did the same for our other 
daughters.  After our assignment in Belgium was over we moved to the United 
States.  The military sent movers who packed the table carefully and the table 
arrived at our new house. 
    
The next big event was our eldest daughter's wedding in 1989.  The table was 
used for dinners with family and friends and sometimes we had to add another 
table so we could seat everybody.  This time my sister brought her tablecloth and 
napkins all the way from Holland. 
  
Cooking and setting the table always kept me busy.  All the holidays and 
birthdays were celebrated at the table.  When my husband retired from the Army, 
we brought the table to our house in Maryland.  Now we sit for dinner at the table 
with our own children and grandchildren.  There are 14 of us.  Our youngest 
granddaughter danced on the table, it is as strong as ever. (p. 25) 
 
 The table would have come to mean differently had Lawrence-Israëls’ story been 
different, or indeed differently told.  The table through Lawrence-Israëls' personal 
history, through this story, remains open as she describes the table as "strong as ever."  
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This continuous line she draws through the story casts the family as thriving in spite of 
Nazi plans.  The image of her granddaughter dancing on top of the table is a picture of 
jubilation, and it evokes the expression "dancing on someone's grave."  This expression 
means that Lawrence-Israëls' (2008) family, symbolized by the table, has outlasted an 
enemy, moved forward from the Nazi's use of her family's table.  The expression applies 
to the table and to the family and portends the generations to come.  Again, the table is 
not merely a table.  As Lawrence-Israëls describes continuous use, the table remains 
open, or openable.  It remains un-settled, present and in its use meaning filled. 
Room and Board: The Table as Gathering Place 
 The table's use as a symbol is also not settled but remains "poetically useful" 
(Bachelard, 1994).  The table as a metaphor for family as Lawrence-Israëls (2008) casts it 
in the story above is one of the ways that we understand "table."  Our sense of what 
"table" means, though, allows it to be used as a symbol that moves through time and 
experience.  As a symbol, or as an object, table is something we know.  We understand 
that a table's context is all-important.  A table in a diner means something different to us 
than a table in a dining room.  We understand that we will use different manners at a 
conference table than at the table in our own kitchen.  If a meeting is called at the kitchen 
table, the people there will act in a different manner than they would at Sunday breakfast.  
When lunch is served over a conference table, the change in the table's function might 
change the atmosphere of the room.  We have laid our hands, or draped our arms, or hung 
our heads over every table at which we've had a meal and we know table as a symbol to 
which we bring our own contexts.  Bringing our own sense to the symbol allows for 
conversation between reader and writer.     
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 We bring personal context to the table.  Our conversation allows for the space of 
those involved, as intersubjectivity.  We interact with the table of Lawrence-Israëls' story 
through our own experiences of tables.  Did you always sit down with family to eat a 
meal when you were young, or did you and your siblings sit at T.V. trays?  Did you eat 
over the sink between jobs, or eat alone?  Were you uncomfortable at meals, worried 
about good table manners and fearing criticism?  Were there silver napkin rings, or paper 
napkins, or your shirt's sleeve?  Was the table a family heirloom that stood in your 
grandparents' house, or a card table set up in the kitchen?  Were you required to eat in 
silence or asked to talk about your day?  Each of these are meanings that might be 
brought to tables you read about, see, sit at.  
To Come To The Table: Symbol as Gathering Place 
 The table is of history and in that way of the future.  The tabula rasa is a clean 
slate metaphorically, or an empty table literally ("table," 2012).  There are bed tables, 
bridge tables, backgammon tables, bird tables and alter tables.  To stick with the dining 
table, it could be called "the daily breader" as in the place where meals are received 
("table," 2012).  Board is another name for a table; room and board means a place to 
sleep and a meal.  A sideboard is a piece of furniture that sits to the side of a table.  The 
table becomes synonymous with the gathering that happens there, the meal that is eaten 
there. To bring parties "to the table" means to have people agreeing to discuss a topic of 
importance to all.  To "table a discussion" means to keep the conversation open for 
another time, for it to remain unsettled.   
  An archaic meaning of table describes a piece of wood, used as a "raft after 
shipwreck" ("table," 2012).  A no longer used figurative use of table means the "penance 
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or repentance as the salvation of a sinner" ("table," 2012).  This usage is a punning 
reference to the "tablets," literally "little tables" upon which the Ten Commandments 
were carved.  This use of table from "tablet" becomes the use of "table" as "noticeboard" 
or a place where information is presented such as the "multiplication tables" where 
information is organized for use ("table," 2012).   
  Our sense is that the table is at the heart of every home, as a hearth is also 
physically a table.  The definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary reads, "A flat 
and comparatively thin piece of wood, stone, metal or other solid material; a board, plate, 
slab, or tablet, esp. one forming a surface used for a particular purpose" ("table," 2012), 
meaning that tables are able to be written upon and on. 
 Table as symbol and as object embodies all of these contexts, all of these 
descriptions and allows for the conversation that occurs through meeting at a symbol.  
The meaning of table grows and evolves as our use of it does.  The conversation around 
symbols occurs and keeps occurring.  In this way through language, through narrative, 
history remains open, ever able to be discussed.  The writing does not cause the past to 
become static in time, set in place.  The author's necessary use of language and symbols 
allows for meaning making.  Bachelard considers this:  "Very often . . . it is in the 
opposite of causality . . . that I think we find the real measure of the being of a poetic 
image.  In this reverberation, the poetic image will have a sonority of being" (p. xvi).  
Through the symbol, the poetic image, a truth through resonance is forged.  What does 
this mean, then, for us, for the phenomenon, that Lawrence-Israëls' (2003) writing, and 
the writing of survivor-writers exist now, as the table exists, as an object, and as texts, 
where meaning can be made?  What might it mean for these pieces to act on us in the 
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way symbols do, for them to coalesce meaning as symbols do?  How do the writing 
process and the "finished" product of writing inform one another within the phenomenon 
of life writing the Holocaust? 
The Unfinished Product: Writing as Process 
 A book is not shut by its contours, it is not walled up as in a fortress.  It asks  
 nothing better than to exist outside itself, or to let you exist in it.  In short, the  
 extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the falling away of barriers between you 
 and it.  You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or  
 inside.  (Poulet, 1970, p. 57) 
 
 A living text is necessary to the injunction to "never forget" the Holocaust.  This 
sense that life writing the Holocaust might be one way to act "in thoughtful mediation 
with contemporary life," is clear from a preliminary discussion I had with Susan 
Warsinger (2009) a survivor writer (Levinas, 1981/1997, p. 161).  She describes her work 
as a text that might act to spur readers to action in the face of injustice:   
 Well I guess in case they’re curious about their ancestors I want them to   
 understand, I’m sure they are going to see injustice in the world, some other kind  
 of injustice and I hope that they will learn how to deal with it.  I hope that perhaps 
 that they might, if they see injustice happening that they will get more involved  
 Uh, I guess I got involved, when I saw injustice here in the United States with the  
 black people then I did all kinds of work and so I want my grandchildren to do  
 the same thing and so maybe they will . . . if they see injustice. (Susan) 
 
This sense that her writing now might act as a way for future generations to act in the 
face of injustice is beyond simply remembering the fact of the Holocaust or even the facts 
of the Holocaust.  It asks that meaning be made in the story Susan tells of her survival.  It 
asks that action be taken as a result of that meaning making.  She goes on to say:   
And I guess later on when I found what was going on, I felt extremely guilty and I 
said, because I was in this children’s home, maybe there were a hundred, around a 
hundred children and I know that I left with my brother in 1941, but I know that 
most of the other children weren’t able to get out and so I guess I felt guilty 
because I was the one that got out.  And all those other children who were just as 
worthy as me, even more worthy than me and some of them were a lot smarter 
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than me and had more understanding about life and they didn’t get out.  So I 
guess it made me . . . and eventually this guilt went away, it went away. But 
somewhere in my head it’s still here and um uh maybe that’s one, another reason 
why I wanted to write. (Susan)  
 
 Susan expresses that she feels a kind of responsibility to tell the story of her life, 
to tell something of the children she knew.  This belief is at the heart of how the living 
texts created by the survivor writers may take their material from past events but are 
pointed, like memory, toward a possible future.  This, too, is memory's project.  The 
description here of writing as attaching a reader, through language to a past, returns us to 
the experience of resonance described in Chapter One.  Language elicits our response; it 
fosters resonance.  Language, through the writing, puts us in a place where we are able to 
experience and this experience, acts on our perception, on our further action.  Susan 
describes this as her goal for her writing, in the first passage.   
 In Merleau-Ponty's (1945/1958) critique of Descartes' Meditations, he writes of 
language: 
 This certainty which we enjoy of reaching, beyond expression, a truth separable 
 from it and of which expression is merely the garment and contingent 
 manifestation, has been implanted in us precisely by language.  It appears as a 
 mere sign only once is has provided itself with meaning, and the coming to 
 awareness, if it is to be complete, must rediscover the expressive unity in which 
 signs and meaning appear in the first place. (p. 466) 
 
Each of the tensions I have described in this chapter: that language seems unable to 
describe the Holocaust and that story exists too far from "actual" experience are 
addressed here by Merleau-Ponty.  Our sense that we may somehow escape language to 
get to actual experience has the result of casting story as untruth and casting writing as 
even further than that from "actual" experience.  In our understanding that construction of 
story through language makes "something else" out of experience, we hold to the idea 
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that we might somehow recapture experience outside of language.  This false sense 
makes memory, narrative and writing pale in their comparison to a supposed, but never 
able to be reached, truth. 
 Through these two chapters I have described language as pointing outward from 
experience.  I have described writing as a way to use the raw materials of experience to 
make meaning of experience.  This sense of writing as a discovery process is one that is 
described through hermeneutic phenomenology.   
 In the following chapter I describe the ways in which memory, history, story and 
writing are described by hermeneutic phenomenology and the ways in which the 
phenomenon unfolds through the ontological questions able to be asked through its 
methodology.  Further, I describe my study through the way that dwelling thinking 
requires a questioning aspect.  I describe also in Chapter Three how using the 
methodology rendered by van Manen (1997) allows for tracing and opening the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.   
 Following Chapter Three, through conversation with the Holocaust survivor 
writers of The Memory Project, I describe what meanings they have made from writing 
about real life experiences, through memory, through language, and with (within) a 
historical sensibility.  I approach these questions with connection to the people at the 
center of the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust and with passionate interest in the 
phenomenon in the world.  Merleau-Ponty's (1945/2002) sense of time and history 
evokes this poignantly for me: 
 Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession that I am content to 
 record.  It arises from my relation to things.  Within things themselves, the future  
 and the past are in a kind of eternal state of pre-existence and survival; the water  
 which will flow by tomorrow is at this moment at its source, the water which has  
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 just passed is now a little further downstream in the valley.  What is past or future  
 for me is present in the world. (p. 478) 
 
It is in the phenomenon's presence "in the world," that these ontological questions guide 
the rendering of the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust as it moves forward.        
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
ASSEMBLING THE CONSTITUENTS: CORNERSTONES AND KEYS 
 
 
The Home Phenomenology Builds: The Growing Doorway 
 I begin this chapter with a poem by Stanley Kunitz (1979), who describes here 
how memory presents itself, how questions, which are the impetus of research, present 
themselves.  His poetic engagement shows how embracing these questions as they 
present themselves can bring us both closer to the phenomenon we study and closer to 
our own being:  
 The Knot 
I've tried to seal it in, 
that cross-grained knot 
on the opposite wall, 
scored in the lintel of my door, 
but it keeps bleeding through  
into the world we share. 
Mornings when I wake, 
curled in my web, 
I hear it come 
with a rush of resin 
out of the trauma  
of its lopping-off. 
Obstinate bud, 
sticky with life, 
mad for the rain again, 
it racks itself with shoots 
that crackle overhead, 
dividing as they grow, 
Let be! Let be! 
I shake my wings  
and fly into its boughs.  
(p. 1) 
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The poem helps me to understand, through its story, through its references and through its 
language, the reasons I have for situating myself in the frame of hermeneutic 
phenomenology as a beginning researcher and as a beginning scholar.     
  The phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust is one that presents itself to me 
through experiences with the people of the Memory Project.  In this manner, the 
constituents, those who make and are made by this phenomenon act as the cornerstones 
and keys of the phenomenon itself.  They build and are built in it and through it.  These 
building elements, in a structure, provide the strength of an opening, as a keystone holds 
an arch or a window frame open.  The cornerstone sets the slope of a wall, sets the quoin, 
acts as a guideline for the building's structure.  The participants of this research are the 
constituents of the work I do at the museum and act as the impetus for the questions I ask.  
As I've described in Chapters One and Two, my experiences with the survivor writers 
present questions that I cannot turn away from, as the speaker of the poem tries to paint 
over the knot in the lintel that will not be ignored.   
The knot in the poem recalls the mark of blood on the lintel of Moses' people in 
Egypt, which signified that their first-born children would be spared.  In the biblical story, 
as in the poem, the mark on the lintel becomes a symbol of regeneration.  Questioning is a 
regeneration also.  Through Heidegger's (1927/1962) sense of Dasein or being as the 
matter of hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry, the questions we ask are ontological in 
nature.  The questions are those that bring us closer to our subject of inquiry and that put 
us, simultaneously, in direct contact with our own being – which is also the source of our 
questioning.   
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Heidegger (1993a) writes, "The questioner is present together with the question, 
that is, placed in question" (p. 93).  Being placed in question means to be also the subject 
of inquiry as, in play, or to be the topic "in question."  This being in play means that our 
own being is always also in question and therefore always able to have meaning.  
Heidegger (1962) writes that "Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property 
attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate 
domain'" (p. 193).  Questioning is also regeneration in this way, in that by questioning the 
being of an other, being itself becomes "discoverable in that disclosedness" (p. 193).  So 
in this same way, the "cross-grained knot" of Kunitz's (1979) poem intrudes into the world 
and allows for the speaker in the poem to "Let be!" 
  As the problem/opportunity/question of the "cross grained" knot presents itself 
"with a rush of resin" in the poem - the intrusion of it into the "world we share" is how the 
speaker is able to move closer to the problem/opportunity/question while moving at once 
closer to him or herself, which makes being more visible.  The 
problem/opportunity/question become branches "that crackle overhead," a question that 
"racks itself with shoots," ideas that are "dividing as they grow" and each is understood as 
the renewed understanding of a self, that allows for relationship with an other.  And this 
relationship with the other is the pure heart of questioning. 
Being At Home: The Researcher in the Methodology      
 In hermeneutic phenomenology, the self of the researcher is not able to be 
separate from the phenomenon she studies.  Heidegger (1927/1962) writes, "Every inquiry 
is a seeking (Suchen).  Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought.  Inquiry 
is cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to 
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its Being as it is" (p. 24).  In this understanding, a researcher asks with a foreknowledge of 
the subject in mind, but must be able to question the questions asked, so we ask not only if 
a being is, but what it means to be.  Heidegger's sense that we look at both being and 
beings in every question we ask as phenomenologists places the researcher not at a 
remove, but as a being hoping to understand being more fully.  This is research that seeks 
to see the door frame and to look through it, while wondering all the while what the frame 
itself bars from view.  The hermeneutic phenomenologist's questions must be open to 
allow for the life world of the phenomenon to be understood in ways that might have been 
previously denied or unseen.  The complexity of how a phenomenon exists in the world is 
not to be explained away, but instead, opened up (kept open) in a way that keeps the 
phenomenon as Heidegger describes "worthy of questioning" and "worthy of thought" (p. 
362).   
  So it is that I ask, what is it for this phenomenon, for myself as the researcher, that 
makes hermeneutic phenomenology the philosophical grounding in which I situate myself 
and in which I am situated?  In what manner does hermeneutic phenomenology allow for 
the colloquy that will engage and describe the phenomenon?  What is it that hermeneutic 
phenomenology makes visible through the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust?  
Why, then, is hermeneutic phenomenology the methodology I choose in order to open the 
phenomenon?    
  Van Manen (1997) writes that hermeneutic phenomenology "attempts to explicate 
experiential meanings as we live them in our everyday existence, our life world.  
Phenomenological research is a search for what it means to be human" (p. 12).  
Hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to describe the life world of a phenomenon through 
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questioning the expected and accepted interpretations of it, by interrogating the banal 
language used as shorthand to characterize it (Heidegger's sense of "enframing" or "Ge-
stell").  Heidegger (1927/1962) writes:  
Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presenting traditional 
 logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within 
 certain limits,  provides a justifiable way of characterizing 'entities'. The 
 indefinability of Being does not eliminate the questions of its meaning; it 
 demands that we look the question in the face. (p. 23)     
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology does so with the purpose of exploring and understanding 
being.  Heidegger's (1927/1962) conception of Dasein casts us as beings in being and 
both whole and part of being.  We are in it, but so in it that we may not be aware of it, 
until we begin to question the nature of it.  He writes, "Dasein is not only close to us – 
even that which is closest: we are it, each of us we ourselves.  In spite of this, or rather 
for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest" (p. 36).  Because we are 
being(s), we are farthest from being and beings until we begin to question, until we are 
called to wonder what being is.  This is Heidegger's sense of "dwelling thinking."  It is 
through this wondering, not in order to characterize, but to approach understanding of 
being and to explore the life world we share that we come to fuller understanding of a 
phenomenon.   
Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart and gives himself over 
 to meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking he 
 finds himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed.  The 
 unconcealment of the unconcealed has already propriated whenever it calls man 
 forth in to the mode of revealing allotted to him. (Heidegger, 1993d, p. 324)    
 
In this way, Heidegger describes how turning to question, looking closely in order to see, 
allows for discovery sought by a discoverer.  In research we strive to look to see, aware 
that we are the being doing the looking and aware that it is through our own being, 
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because and in spite of it, that we can see.  I approach research in this way as a re-seeing, 
an un-concealing of being, through questioning the nature of being - an ontological 
question that explores the life world of the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust. 
The Opening: Writing as Dis-covering   
 For this phenomenon the essential themes of writing, memory, history and 
story/narrative are expressed through and as these existential and ontological questions.  
It is the seeing and re-seeing of the writing process; the never ending process of memory 
making through narrative; and the constantly recursive way that history is made, read, 
questioned, discarded and then used as raw material for the next making, for which 
hermeneutic phenomenology as a philosophical grounding allows.  The opening of the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust through hermeneutic phenomenology allows 
further for a greater understanding of my own being, both in and of the phenomenon, as it 
opens the life world of The Memory Project writers.  I situate myself within the 
framework of hermeneutic phenomenology because of the kinds of questions that must be 
asked within the framework, because these questions (ontological and existential) seem to 
me to be the questions that must be asked by and of human subjects.    
 When I began to learn about hermeneutic phenomenology I compared the 
methodology with an artistic process, specifically with the writing of poetry, but 
hermeneutic phenomenology is not art and the work is not poetry – though it shares the 
desire to resuscitate language and the belief that writing fosters/is discovery, and as such, 
is a poetizing through a language of revealing.  Gadamer (2006) cautions us, though, that 
"Aesthetic experience is indifferent to whether or not its object is real, whether the scene 
is the stage or whether it is real life" (p. 77).  But hermeneutic phenomenology is deeply 
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concerned with the real, the essential nature of the life world in which phenomena come 
to being.  Heidegger (1993b) writes, "What should be examined are beings only, and 
besides that – nothing; beings alone, and further – nothing; solely beings and beyond that 
– nothing" (p. 95).  His play with language allows us to see that beings do not exist 
outside of being.  At the same time, he means that in hermeneutic phenomenology we 
study being and in studying being, we must study its corollary, nothingness.  Krell (1993) 
describes Heidegger's conception of "nothingness" in this way: "'The nothing' comes to 
be a name for the source not only of all that is dark and riddlesome in existence - which 
seems to rise from nowhere and to return to it - but also of the openness of Being as such 
and the brilliance surrounding whatever comes to light" (p. 91).  Hermeneutic 
phenomenology does not strip the connections between "things," but describes them in 
their relationships, through those connections to other things.     
 The mode of description, the phenomenological rendering, does not paint over, as 
art might, or obscure through language as poetry might the essence of the "things 
themselves" that hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to know, that I as a researcher desire 
to study.  Writing and re-writing, crafting through writing is the mode used to render the 
lived experience of the phenomenon.  This methodology is most appropriate for this 
phenomenon because writing as a dis-covering process mirrors the work done by the 
survivor writers.  Hermeneutic phenomenology is the methodology that allows for the 
study of how writing is a pneumonic and allows for the questioning of how memory is a 
text.     
 Hermeneutic phenomenology becomes in this way, a home for me as a beginning 
researcher, and the doorway becomes my vantage point, or point of view – built by me, 
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for my use.  My dwelling is a questioning, and in dwelling I look to see the doorway, the 
frame around it and the view beyond.  There is no doorway without the building; the 
dwelling, which is also questioning brings me closer to "the world we share," the life 
world. 
The Four Existentials: Frame and Structure of Lived Experience 
 Van Manen's (1997) four existentials, "lived space (spatiality), lived body 
(corporeality), lived time (temporality), and lived human relation (relationality or 
communality)" (p. 101 italics in the original) are the basis for exploring the life world of 
the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust and allow for a description of lived 
experience with the conversants.  They are able to be “differentiated but not separated.  
They all form an intricate unity which we call the life world – our lived world” (van 
Manen, 1997, p. 105).   Heidegger (1993a) writes: 
Thus phainomenon means what shows itself, the self showing, the manifest. . . to 
bring into daylight, to place in brightness that within which something can 
become manifest, visible in itself.  Thus the meaning of the expression 
"phenomonon" is established as what shows itself in itself, what is manifest.  The 
phainomena "phenomena" are thus the totality of what lies in the light of day or 
can be brought to light. (p. 73)   
   
 Because phenomenology refutes the idea that beings (subjects) occur separated 
from context (objects), phenomenology describes the life world. In this example, "the 
light of day" the "brightness that within which something can become manifest" is the 
manner in which we get to the things themselves.  This life world is always built by and 
of the constituents of time, place, bodies and relationships.  In the living life world we 
come to know ourselves through and in the world.  Coming to understand the life world 
is an understanding of a reflective nature.  The life world and lived experience are 
interpreted through "relating the particular to the universal, part to whole, episode to 
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totality" (van Manen, 1997, p. 36).  This part to whole relationship means that each 
instance of lived experience accumulates the total of lived experience and that each 
instance is experienced in and because of the total.  We undergo lived experience and 
reflect on it afterwards.  Through this reflection the lived experience "gathers 
hermeneutic significance" in that we, through memory and through revisiting this 
memory make meaning from experience and through it (van Manen, 1997, p. 37).   
 This "past presence" gives us the sense that the life world is one we constantly 
recreate as it is built through our experience.  The meaning we make of an experience is 
how we place our self within the scheme of things, how we see our selves in relation to 
the past, present and future world.  Our meaning making is how we place our experience 
within the sum total of all experiences everywhere.  Finally, it is how we understand our 
own being and its relationship within all being.  Van Manen (1997) writes:    
All phenomenological human science research efforts are really explorations into 
the structure of the human life world, the lived world as experienced in everyday 
situations and relations. Our lived experiences and the structures of meanings 
(themes) in terms of which these lived experiences can be described and 
interpreted, constitute the immense complexity of the life world. (p. 101) 
 
The life world may be described through the four existentials, and the four are related and 
interconnected; each informs lived experience specifically. 
 Lived experience is described through the four existentials van Manen (1997) 
explicates, and each is related to each.  So, in this way van Manen describes time through 
use of the visual imagery of “lived space:”  “The temporal dimensions of past, present 
and future constitute the horizons of a person’s temporal landscape” (p. 104).  The 
landscape is something we see, the physical frame in which we live, the horizon toward 
which we project ourselves.  In describing being, the four existentials frame experience 
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and are the structure on which it lays.  To describe the lived experience of life writing the 
Holocaust, the four existentials can help to guide the description of the phenomenon.   
Lived Time 
 Lived time is the way in which we perceive time, the way time can be 
experienced as stretching out or contracting independent of objective time, the time 
measured by clocks (van Manen, 1997).  Time is experienced also through our existing as 
learning beings; each experience shapes us as we experience and interpret through each 
moment of living.  Lived time is also related to memory in that how we think of past 
events is affected by our perceptions of the now, and our sense of what is coming. 
Steeves (2007) describes time in this way: 
The instantaneous Now moment is a fiction.  Like the notes of a melody that  
 are experienced long after they sound, so each and every experience I have  
 stretches forward and backward in time, calling forth what has just passed   
 and anticipating what is to come. (p. 104) 
 
This echoes the refrain, spoken by a person calling forth memory, or having it come forth 
unbidden, of I can close my eyes and picture it, or I can still see his face like it was 
yesterday, and means that memory has the ability to make something, in some sense, 
present again.  Aristotle, as cited by Bernard-Donals (2009) describes the difference 
between mneme or memory and anamnesis or recollection where anamnesis is a coming 
to presence, not as an object in the present, but as a process or movement.  However, the 
experience may be one that is temporal, spatial and corporeal all at the same time.  Being 
able to "see" a person from the past, in one sense allows the person seeing to go back in 
time, or allows for the re-presencing of a past.  The lived-body "sees" with the eye or 
mind's eye, thereby transporting the "see-er" back in time "bodily."  In that 
transformation of time, the lived-space is viewed and "re-seen."   
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Writing about that time and place may never be fixed within one time.  A 
knowing now, from a self now, frames the experiences lived then.  Therefore, I wonder 
about the "time travel" done by survivor/writers when writing about or visualizing the 
past. What is the lived time of this experience?  What is it that is made present through 
the experience of memory?  How is the lived time of the survivor writer experienced?  In 
what manner is the Holocaust as a past event experienced through and in time, through 
and in the writing?  What meaning is made, I wonder, of the experience of remembering 
and writing over time? In what way does remembering affect the experience of the then? 
And how do these multiple thens affect the writer's sense of lived time, and of memory? 
The temporal space of the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust is made 
more complex through the use of writing as a description of time.  The language requires 
the use of verb tenses to describe lived experience.  The writing requires crafting to 
express the temporal experience of living through an event, and new insights gleaned 
after the fact.  Further is the dis-covering process of writing, which van Manen (1997) 
describes in this way, "So that in the words, or perhaps better, in spite of the words, we 
find 'memories' that paradoxically we never thought or felt before" (p. 13).  In this way, 
the thinking about the “then,” has implication for our way of thinking about the “now” 
and vice versa.  When Holocaust survivors say that they are writing for “history” or for 
“their family,” they describe the complex interplay of past and future in the work they are 
making, and this interplay is one of the ways in which the phenomenon may be more 
fully opened.  
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Lived Space  
Lived space is our perception of places, and our sense of being in a space.  How we 
perceive the spaces around as opposed to their physical location and measured dimension 
is our sense of lived space (van Manen, 1997).  Space is perceived by our bodies, felt 
through our five senses and may change as we grow and learn through time.  Our 
experience of space is also tied to our experience of the bodies in that space.  Van Manen 
(1997) writes, "Adults have learned the social character of space, conventional space.  
There are social conventions associated with space that give experience of space a certain 
qualitative dimension" (p. 103).  This "qualitative dimension" means that, as with lived 
time, lived relationship and lived body, lived space is experienced through perception, 
making separate accounts of the same place personal and individual.  As with all of the 
existentials, space is highly influenced by the other existentials.  
The lived space of a favorite room changes qualitatively as it intersects with time.  
The quality of the light in the room in summer looks different to the lived body than the 
light in winter.  Even the sense of being alone in the room happily or unhappily, or there 
with others, affects our sense of it.  Further affecting our sense of lived space is what we 
do in the space.  Imagine the "qualitative dimension" of a space used for hiding during 
the Holocaust. Consider how the act of hiding must change the way that space is 
experienced.  And how time spent in hiding, changes the nature of the space.    
I wonder also about the space we encounter when making a written work.  As the 
piece is built word by word, my sense of it is spatial; it appears to be built before my 
eyes.  Moving parts of writing around in the space of a document is another way I 
experience spatiality in writing.  If lived space can be experienced in the writing process, 
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then how is it experienced by the writers of The Memory Project?  What is the space 
inhabited by writing?  How is space inhabited through memory and by the presencing I 
questioned above when discussing lived time? 
Lived Body  
The fact that we experience each of the other existentials and perceive them all 
through our bodies makes all of our knowing, embodied knowing (van Manen, 1997).  
Lived body is the way we perceive our body and through our body.  As phenomenology 
refutes the Cartesian sense that the body and mind are separable, our knowing is through 
and of our bodies.  The lived body hungers, ages, feels cold and pain and in each lived 
experience the body perceives time, space and relationship through these, and many 
other, sensations.  Levin (1985) writes: 
Metaphysical thinking takes place only in the theoretical 'mind,' and is always in 
an 'I think (= represent to myself) that . . . Ontological thinking is radically 
different: it engages us in the opening wholeness of our being, and takes place as 
much in the life of our feet and hands and eyes as it does in our head, our brains 
or in our mind. (p. 56) 
For the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust, how are the described perceptions 
of bodily sensation, a part of the lived body of the phenomenon?  In what ways are the 
life of the feet, the stomach, the heart (both literally and figuratively) part of the lived 
experience that stretches over time?  In what manner does the body remember? In what 
way does the body experience the phenomenon?  What would it mean for sensory 
language, language that evokes the body's senses, to contribute to the lived bodily 
experience of life writing the Holocaust?    
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Lived Relationship  
The experience of the other is described through the body, through our cumulative 
and changing sense of others and our relationship with others (van Manen, 1997).  Lived 
relationship is also our sense of ourselves in the scheme of things.  From one perspective 
I am a mother, from another a wife, from another a teacher, and in each of these my sense 
of self is described through my relationships.  My relationships form my perspective as 
one relates to others, and as I relate those others to myself.  This sense of how 
relationship to beings and things describes our actions and place in time, space and in our 
bodies is how we see through and with others.  Van Manen writes that it is also how we 
are able to "transcend ourselves" (p. 105):  
In a larger existential sense human beings have searched in this experience of the 
other, the communal, the social for a sense of purpose in life, meaningfulness, 
grounds for living, as in the religious experience of the absolute Other, God. (p. 
105) 
In what way, then, is the lived relationship with others and with the Other 
experienced through the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust?  In what manner are 
others experienced through writing of their loss?  Do the writers experience relationship 
to God through life writing?  In what way is the experience of life writing the Holocaust, 
as a member of a writing group experienced through the participant's sense of 
relationality? 
In each of the four existentials I have raised some of the questions that guide the 
description of the lived experience of the phenomenon.  These four existentials, van 
Manen (1997) describes as being inseparable except temporarily, as a mode of describing 
a phenomenon through research.  In the following written work it becomes clearer how 
the four inform one another and comprise the life world.  The multiple perspectives in the 
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written piece show further how perspective itself is how we know the world, how we 
make meaning from experience. 
Perspective: Coming to an Understanding of Standing  
Perspective is the place from which an object may see or be seen.  “Perspective is 
not a distortion” (Steeves, 2007, p. 90).  Neither then is memory.  Whatever may be told 
years after an event is not merely an interpretation, or a representation.  It is instead, an 
understanding, a meaning, a "continuation" of experience (Carr, 1986).  The telling is one 
that tells about the teller and tells about all the eras that that teller has told in and told 
through.  Esther Starobin (2008), a Holocaust survivor and writer describes the complex 
ways time and her evolving perspective change her own sense of an object in her story 
entitled "The Boots."  
I love to look at the boots that are so stylish these days.  There are so many 
different types but they all remind me of the little boots that are tucked away in a 
safe place in my home.  My boots are brown and lace up the front.  It is obvious 
that they have been worn a lot and patched again and again.  
The boots traveled with me from Germany as I left my home and parents when I 
was just two years old to start a new life in England.  I was part of the 
Kindtertransport that rescued Jewish children and sent them to live in England.  I 
suppose I wore them on the train, the ship, and then another train as I traveled to a 
new family.  In Thorpe I must have worn those boots for a long time.  My foster 
father, who worked in a shoe factory, repaired them many times, as is evident 
when I look at them.  Like all children, I outgrew the boots and cared nothing 
more for them.   
Many, many years later, in 1964, Alan Harrison, my foster brother, came to the 
United States as a Fulbright exchange teacher.  He brought me a gift from my 
foster mother, of these boots, which she had kept safe all those years.   
I find it strange to think that these ordinary boots can represent such caring and 
love to me.  My parents bought the shoes for me in Germany.  My foster father 
repaired them for me in England.  My foster mother saved them for me and sent 
them to me in the United States when I was an adult and could appreciate the 
significance of a little pair of brown boots. (p. 33) 
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Starobin's story has the boots acting as a mode of conversation, an unbroken line 
from parents to foster parents to her.  The boots become, in Starobin's conception of them 
here, a symbol of love, protection, care and keeping.  The boots are specific and personal; 
they may exist separate from Starobin's perception of them, but with a different meaning.  
The boots she describes cannot be any other pair of boots in the world, but are cast by her 
in the story as mutable, as is her perspective.  The boots to Starobin now have become 
quite different from the boots then, where she outgrew them and cared no more for them.  
This description of Starobin’s understandings of the boots allows them to be seen as an 
object that is not static in time and meaning, but as an object whose meaning has changed 
through time, through experience and understanding.  The boots are remembered through 
lived space, time, body and relation.    
At any step on the journey of Starobin’s boots, the boots mean a different thing to 
each person associated with them.  Her conception of the boots is different at different 
times and changes the meaning of the boots as time goes on, as she matures and lives 
through different life experiences, such as becoming a mother of daughters herself.  This 
is the lesson of the boots.  The boots, made by a person's hand, were to be used, worn for 
utility.  The boots began as cows' hide, but became through work, time and shifts in 
perception, something else entirely.  Each of these changing views is a perspective; each 
becomes a memory as time passes and time's passing changes the perspective.  This 
changing perspective, and perspective in general, is within the purview of 
phenomenological research.  The understanding of the standing of beings is its purpose.      
Through Heidegger's (1993c) description of a work of art I explore further what it 
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is that hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to describe.  In Van Gogh's painting of a pair 
of shoes, Heidegger interprets the wearing of the shoes as well as the work of art: 
On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil.  Under the soles 
stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls.  In the shoes vibrates 
the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained 
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.  This equipment is 
pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless 
joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending 
childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. (p. 159) 
In Heidegger's description above, the shoes act as a constantly changing constant 
presence within the time, place, body and relationships of the woman.  He writes,  "But 
perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes.  The peasant 
woman, on the other hand, simply wears them" (p. 160).  
The work of hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry moves beyond the 
interpretation of the work of art, in this case Van Gogh's painting, and beyond the 
possibly unexamined usage, or "readiness to hand" of the shoes, by the peasant woman.  
It seeks to ask other questions entirely, and to move closer to the life world inhabited by 
the shoes and the wearer, the intersection of the real woman he imagines and the shoes he 
interprets.  Heidegger writes further: 
If only this simple wearing were so simple.  When she takes off her shoes late in 
the evening, in deep but healthy fatigue and reaches out for them again in the still 
dim dawn, or passes them by on the day of rest, she knows all this without 
noticing or reflecting.  (p. 160) 
Hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry seeks to understand the standing of the peasant 
woman as she stands, or stood, in her own shoes, her experience of "being there" – in 
capturing the woman's standing, we capture her perspective.  This making explicit of the 
implicit wearing of the shoes is the work of hermeneutic phenomenology, and as a 
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methodology, it asks questions that enhance our understanding of the life world, through 
our questioning of its true nature.    
The Shape of The Doorway: What is Seen Through Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
To do research is always to question the way we experience the world, to want to 
know the world in which we live as human beings. And since to know the world is 
profoundly to be in the world in a certain way, the act of researching – 
questioning- theorizing is the  intentional act of attaching ourselves to the world to 
become more fully part of it, or better to become the world. (van Manen, 1997, p. 
5)  
The study of our "being in the world" is different from what is sought by other 
forms of education research and is meant to elicit a different response.  Action is the 
result sought by research in hermeneutic phenomenology; responsibility for beings is the 
point of studying being and beings.  Hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to foster 
responsibility for an other, and in so doing, repair the world we share.  Levinas (1997) 
writes, "Responsibility for the others or communication is the adventure that bears all the 
discourse of science and philosophy.  Thus this responsibility would be the very 
rationality of reason or its universality, a rationality of peace" (p. 160).  Levinas sees this 
responsibility to others as the purpose of the work we do, as the basis for time and for our 
own being.  Van Manen writes, "It is the progress of humanizing human life and 
humanizing human institutions to help human beings to become increasingly thoughtful 
and thus better prepared to act tactfully in situations" (p. 21).  
So while empirical scientific research seeks to know how; hermeneutic 
phenomenology seeks to know the essence of being in experience.  While empirical 
research seeks to know how much, how often and when; hermeneutic phenomenology 
seeks to understand what quantity, frequency or time mean to human beings as they 
experience them.  Original experience, before theorizing occurs, is the subject 
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hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to describe.  Empirical research seeks to create 
phenomena in ways that can be reproduced, or generalized to other groups.  Hermeneutic 
phenomenology asks about original experience, seeks to describe its essence, but does not 
assume that experience can ever be generalized or exhaustive.  Empirical scientific 
research demands that the researcher remain "objective" and "unbiased," separated from 
the subject of study. Because being is individual and original, hermeneutic 
phenomenology requires the researcher's "general orientation to life" to describe the 
phenomenon of "lived experience" so that the "essence of being" is uncovered.  It is in 
that uncovering that the possibility for justice and peace may exist (p. 28).  So while the 
"otherworld" is described as an area for ethnographic research, hermeneutic 
phenomenology seeks to uncover being in its essential and mutable incarnations in this 
world (Van Maanen, 1988). 
 Hermeneutic phenomenology differs from Edmund Husserl's descriptive 
phenomenology that sought to create a science of "the essential structures of pure 
consciousness" (Moran, 2000, p. 60).  Heidegger's phenomenology, developed further by 
Gadamer (2006) among others, is a mode of interrogating lived experience, and as a mode 
of interrogating the questions we use to get to understanding.  Heidegger (1993c) writes, 
that the task is not "to solve the riddle.  The task is to see the riddle" (p. 204).  With every 
question guided by a pre-understanding of the phenomenon, albeit a vague understanding, 
the questioning of the questions themselves allows us to begin to get to a truth of human 
experience.  This truth lies in lived human experience, in Heidegger's description, "truth . . 
. driven back to the subjectivity of the human subjects" (p. 124).  We are called to question 
the modes of our knowing themselves.  Since how we first come to know a phenomenon is 
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through culture, language, and history, hermeneutic phenomenology requires the 
questioning of these as well.  Because of this, we interrogate ordinary encounters of 
everyday life, the language we use to describe them and our own perceptions of these 
experiences to move to the questioning of being (Moran, 2007).  
Because of this requirement to engage the symbols of language, culture and 
perception in phenomenological study, Gadamer (2006) develops Heidegger's 
phenomenology by exploring and expanding on the hermeneutic aspects.  In Gadamer's 
phenomenology, as in Heidegger's, the life world is already always open, but our unity 
with the life world is only implicit.  Through questioning our ways of knowing, our sense 
of tradition, and the entrenched meanings of language we are able to make our unity with 
the life world explicit.  Gadamer (2006) writes of hermeneutic phenomenology: 
It is not only that historical tradition and the natural order of life constitute the  
unity of the world in which we live as men [sic]; the way we experience one 
another, the way we experience historical traditions, the way we experience the 
natural givenness of our existence and of our world, constitute a truly hermeneutic 
universe, in which we are not imprisoned, as if behind insurmountable barriers,  
but to which we are opened. (p. xxiii) 
This understanding of the researcher as a part of the unity of a life world means that 
through a "new critical consciousness," through the research, we strive to be aware of the 
modes of perception that have been so influenced by tradition and by language.  The 
researcher must put at the forefront of research communication with the phenomenon of 
study, while interrogating the language and historical knowing.  
Because of the ontological questions I ask, the phenomenon I seek to open, and 
because of my understanding of writing as a dis-covering process as well as a method of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, my research is situated within this methodology.  My 
research, my desire to do research in the first place, requires the ontological questions 
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that are phenomenological in both mode and method, and I must employ the 
methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology for both their frame and structure. 
In the next sections I explore the ways phenomenology approaches history, 
memory, writing and narrative.  These themes are essential to the description of the lived 
experience of life writing the Holocaust and are approached through the writings of 
hermeneutic phenomenology through Heidegger and Gadamer. 
Cornerstones: Themes Essential to the Phenomenon 
Van Manen (1997) describes an essential theme for a phenomenon as that which 
"makes a phenomenon what it is and without which the phenomenon could not be what it 
is" (p. 107).  Just as cornerstones provide the "salient angle of a wall," the themes of 
history and memory, writing and narrative are essential to the phenomenon of life writing 
the Holocaust ("cornerstone," 2012).  Van Manen asks that we pose one question of the 
phenemonon to develop and differentiate essential themes.  He writes, "Does this 
phenomenon without this theme lose its fundamental meaning" (p. 107)?  That we might 
be able to describe the phenomenon without discussing a certain theme allows us to know 
how essential that theme may be.  Just as a cornerstone has come to mean the most 
important, or consolidating element, for the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, 
describing the phenomenon without the theme of "history" is impossible.  Through 
asking about the nature of history, present both in the writers' experience and in the 
written product of the writers, the phenomenon becomes more of itself instead of 
something else entirely.  
Further, as with the four existentials, the essential themes allow a way for 
description to be made of the phenomenon by beginning with the constituent parts.  The 
	  107 
part to whole relationship described by van Manen (1997) means that the essential themes 
are imbued with the phenomenon as they are its structure, and for the purposes of study, as 
they are its frame.        
 The Window Frame's Keystones: History and Memory 
In hermeneutic phenomenology, history is distinguished from historical 
objectivism, which Gadamer (2006) writes, "resembles statistics," that he describes as, 
"excellent means of propaganda because they let the 'facts' speak and hence simulate an 
objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of the questions asked" (p. 300).  
Historical objectivism is related to the discipline of History as it strives for objectivity 
through methods designed to get to historical accounts that generalize experience and 
separate events from the beings perceiving them.  David Gross (2000) describes memory's 
inability to act as an artifact for the study of History: 
The processes of memory involve so much selecting, editing, revising,  
interpreting, embellishing, configuring and reconfiguring of mnemonic traces  
from the moment they are first registered in the mind until the moment of retrieval 
that it is almost impossible to think of memory as a trustworthy preserver of the  
past. (Gross, 2000, p. 32) 
That there is a past to "be preserved" contrasts with Gadamer's (2006) conception, but 
aligns with an objectivist sense of the past as "existing" in the record of facts or in "actual" 
events.  Gadamer writes of the objective past, "Is this a romantic refraction, a kind of 
Robinson Crusoe dream of historical enlightenment, the fiction of an unattainable island" 
(p. 303)?  This unattainable island sets "reality" as separate from beings and being.  In 
phenomenological thought, this kind of "reality" is seen as impossible to recreate, because 
any recreation of a thing means that something new, something else is made.
Gadamer (2006) illustrates the sense of history in hermeneutic phenomenology as 
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a horizon and of humans as "historical beings." As historical beings our being is always 
situated in this changeable horizon.  Phenomenological thought works to describe beings 
within the horizon, affected and constituted as we are by the four existentials.  So we 
historical beings are constantly coming through history and are in each moment able to 
perceive and decipher the past we have lived through and to reflect on it as a text for 
future actions, thoughts and ideas.  Gadamer (2006) writes: 
The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never   
absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly   
closed horizon.  The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that  
moves with us.  Horizons change for a person who is moving.  Thus the horizon 
of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of  
tradition, is always in motion.  The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by  
historical consciousness.  But in it this motion becomes aware of itself. (p. 303)  
For the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, the events of the Holocaust do not stay 
put in that time and place, but are made present from that time until now in newly 
discoverable and newly understood ways.  This ability to be aware of and thinking within 
our own history becomes what Gadamer describes as our "historical consciousness." 
"Historical consciousness" does not form a separate horizon, but becomes part of the 
horizon we inhabit.  This horizon, which moves as we move, is described, too, by our own 
sense of our tradition and heritage, our situatedness in the life world.  
In phenomenological thought the historical nature of humans is also described by 
their learning through time and experience.  Husserl, as cited by Carr (1986), describes 
two modes of memory: primary memory (or retention) and secondary memory (or 
recollection).  Primary memory allows a person to place herself and her experiences in 
context along with the past; in Carr's (1986) description it is "horizon- consciousness" (p. 
22).  This being steeped in the past allows for construction of a building whole.  So as you 
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read each word on the page, it connects to the words before it to construct a sentence and 
then a paragraph. Without the knowledge of the words that have come before, the whole 
of this work could not be experienced or understood.  Even after you no longer remember 
each word, or any of the words for that matter, the whole of the work will exist to you, as 
a whole, coloring imperceptibly or dramatically, your understanding of experiences that 
come both before and after.  
Carr (1986) describes Husserl's conceptions of retention and recollection in this 
way:  "Retention and recollection are thus two radically different ways of being conscious 
of the past.  Recollections come and go, whereas retention belongs to all experience" (p. 
22).  In this way history is linked inextricably to memory.  Since history cannot exist 
separately from lived experience and memory is the means by which we carry or recollect 
past experience, memory and history act upon one another.  Through the concepts of 
retention and recollection, two types of memory work to structure experience into 
understandable events.  Carr writes, "The life of consciousness is composed, then, in the 
phenomenological view, of a sequence of more or less distinguishable experiences" (p. 
22), and it is these experiences and our retention and recollection of them that form the 
texts we may decipher through hermeneutics. 
In this way, memory is also a construing toward the future.  Carr (1986) writes, 
"The relation of my past experience to the one I am now having is not that the former 
causes the latter, but that the former has meaning for me now" (p. 27).  This meaning 
making is how we extend ourselves into a future.  Husserl calls this "protention" and links 
it to the primary memory or retention that allows for consciousness of context.  Carr 
describes it in this way: "Our experience is directed towards, and itself assumes, 
	  110 
temporally extended forms in which future, present and past mutually determine one 
another as parts of a whole" (p. 31).  This sense that past, present and future constitute an 
ever-emerging life world deals with retention but does not specifically describe how 
memory may be recollected, or what that recollection means.    
In Carr's (1986) description, recollection is the re-presencing of the past, different 
from retention and related to forgetting in that something comes back.  Aristotle, as 
described by Bernard-Donals (2009), writes that there must be a starting point for the 
motion of recollecting or calling back of memory and that that starting point is always an 
absence.  In this way recollection moves us toward memory.  Michael Bernard-Donals 
(2009) writes: 
The person brought to memory does not experience the presence of an object or  
event . . . but is brought to nexus, a juncture comprised not by a convergence of  
objects or events but a concavity of experience, a void.  In Krell's terms, 'kinesis . 
. . here means a gradual or perhaps quite sudden coming-to-presence or self- 
  showing of an absent being that till now was also absent from memory' and what 
occurs is a 'nexus or node - the origins of what Dilthey, Heidegger and Merleau- 
Ponty will much later call the Zusamenhang des Lebens, the 'holding together' or 
cohesion of life.' (p. 9)  
I think of these nodes as junctures. So where memory is ever present if not explicit in 
retention, in recollection, memory is happened upon and, therefore, affects the whole of 
our memory through that happening, that "coming-to-presence."  The movement is one 
that is recursive, a back and forth where we begin in the middle and where we are always 
in history, but where we return again and again to memories that affect our sense of the 
whole each time we revisit them or they revisit us.  
Bernard Donals (2009) believes that these flashes of recollection, which begin 
with forgetting are the impetus for writing about past experiences.  The relationship 
between forgetting and memory, in this conception, is that the former is the impetus for 
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the latter.  This, then, is a mirror for the relationship between a being and an other, where 
the other is the impetus for communication.  Writing is one response to the impetus to 
communicate, to ask of another, "what are you?"  Further, that communication may come 
in the form of past and present needing to speak to one another, as they can only do 
through memory.  Through this conversation between past and present, between one and 
another, an understanding of sorts happens, a sorting, a deciphering of experience for the 
future.     
 Writing and Narrative: The Mullioned Windows 
Deciphering the past and present is meaning making, and while memory and 
history begin the process, first narrative and then writing make individual meaning explicit 
through ordering and then crafting.  The process of deciphering meaning though, begins 
with perception.  Carr (1986) describes our perception as immersed in narrative: "The 
narrative structure pervades our very experience of time and social existence" (p. 9).  His 
claim that we experience perception through the ordering and meaning making process of 
narrative, makes writing closer to being a naming of our perception, a description of our 
lived-experience.  
Roland Barthes (1977) writes that "Narrative is international, transhistorical, 
transcultural: it is simply there like life itself," and in this way, narrative structures our 
perception apart from culture and gets to be a description of human lived experience.  
"Narration" comes to us from Latin and Sanskrit, meaning to "know" to "be acquainted 
with" to be "expert" and "skillful" and comes from the Greek root word meaning 
"knowable" and "known" (White, 1980).  In this sense, how we know and how we are 
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able to know are structured or understood through our human understanding of narration.  
White (1980) writes: 
Far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing  
experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis 
of which transcultural messages about the nature of shared reality can be   
transmitted. (p. 2) 
If narration is our way of knowing and transmitting our knowing to others, the relationship 
puts the relationship of one to another, front and center.  Our understanding of our lived-
world, in this conception, is one where we know ourselves, know our experience, through 
translation of it to be understood by another.  
Carr (1986) writes of this when he describes lived relationship amidst lived time 
in this way: 
Natural and social events, such as the movements and actions of others  
around us, are configurations we follow through time in spite of their  
discontinuities.  Some of our more complex actions are performed   
discontinuously as well, and in the intervals we are occupied with other actions 
which serve other ends.  Each of these is like a distinguishable 'story-line'   
constituted by our protentions, retentions and intentions. (p. 75)   
Then he describes how we are ever-perceiving and then knowing through story: 
If each of these stories requires a narrative grasp, a quasi-narration which holds  
the story together, my life-story requires yet a further, more comprehensive  
grasp which takes them all as mine and establishes the connections among them.  
My "life" . . . is of course composed of all the experiences I have and the  
actions . . . in which I engage. . . it is itself something temporal which unfolds in  
time and whose phases I survey prospectively and retrospectively from within an 
ever-changing present. (p. 73)      
Carr questions: 
Can my life be regarded as an event I experience, an experience I have or 
live through or perhaps an action I perform?  Is it thus the sort of "story"  
in which I am character, story-teller and the audience all at once? (p. 73)      
He contends further that, "full-fledged story-telling arises out of life" (p. 17).  
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So, while perception of experience happens through narrative, writing is a step 
further, a further crafting of lived-experience for communication in writing.  This crafting 
or structuring through deliberate use of language and through poetic devices moves 
writing closer to the condition of the work of art.  It is what distinguishes narrative, which 
just is, from writing, which is made. 
For phenomenological rendering of lived-experience, writing is the method that 
allows for meaning making, first for a writer and then for a reader.  "Writing is self-
alienation.  Overcoming it, reading the text, is thus the highest task of understanding" 
(Gadamer, 2006, p. 392).  Through writing, an understanding is put forth, from a writer to 
an other; the written text is a communication of a self to an other.  Through these 
conceptions, writing becomes not only a communication of a knowing, it becomes a way 
of knowing.  Writing uses the ingredients of lived experience in order to structure and 
understand lived experience.  Through the structure of perceiving through narrative and 
the crafting of communicating through writing, the writer and reader can come to forge a 
sense of their shared reality and how it describes each of them.  This forging is the place 
where writer and reader compare lived-experience and where resonance begins.  The built 
understanding is one that, through craft, moves narrative through writing toward the work 
of art.  Emig (1977) writes, "Vygotsky notes that writing makes a unique demand in that 
the writer must engage in 'deliberate semantics' - in Vygotsky's elegant phrase, 'deliberate 
structuring of the web of meaning'" (p. 125).  
Care and Keeping: Phenomenology as Methodology 
Van Manen (1997) describes hermeneutic phenomenology as a method with "no 
methods" and instead provides guidance that might help to inform a way of doing 
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phenomenological research.  He writes, "The paths (methods) cannot be determined by 
fixed signposts.  They need to be discovered or invented as response to the question at 
hand" (p. 29).  Instead of signposts, he provides suggested guidelines for a methodology in 
hermeneutic phenomenology that may help to guide the opening of the life world of a 
phenomenon.  These components help to render the phenomenon carefully in order for the 
pedagogical implications to be clearly drawn:  
1. turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commits us to the
world;
2. investigating experience as we live it rather than as we conceptualize it;
3. reflecting on the essential themes which characterize the phenomenon;
4. describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting;
5. maintaining a strong and orientated pedagogical relation to the phenomenon;
6. balancing the research context by considering parts and whole. (pp. 30-31)
Being-In: "Turning to a Phenomenon Which Seriously Interests Us and Commits us 
to the World" 
For the rendering of the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust, each of the 
research habits van Manen suggests require the researcher to work at inquiring of a 
phenomenon to which she is committed.  What van Manen refers to as "interest" and as 
"committing us to the world," Heidegger (1962/1927) describes as "care."  Heidegger 
writes, "The totality of Being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as 
care" (1962/1927, p. 231).  Van Manen requires caring through each of the habits he sets 
forth above.  In each habit van Manen describes an aspect of attendance, of commitment 
to the phenomenon, the questions and the conversants.  Van Manen wonders, "Aren't the 
most captivating stories exactly those which help us to understand better what is most 
common, most taken-for-granted, and what concerns us most ordinarily and directly" (p. 
19)?  These kinds of questions wonder about "Being-in-the-world" and are the questions 
that must be asked in human science research.  The questions I've posed here of the lived 
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experience of life writing the Holocaust are those that explore the lived world of The 
Memory Project participants and come from my own caring stance.  Heidegger 
(1962/1927) describes actions of concern as: 
Having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining . . . . . All of these ways of Being-in have concern. (p. 57) 
Because of my interest in more fully bringing forth the phenomenon, which is an act of 
concern; because of my desire to look after the stories written by survivors, the work is 
situated in the world and describes Being-in-the-world as it is in the world, through care.  
For this work too, care is necessary to challenge notions of history, writing, story and 
memory. 
I choose to begin by asking questions that specifically focus on how participants 
describe the writing in which they are engaged.  I believe that asking participants to name 
and describe the process they engage in when writing, may help to elucidate the meaning 
they make of the experience.  I believe that through description of the personal process of 
writing that story and therefore meaning is revealed.  Some questions I pose are: 
• How do you describe the writing you do when you are discussing it with others?
Do you use the term autobiography, memoir, testimony, history or something
else?  What does the term you use to describe your writing mean to you?
• How would you describe your specific impetus for writing?  Where do your ideas
for new pieces of writing come from?  How does it feel to have an idea for a new
piece of writing?
• Describe your specific process for drafting or revising the pieces you write?  Do
you read your pieces to others before you bring them to the group?  Do you share
them with others after you have shared them with the group?
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I ask the participants questions about the experience of sharing their written work with 
others.  I want to know how this aspect of the lived experience of life writing the 
Holocaust, is felt by survivor writers. I ask these questions:  
• What's it like to receive feedback on your written work?
• For whom do you write?  Who is your imagined audience?  Recall a time when
you had someone read your work.  What was that like?
• What do you hope readers will experience through your writing?
Finally, I wonder how survivors see the work they are making contributing to an 
understanding of the Holocaust, and/or their own Holocaust experience.  I ask these 
questions: 
• What meaning do you see your writing having in relation to an understanding of
the Holocaust?
• How would you describe the role of your writing, or the writing of others, in your
understanding of the Holocaust?
• Are there topics about which you choose not to write? What does it feel like to
purposely omit those experiences from your writing?
Moving Further In: "Investigating Experience As We Live It Rather Than As We 
Conceptualize It" 
James Ingo Freed, the architect of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
intended that the physical building be a "resonator of memory" (United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, 2012, "What Makes This Building Talk?" ¶ 1).  And as the museum 
is also a memorial, the importance of memory, more specifically of remembrance, has 
been described to me by many of the survivor writers of The Memory Project.  Many of 
these survivors have been engaged in life writing the Holocaust for over ten years; some 
have written for far longer than that.  The sense that they write and speak so that we may 
"never forget" the Holocaust is prevalent in our discussions.  How will the notions of 
memory as I describe it in previous sections, allow for us to parse, through conversation 
with the participants, what it means to remember the Holocaust?  It is through 
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questioning in our conversations that we can get to "experience as we live it rather than 
as we conceptualize it" (van Manen, 1997, p. 30).  Through the conversations as a group 
around how memory has been conceptualized, I hope to move toward a better knowing of 
how memory is lived by the survivor writers. 
In an initial, informal conversation with Susan Warsinger, I asked her to describe 
her desire to write about her experience during the Holocaust. She relates: 
Perhaps my children would want to read it some time . . .  right now they are busy 
with their own lives and sometimes I say, I need for you to listen to this story and 
so they do it. I think maybe after I die . . . then maybe my grandchildren would 
like to know.  Right now, while I am living . . . they tell me you’ve told us 
everything mom, what else is there? . . . I do want to write it for them.  I want to 
write it for my great grandchildren, because I am not going to be around, so that is 
most of it.  
In this one response, Susan describes her lived and finite body and her sense of lived time 
as she describes not being "around" to meet her great grandchildren.  She also describes 
how she means to translate her own life to generations of her relatives to whom she has 
not yet "told everything."  This complicated sense of what the survivors mean by telling 
the stories of the Holocaust through which they lived make this phenomenon one that 
must be opened while the survivors are able to describe what it means to them, to life 
write the Holocaust.  Through further description from survivor writers, it seems possible 
to get to a fuller sense of the lived experience as it is lived, rather than conceptualized. 
I ask the questions I have drafted to the assembled group of survivor writers 
during two or three of our monthly meetings. These conversations evince the places of 
divergence and convergence among participants' experience that help to describe the 
phenomenon more fully.  The group discussions were recorded with two audio recording 
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devices.  After each conversation, I transcribed the conversations to a password protected 
Word document.  
Exposing The Structure: "Reflecting on the Essential Themes Which Characterize 
the Phenomenon" 
During these conversations with the participants of The Memory Project, as a 
group, I bring forward the meanings made through the phenomenon.  In van Manen's 
(1997) words, we "try to unearth something 'telling' something 'meaningful,' something 
'thematic' in the various experiential accounts" (p. 86).  Van Manen (1997) describes a 
"theme" as "experience of focus, of meaning, of point" (p. 87).  His descriptions makes it 
clear that themes are a way of seeing into the phenomenon as it is described through the 
"experiential accounts" of participants.  Van Manen continues, mindful that "theme 
formation is at best a simplification" (p. 87).  Just as in my own turning to this 
phenomenon and naming the phenomenon there are many aspects of my experience 
working with survivors, which are not the phenomenon, which are not the focus of my 
questioning.  So themes act also as a frame through which the phenomenon can be 
viewed, but as with the doorway, the frame necessarily obscures something else from 
view.  Van Manen writes, themes, "are intransitive" (p. 87).  And in that intransitive 
nature, are able to become gesture; in this way they are not tied to an object or subject, 
but existing in the shared space between and around these. This recalls my earlier use of 
the verb, indication, which is how experience is shared as a gesture; this gesture is what 
connects to experience.  So the gesture, comprised of speech and silence, is a showing of 
oneself as much as a sharing of experience.  Through this indication of experience, the 
essential themes can expand our understanding of the phenomenon as our understanding 
of the themes expands. 
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After transcribing the conversations with survivors, I listened several times to the 
conversations and read and re-read the texts made by our discussions.  In these 
conversations, I sought to identify the themes that I have explored through turning to and 
naming the phenomenon.  More importantly, I read looking for new themes to emerge, 
those that were not unearthed through my process of turning to and naming the 
phenomenon.  
Heidegger (1951/1986) writes of Holderlin's poetry: "'Since we have been a 
conversation . . . ' We – mankind – are a conversation.  The being of men is founded in 
language.  But this only becomes actual in conversation" (p. 760).  So, it is through the 
transcribed conversation, through the describing of the phenomenon that "the 
transmutation of the world into word . . .  real conversation, which we ourselves are, 
consists" (p.761).  It is through the study of the we that are in conversation, that the 
phenomenon may open out to the world and become describable. 
Building On: "Describing the Phenomenon Through the Art of Writing and 
Rewriting"  
Just as writing is one of the essential themes of the phenomenon of life writing the 
Holocaust, it is also a method of getting to a further understanding of the phenomenon.  
Writing that helps to dis-cover is writing as a building, a furthering process.  It is a 
process that builds, tears down what does not suit, and rebuilds or builds on.  This 
process is a learning process where a writer, in putting ideas into words, begins to learn 
through that utterance. Then through the text that is made and through its making, ideas 
are described, chosen and revised, always with an eye toward communication. 
Revision in this process, allows for the re-seeing necessary for new understanding 
of the phenomenon.  Revision happens both in the reading and re-reading of the texts 
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made from conversation with the survivors and in the reading and re-writing of the text 
that attempts to describe the themes and ideas brought forth in those conversations. 
Heidegger (1951/1986) writes of the writing process: 
The simple must be opened out, so that the existent may appear . . . The naming 
does not consist merely in something already known being supplied with a name; 
it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the existent is by this 
naming nominated as what it is.  So, it becomes known as existent. (pp. 761-762) 
The writing and revision process is the methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology 
where the phenomenon is opened through the other habits van Manen suggests.  It is the 
habit through which language's searching nature allows for the real to be described.  The 
phenomenon may be known and opened through the craft and making of language, 
through the writing and process of revision. 
Once the transcripts of the conversations with survivors were transcribed, read 
and re-read, after themes were discerned, the work of writing and re-writing began.  This 
bringing into being through language, though, is the work that runs through each of the 
other habits and back to the very questions that began the process of naming the 
phenomenon. Indeed conceiving of writing, thinking about getting ready to write, is 
already to be in writing; the linear steps I’ve described through van Manen’s method did 
not happen in a linear way.  I questioned and wondered through every step and continue 
to do so, as the text is made.  This makes writing the thread, the coherence that questions 
and names, thematizes and describes the phenomenon as it is opened.  It is made through 
searching, and settling on the best possible description, the most apt and intersubjective 
description of the lived-experience of the phenomenon. 
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The Well Built House: "Maintaining a Strong and Orientated Pedagogical Relation 
to the Phenomenon"  
For the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust, the pedagogical stance is one 
that keeps the focus on the writers' being in the world, where the writing they make and 
the making is front and center.  In this same way, van Manen (1997) describes pedagogy:  
Pedagogy is something that a parent or teacher must redeem, retrieve, regain, 
recapture in the sense of recalling.  Every situation in which I must act 
educationally . . . requires that I must continuously and reflectively be sensitive to 
what authorizes me as pedagogic teacher or parent.  Exactly because pedagogy is 
in an ultimate or definitive sense unfathomable, it poses the unremitting invitation 
to the creative activity of pedagogic reflection which brings the deep meaning of 
pedagogy to light. (p. 149) 
So, for this study, the questioning aspect in the caring stance of a pedagogue is the 
mindful practice required.  In each interaction with the conversants, I return to form and 
reform the methods that guide the conversations throughout.  This is revision of the how 
of research, to keep focused on the why of research, which is the pedagogical implication 
for what might be learned through the opening of the phenomenon.    
Made Of and By: "Balancing the Research Context by Considering Parts and 
Whole" 
Each member of our group is both individual writer and member of The Memory 
Project.  Each description of writing done by a survivor is at once unique and part of a 
tradition of memoir and personal writing.  The stories told by survivors are both 
emblematic of a collective understanding of the Holocaust and wholly personal.  The 
group exists both in the finite time in which we meet each month and as experience that 
each of us continues to carry and build on into the future.  The part to whole relationship 
that the researcher of lived experience must keep in mind is both the boundary of the 
phenomenon and the space in which the phenomenon overlaps the world.  In this play 
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between the part and the whole of the phenomenon, description of the lived experience 
exists and is richer in that relationship. 
Through this study, what can be told about the lived experience of life writing the 
Holocaust is also both limited to our group, and applicable to other groups, other kinds of 
survivors and other kinds of writing.  In this sense too, moving closer to ourselves, allows 
us to move closer to the world.    
A Plan To Build 
The Memory Project writers are invited from a larger group at The United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum of survivor volunteers.  These volunteers donate time to 
the museum, engaging in work from translating documents to guiding tours.  Volunteers 
may also speak about their experiences to groups within the museum or they may go out 
of the museum to speak to groups.  All survivor volunteers are invited to attend The 
Memory Project meetings that are regularly attended by ten to fifteen people, all of whom 
volunteer, in some capacity, for the museum.  The group meets ten times a year, monthly, 
for four hours, at the United State Holocaust Memorial Museum, usually in the Ross 
Office Buildings adjacent to the museum, in a conference room. 
Participants of The Memory Project are survivors of the Holocaust, according to 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's definition.  This definition describes 
survivors as: 
Any persons, Jewish or non-Jewish, who were displaced, persecuted, or 
discriminated against due to the racial, religious, ethnic, social, and political 
policies of the Nazis and their collaborators between 1933 and 1945. In addition 
to former inmates of concentration camps, ghettos, and prisons, this definition 
includes, among others, people who were refugees or were in hiding. (Who is a 
survivor? section, ¶1) 
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The members of the Memory Project have varied stories of survival, come from various 
countries in Europe, and write for varied audiences and purposes.  Participation in The 
Memory Project is voluntary and I invited all members of The Memory Project to 
participate in this research.  These members made up the participants of this research.  
The Members Themselves 
The participants of this research are 7 women and 6 men, all survivors of the 
Holocaust, all willing to discuss their writing process with me and all are members of The 
Memory Project writing group, of which I am the instructor.  They are not identified by 
pseudonyms since I have used the actual title and site of our writing group, and each 
member agreed to be identified by name in this research.  The information I provide 
about each writer is based on the biographical information readily available through the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museums website, through the Office of Survivor 
Affairs (www.ushmm.org/remember/office-of-survivor-affairs/memory-project).  In 
addition, I asked each participant to read these short biographical sketches and approve 
them.  I made changes to each accordingly. 
 I include each short portrait to help readers of this research as they read this study 
comprised of the voices and texts crafted by these writers.  I can’t come close to 
describing each participant through these short portraits, but I hope to let them speak 
through my opening of the phenomenon further in the chapters that follow and through 
their writings I have included.  Participants are listed here in alphabetical order.  
Ruth Cohen was born in Mukachevo, Czechoslovakia and survived internment in 
a ghetto, Auschwitz, a labor camp in Nuremberg, Germany and a labor camp in Holysov, 
Czechoslovakia.  Her mother, her younger brother and two adopted cousins were killed 
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immediately upon reaching Auschwitz with her family.  She survived the Holocaust with 
her sister and eventually immigrated to the U.S. with her father and her sister.  Ruth 
married in 1952 and has three children as well as eight grandchildren.  Ruth has written 
and published several pieces of writing including “Freedom in Holysov” where she 
describes the days leading up to being liberated by the United States Army. 
Marcel Drimer was born in Drohobycz, Poland, which fell under Soviet control 
until Germany violated the Soviet-German pact and occupied Drohobycz.  Marcel’s 
family survived a ghetto, during frequent deportations in which much of his extended 
family was taken and murdered in Belzec.  His immediate family hid in underground 
bunkers to avoid being deported, and eventually his father was able to bribe a guard to 
allow them to escape before the ghetto was liquidated.  A family in Ukraine agreed to 
hide the Drimers and nine other Jews, at first in their barn, and eventually in a hole in the 
ground.  The Drimers were liberated by the Soviets in August 1944, and lived in 
communist Poland.  Marcel was able to immigrate to the United States in 1961.  His 
published writing includes “The Diamond and The Cow” in which he describes his 
family’s survival. 
Gideon Frieder was born in Zvolen, Slovakia.  His father was part of Slovakia’s 
“Working Group,” a Jewish rescue organization.  During the Slovak uprising in 1944, 
Gideon, his mother, and sister fled to the mountains and were caught in a massacre at 
Stare Horey.  There, Gideon’s mother and sister were killed.  Gideon was wounded but 
survived.  Gideon was taken by a Jewish partisan fighter and placed with a Catholic 
Slovak family who took him in, keeping him safe until liberation.  Eventually Gideon 
was reunited with his father who had also survived the war.  After his father’s death, 
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Gideon and his stepmother immigrated to Israel in 1947 where he remained until 1975 
when he immigrated to the United States.  He is the A. James Clark Professor Emeritus of 
Engineering and Applied Science at the George Washington University.  
Albert Garih was born in Paris, France.  Albert’s family fled Paris at the time of 
the Nazi occupation, but returned shortly thereafter, and lived under the new anti-Jewish 
measures imposed by the Germans.  Albert’s father was deported to a forced labor camp 
in the Channel Islands.  Albert, his mother, and two sisters, were hidden by a French 
family for six months.  Eventually Albert was hidden in a Catholic boarding school for 
boys, enduring until the Allied powers liberated Paris.  He married, lived and worked as a 
translator and immigrated to the United States in 1976.  He has three children and ten 
grandchildren.  
Agi Geva was born in Budapest, Hungary.  Agi, her mother and sister were 
deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau, and then to the Plaszow concentration camp, and 
subsequently back to Auschwitz.  Later they were transported to a labor camp in 
Rochlitz, Germany and a factory in Calw, Germany.  Agi, her sister and mother were 
forcibly evacuated from Calw.  They were liberated by U.S. troops during this march.  
Eventually, Agi and her sister immigrated to Israel where Agi married.  She lived in 
Israel for 53 years until coming to the United States to live with her daughter.  Her 
published writing includes “Opera In Auschwitz” which describes some of her 
experiences while imprisoned there. 
Louise Lawrence- Israëls was born in Haarlem, The Netherlands during Nazi 
occupation.  After being ordered to move to Amsterdam, Louise and her family went into 
hiding to escape deportation.  Louise’s father acquired false identification papers.  Unable 
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to go to air raid shelters, Louise’s family was forced to take shelter during bombing raids 
on the staircase of the building in which they hid. Canadian forces liberated Amsterdam 
in 1945. Eventually, after marrying an American medical student, and receiving her 
degree in physical therapy in the Netherlands, she followed her husband to the United 
States in 1967.  Her published writing includes “Light,” a remembrance and reflection on 
her time in hiding. 
Harry Markowicz was born in Berlin, Germany.  His family escaped to Antwerp, 
Belgium shortly before Kristallnacht, following a warning from a policeman who was a 
friend of the family.  When Germany invaded Belgium, they attempted to cross into 
France but were denied and eventually fled to Brussels.  The entire family went into 
hiding. The children were hidden separately; Harry was hidden by several families and in 
a children’s group home, and eventually by the Vanderlinden family.  Only a few 
members of Harry’s extended family survived.  Eventually Harry immigrated to Seattle, 
Washington.  He is professor emeritus at Gallaudet University in Washington, DC.  
Harry’s published writing includes “Liberation Day,” a remembrance of Brussel’s 
liberation by British forces. 
Jacqueline Mendels Birn was born in Paris, France.  When Germany invaded 
France her family fled to Deux-Sevres, but returned to Paris, and Jacqueline and her sister 
were able to go to local public school until the French government’s Aryanization 
program was instituted in 1941.  Her father was forced to sell his business to his non-
Jewish partner.  She fled with her family for Vichy-controlled southern France, where 
they were arrested and interrogated.  They were allowed to settle in a small village and 
remained under watch there until Paris was liberated by Allied forces.  Jacqueline learned 
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after returning to Paris that over 200 members of her extended family had been killed in 
Sobibor and Auschwitz.  Jacqueline came to live to the United States in 1958 after 
marrying her American husband.  She is retired from the United States Foreign Service 
Institute and has two children and one grandchild.  
Halina Peabody was born in Krakow, Poland.  Her mother was able to secure 
papers identifying Halina, her sister and mother as Catholics and they went into hiding in 
Jaroslaw, Poland.  Halina’s father had been sentenced to hard labor in Siberia.  Before 
Jaroslaw was liberated by the Soviets, a bomb destroyed the house Halina, her sister and 
mother were living in, permanently damaging Halina’s hand.  Eventually Halina, her 
mother and sister were able to reunite with her father.  Halina lived in London, England 
until she immigrated to the United States in 1968.  Her published work includes “The 
Happiest Day in My Life” which describes her feelings upon seeing Israel for the first 
time while traveling there to represent England in the Maccabiah Games. 
Esther Starobin was born in Adelsheim, Germany.  Esther was sent on the 
Kindertransport to England, where she lived with the Harrison family from 1939 until 
1947.  Her sisters, who had also come to England on the Kindertransport were able to 
visit during this time.  Esther’s parents and her brother were deported to the Gurs camp in 
France; her brother was rescued and sent to live with an aunt and uncle in the United 
States.  Esther’s parents were sent to Auschwitz and were murdered in 1942.  Following 
the wishes of her mother, Esther’s sister Bertl arranged for Esther and her three sisters to 
immigrate to the United States.  Esther is a retired public school teacher.  Her published 
writing includes “The Last Letter,” a piece describing the final letters sent from her 
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parents while they were interned in France and their donation to the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum.   
Fred Traum was born in Vienna, Austria.  After Germany annexed Austria, Fred 
and his sister were forced to leave their public school and were made to attend a school 
for Jews.  Eventually, Fred and his sister were able to leave Austria on the 
Kindertransport to England, when Fred was ten years old.  They survived the war in 
England, being forced to evacuate London due to heavy bombing.  After the war, Fred 
and his sister learned their entire family had been killed.  Fred served in the English and 
the Israeli armies, and later in the Israeli merchant marines.  Fred and his wife and 
children moved to the United States in 1963.  Fred retired from the Boeing Company, 
after a successful career there.  His published writings include “Keep Off the Grass,” a 
description of events during his life in Nazi occupied Austria.  
Susan Warsinger was born in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.  Susan was forced to 
leave her public school after the Nazi’s came to power.  Her father was forced to close his 
business.  Susan’s family home was damaged during Kristallnacht, when Nazi thugs 
smashed the windows and broke down the door.  Later, Susan and her brother Joseph 
were smuggled into France for their safety.  She and her brother were deported from a 
children’s home when Germany invaded France and fled to Vichy controlled France 
where they were eventually able to receive permission to immigrate to the United States 
to be reunited with her parents and younger brother.  Susan is a retired teacher.  Her 
published writings include “The Interpreter,” describing her experience of being asked to 
translate the conversation between a Nazi officer and a French representative in 
Versailles. 
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Martin (Marty) Weiss was born in Polana, Czechoslovakia.  During the years 
leading up to Marty’s family’s deportation to the Munkacs Ghetto, two of his brother’s 
were conscripted for slave labor and sent to work on the Russian front.  Marty’s 
remaining family was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where most were killed 
immediately upon arrival.  Marty, among a few family members, was selected for slave 
labor.  Marty and his father were transported to Melk, a subcamp of Mauthausen 
concentration camp where he was forced to carve tunnels into the sides of the mountains.  
He was forcibly marched to another sub-camp Gunskirchen, where he was liberated by 
the United States Army.  Eventually Marty was able to immigrate with a sister and a 
brother to the United States.  Later he served in the United States Army during the 
Korean War. Marty and his wife have two children and four grandchildren.  Marty has 
written and published several works including a reflection of life after liberation entitled, 
“Going Home: Liberation, May 5, 1945.”                       
The group currently consists of these 13 regularly attending members.  In order to 
be allowed to conduct research at the museum, during our meetings, I first contacted my 
supervisor, The Director of Survivor Affairs at The United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, Diane Saltzman, through e-mail (Appendix A).  In this e-mail I asked to use 
class time to be allowed to record conversations with the participants.  Since I am paid by 
the museum, Diane Saltzman contacted the legal department of USHMM in order to be 
advised on how to proceed (Appendix A).  I received an e-mail giving permission for me 
to use time during an hour-long lunch break to record those who were interested in 
participating (Appendix B).  Throughout this process, I revised my application for The 
University of Maryland's Institutional Review Board and I provided the release form that 
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would be signed by those Memory Project participants who consented to be audio taped 
(Appendix C).  In addition, my IRB release form asks survivor participants to allow me to 
use written work produced through the group, as well as e-mail correspondence 
pertaining to the research as data for this study (Appendix C).    
Diane Saltzman sent an introductory e-mail to the participants (Appendix D) in order to 
explain that the research was voluntary and that the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum was not conducting the research.  
 Through the conversations with participants I describe in the next chapter, I bring 
forward the lived experience of life writing the Holocaust.  The survivors who share their 
description of process, who communicate experience, open the lived experience of our 
group.  Because these survivors describe the importance of sharing their memory as a 
way of keeping the Holocaust most acute for others, this work is pointed throughout 
toward pedagogical implications and toward action whose purpose is to know our shared 
being more fully.  As Wiesel writes: 
 Granted, our task is to inform. But information must be transformed into 
 knowledge, knowledge into sensitivity and sensitivity into commitment. 
 How can we therefore speak, unless we believe that our words have meaning, that 
 our words will help others to prevent my past from becoming another person's — 
 another peoples' — future. Yes, our stories are essential — essential to memory. I 
 believe that the witnesses, especially the survivors, have the most important role. 
 They can simply say, in the words of the prophet, "I was there." 
 What is a witness if not someone who has a tale to tell and lives only with one 
 haunting desire: to tell it. Without memory, there is no culture. Without memory, 
 there would be no civilization, no society, no future. 




   CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
DWELLING IN: THE SITE OF THE DEMOLITION 
 
 You had no occasion for knowing. (Marty) 
 
The sense of the Holocaust as incoherence, as a breach in being able to 
understand the events of one’s own life, came up many times in the conversations I 
initiated with the group of survivor writers, members of The Memory Project writing 
group.  This breach, this time where there was “no occasion for knowing” as Marty 
describes it, becomes, through the project of memory, knowable in new ways through the 
writing, the re-membering, the shared experience of the writing group.    
Participants describe the writing process as a mode of knowing and there are 
several ways that this building process takes place.  First is the impetus to write and 
speak, and the sense-making required to do so.  In this way these writers are building 
through the project of memory as evoked when participants describe their process, as 
“discovery” (Harry).  This process is one where having questions about the past allows 
survivors a mode to seek out memory.  The impetus to write begets further questions that 
writing asks, as crafting writing becomes the reason to seek answers.  Merleau-Ponty 
(1968/1975) describes this:  
Life becomes ideas and ideas return to life, each is caught up in the vortex . . . 
each is led on by what he said and the response he received, led on by his own 
thought of which he is no longer the sole thinker. (p.119) 
   
In this “vortex,” where conversation happens, the conversation of memory, as I’ve 
described it in Chapter Two,  or in conversations with others, survivors come across and 
“fill in the blanks” of their memory for their writing through the process of wondering, 
the process of writing (Albert).  These conversations described by survivors happen in 
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multiple communities, with historians of the Holocaust, with family and friends and in 
our group.  In this way life writing, the experience of our group, the phenomenon itself, is 
described by survivors as reflexivity, one where writing is both the reason for seeking 
memory and a way that memory may be uncovered.  It is being-in dialogue with the past, 
as it happens through conversations about the past with others.    
The second way in which writing is a “dwelling-in” is in the re-connecting, 
through dialogue with details, facts of the Holocaust, as important for the kind of 
knowing, through the writing, valued by these writers.  Survivors speak of consulting 
historians, doing research and looking for facts and figures that will also help to “fill in 
the blanks” of their memory (Albert).  This desire for the structure of facts, the structure 
of narrative, true to the experience of each writer and to their readers (however audience 
is viewed) is achieved in multiple ways, often through building community with others.  
Survivors speak of relationships, being in dialogue with local historians, with historians 
at The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and of important ongoing 
conversations with siblings and other family members.  These kinds of conversations 
occur also within the writing group, where confirmation of experience, dialogue and kin-
ship are sought.   
Survivors speak also about what happens when they cannot remember.  Ruth says, 
“What I wonder about is what I can’t remember, what is not on the paper.  If it’s not 
there, it’s because I can’t remember.” This sense of things not remembered becomes 
particularly poignant as participants, during one conversation, took up a name for their 
writing, “snippets of life.”  This image of life as cut fabric or paper is evocative of the 
“holes” some describe in their memory, of crafting an understanding of a broken past 
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through bits of memory.  But this phrase, “snippets of memory” was intended, I think, to 
evoke the idea that pieces of memory are laid down, in whole cloth, so to speak, as 
objective bits of the past.  
In this chapter, I bring forth the ways in which participants describe being pulled 
to do life writing, the ways in which audience and purpose are experienced by these 
writers, how writers feel about the work they do, and how they describe their writing and 
themselves as both Holocaust survivors and writers. In the second half of this chapter I 
return to a discussion of the way in which writing and memory are methods of knowing 
for these writers.  This mode of knowing experience, is built of and through community, 
and happens through being-in conversation with others: dwelling in the site of the 
demolition, as experiences are deconstructed and then reconstructed again.  This dwelling 
in questioning allows these writers a place to do the thoughtful building of a more 
coherent sense of their own past, present and future.   
No Place of Visitation: Inhabiting Air 
The experience of survival is one that is described by questions and one that 
continues through questioning. The impetus to write and speak about personal experience 
of the Holocaust, is made through seeking to know and understand the nature of personal 
experience, in order to communicate experience to others.  The Holocaust experience 
may not be unique in this regard, but the enormity of the event produces questions that 
seventy years later, remain unanswered and unanswerable.    
In Manya Friedman’s (2006) text entitled “A Headstone in the Air,” her sense of 
the Holocaust as always unfinished, as always present, is expressed through her sorrow at 
the lack of a final resting place for the family she lost.  She writes:  
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My thoughts went back to my own parents and my two younger brothers. 
How I wished that there was somewhere a marker indicating their place of 
burial.  Instead, I can only envision the smoke from the chimney rising 
toward the sky and a handful of ashes from the ovens of Auschwitz 
scattered around in the fields and blown away by the wind. 
 
How can I place a pebble, a sign of visitation, on this headstone in the air? 
(p. 18) 
 
Friedman expresses the continuity of her loss, of the Holocaust as ceaseless, in that she is 
left without even a place where she can express her mourning.  Her expression of a 
“headstone in the air” evokes the idea of something ongoing as it is “up in the air.”  The 
sense described by survivors as “filling in the blanks,” expands here, through this text, to 
mean the blanks that exist for Friedman, that remain unfilled, even in finding a way to 
memorialize the dead members of her family.  
While the idea of the “headstone in the air” is one that makes the Holocaust 
experience unending for the writer, it also evokes a sense of the Holocaust as being all 
around her, as something can be “in the air.”   It is this constancy, this presence, that 
leads to the writing done by survivors.  In the poet Myra Sklarew’s poem, “Lithuania, 
Part 1,” the poet concludes with these lines. 
. . . I name you tree,  
for death.  I name you, star, for death, you  
grass, you earth, you sister, father. I  
name you Christ, I name you Jew name you.   
In the territory of the forbidden  
 
like the green ailanthus which dares to grow  
      in the interstices of stone, they found  
what home they could.  They occupied air. 
(1995, p. 287) 
 
As expressed in each of these excerpts, Jews murdered by the Nazis become a people 
without a country in ever more monstrous ways.  In Sklarew’s poem, the earth itself is 
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named for death, but still will not be a home for the dead of the Holocaust.  In each piece, 
the writer refutes the idea to which I referred in Chapter One as a “finished miracle” of a 
final sense, a finished view of the Holocaust.     
Incomplete Knowledge: Being Historically  
 That there might ever be finality for those who experienced the Holocaust, even 
as they continue to write, becomes unthinkable as it is described in each of these texts.  
Expressed here, by each author, is the sense that the air we breathe is inhabited by the 
murdered dead of the Holocaust, that this is part of the fabric of the being of survivors, 
and in Sklarew’s (1995) poem, it is part of all being.   
This comes through in the written texts of the survivors of The Memory Project 
and is part of the experience of their writing.  It is this recursive nature of the Holocaust 
experience that continuously provides questions that spur on the writing for the survivors 
of The Memory Project.  It is the “blanks” that may never be filled that the writers seek to 
address through their writing, over and over again.  It is this ongoing search for 
coherence after the Holocaust that makes this writing process pedagogical and never able 
to be complete, even after the death of the last survivor of the Holocaust.  Gadamer 
(1975/2006) writes, “To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be 
complete” (p. 301).  Then, too, “to be historically means that knowledge” of history, even 
as we are situated in it, can also never be complete. It is the nature of this incompleteness 
that frames questions that keep personal experience of the Holocaust ever present and 
ever open.  It is this openness that leads to the writing and is continued through the 
writing done by survivors. 
It is this incomplete and always partial knowledge of oneself and history that 
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allows for the building process of writing and memory.  The unfinished self, with its 
unfinished historical knowledge, allows for the un-building rebuilding, and building of an 
ever emerging understanding.  This echoes Merleau-Ponty’s (1958/2005) refutation of an 
objective history, as he calls a house “seen from nowhere” (p. 77).  Still, we long for one 
always true and static house.  Merleau-Ponty writes: 
But we still believe that there is a truth about the past; we base our 
memory on the world’s vast Memory, in which the house has its place 
as it really was on that day, and which guarantees its being  at this 
moment. (p. 81) 
    
 It is this kind of continual questioning by the writers themselves, and from those 
whom the writers imagine reading the works they make, that allows the writing process 
to be a pedagogical one.  It is because of these questions spurring on the writing that it 
becomes a way of knowing. Then in turn, the questions each text brings up for a reader 
continue the conversation, as in the next section, where Harry Markowicz’s writing led 
me to question, through my own writing, the meaning of his experience.   
 The Loss of Home: Denial of the Ordinary 
In the poem I cite at the beginning of Chapter One, John Ciardi (1997) describes 
three propositions written by the fictional poet and Holocaust survivor Joseph Stein.  I 
wrote about the third proposition in previous chapters, but the first proposition is one I 
have not yet addressed.  Ciardi writes, “Hell is the denial of the ordinary.”  For survivors 
of the Holocaust, the “denial of the ordinary” happened first in the ways in which family 
life, everyday existence was in peril.  In this excerpt from Harry Markowicz’ (2014) 
“Remembrances of a Hidden Child,” it is a “denial of the ordinary” that produces the 
story’s central moment.  He writes: 
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It was a sunny day and I was playing outside with Jean-Paul whose parents owned 
the butcher shop across the street. We were throwing his small rubber ball back 
and forth on the sidewalk.  The droguerie was on the same sidewalk behind me. 
While waiting for Jean-Paul to throw the ball back to me, in the distance behind 
him, I noticed a woman walking in our direction. She was not a stranger. In fact, it 
was my mother. I realized she was going to the droguerie and she would have to 
walk right by us to get there.  
 
When I first moved in with Mami and Papi I had been given some instructions. My 
name was Henry Vanderlinden; the Vanderlindens were my parents and their 
teenage daughter Florence was my sister. Also, I would always have to speak in 
French and never let anyone know that I could speak or understand German.  On 
the other hand, I had not been given instructions on what to do in the unlikely 
event that I would see my mother on the street. 
 
As my mother approached, we continued to throw the ball. She walked past Jean-
Paul and she was getting closer to me. I returned the ball every time Jean-Paul sent 
it to me. Now she was next to me; I could have touched her if I had put out my 
arm. She ignored me completely as she passed by me and I did not even glance in 
her direction. (pp. 29-30)  
   
In the story Markowicz recounts something small, something intimate, in the scale of the 
Holocaust, yet it is in this dissolution of the ordinary experiences of a childhood, where 
we can glimpse also the negation of our humanity.  As Harry Markowicz loses his family, 
his language and his own name, the “denial of the ordinary” occurs.  But most 
poignantly, the denial of the ordinary happens in the way he, as a child, figures out that 
he must not appear to recognize his own mother, that he should not put “out” his arm to 
touch her.   
I continue to wonder about the questions the story Harry Markowicz wrote brings 
up.  In my own poem, entitled “Passing,” I wonder what the experience he describes 
means to him, and I reflect on the moment he describes.    
The woman he sees   
is his mother. 
 
What he remembers, is her passing  
as he throws and catches a ball on the sidewalk, 
how his mother walks past, 
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knowing that he must appear  
not to know her. 
   
Is it the moment itself, the averted eyes, the impassive  
second that cause him to weep, sixty years  
later as he tells of that passing? 
 
Is it that,  
having the memory of it, raising his own children  
he feels what it cost his mother  
to look beyond him? 
 
Are his tears for the person he becomes when she passes,  
saved, I mean,  
and bearing it every  
day from that  
to this. 
 
When I heard Harry speak about his mother passing as a stranger on the street, I felt that 
Harry must write about the experience and told him so.  I could picture the scene he 
described in my mind.  I imagined the way Harry’s knowing of this event might have 
changed over the years.  The poem asks, as it supposes, what it means to him as a child, 
what it means to him when he has his own children, what it means to him now? The verb 
tense I employed throughout the poem is the present, as the memory is always present in 
some always emerging understanding of it, as it is never fully past.     
After reading the story he wrote, new questions arise.  What does it mean to those 
who might perceive the Holocaust as a collective, monolithic history to read Harry’s 
story? How is it that we may also (must also) know the history of the Holocaust in the 
incremental shifts, described by the survivors, away from these most ordinary human 
experiences?  What does it mean for those who write these stories to tell about the loss of 
a name, a mother passing her child on the street, or the lack of a headstone to visit?  How 
do survivors know these losses more fully through writing about them?   
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 I asked questions through the poem also about what it means to have been 
“saved” in the way that the survivors of The Memory Project were.  Whatever or 
whomever is responsible, each survivor, each writer in our group describes, in telling a 
life story, a story of being spared.  In each story, where a survivor bears witness to being 
saved, there is also the bearing of this survival in the question of why he or she survived 
when so many others did not. 
 The questions help to describe life writing the Holocaust, as they are the purpose 
for life writing the Holocaust.  These questions do not cause the end of questioning; they 
begin it and begin it again, as the Holocaust reverberates.  One of the ways in which this 
questioning is continued through the writing of survivors, is through conceiving of an 
audience and sharing personal stories of the past with an audience.   
On the Wide Front Porch: Audience as Expanding Purpose  
Levinas (1981/1997) describes how questioning and audience, as an other, are 
related.  He writes that questioning is necessary for being, and for understanding the 
being of our self and others and suggests that, “the question, ‘who is looking?’ is also 
ontological” (p. 27).  The answer to that question, Levinas writes, “should be stated in the 
monosyllabic ‘Me’”( p. 27). He means that audience is an understanding of our self 
through tyring to understand an other.  We imagine an audience for our thoughts and 
ideas.  We share what we think others may understand in the way we think they may be 
able to understand.  We share what we ourselves are able to know in words we think will 
allow us to be comprehensible to others.  Levinas writes that the answers to the question, 
“who is looking” might be, “ ‘me who am known to you,’ ‘me whose voice you find in 
your memories,’ or ‘me who could situate myself in the system of your history’” (p. 27).  
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This description helps us to see how important a sense of audience is to our crafting of 
expression through art or writing.  It allows us to see how we work always from and 
within our own experience, our own understanding, in order to make ourselves 
understood by those we also are able to understand.    
Audience is how we know that what we have shared is, but it is also a way of 
knowing ourselves and our being through that listening other.  Further, it is a mode of 
knowing that other through communication of our self.  Resonance happens through an 
audience, and questions continue because of audience.  We rely on language, though not 
language alone, to convey the meaning we make of our self for another.  As Levinas 
(1981/1997) writes, “It is on the bases of proximity that being takes on its just meaning” 
(p. 27). In this way, it is the other, as audience or colleague, group member, historian, 
family member or friend, who are both part of, and central to, any understanding or 
communication of this experience.  There is no conceiving of audience without a better 
and clearer conceiving of yourself and of the work you will share.    
Continuing in this thought, Levinas (1981/1997) surely does not use the word 
“just” without expressing that it is the “just meaning,” as in sharing a meaning that does 
justice to the other that he considers necessary for communication.  When audience is 
described as Levinas does, as “Me,” it is his expression that justice resides in the real 
communication of one to the other.  He believes that there is a transcending of one and 
other in that communication.  Questioning, in this sense, is a mode of learning, and a 
move toward justice.  I will discuss this more in Chapter Five as a pedagogy of 
questioning.  
	  141 
Gadamer (1975/1989), too, understands that even when what we make is not 
meant to be shared with “others,” it is in the making, even with no intention of 
performance, that the shared thing exists.  He writes:    
The requirement that the play itself be intended in its meaningfulness is the same 
for both (player and spectator).  This is the case even when the play community is 
sealed off against all spectators, either because it opposes the social 
institutionalization of artistic life, as in so-called chamber music, which seeks to 
be more authentic music-making in being performed for the players themselves 
and not for an audience.  If someone performs music in this way, he is also in fact 
trying to make the music “sound good,” but that means that it would really be 
there for any listener.  Artistic presentation, by its nature exists for someone, even 
if there is no one there who merely listens or watches. (p. 110) 
 
Here again, is the idea that the question Levinas asks, “who is looking?” (who is my 
reader) has an ontological answer.  The making of anything is guided by those we are 
able to know, whose time we also understand. The writing is made with a sense of an 
audience we are able to understand, as we conceive of our self.  I wonder, in my 
conversations with the survivors of The Memory Project, how they conceive of those 
voices, which answer “Me” in response.  What does it mean to write for “ ‘me who am 
known to you,’ ‘me whose voice you find in your memories,’ or ‘me who could situate 
myself in the system of your history’” (p. 27)?  It is already a communicaton of 
themselves, a sharing of their own being when they conceive of the writing to be shared.   
Survivors of the Holocaust often have asked me why they should write if they 
have given testimony, recorded video testimony for various archives, or if they speak 
publically to groups about their experiences.  Inherent in the question itself is a focus on 
audience as purpose for testimony, who will see it? Who will keep it and remember it?  
How might listeners be moved to action?  These survivors feel drawn to speak, and 
initially to write, for the reason Gideon describes.  He says, “I do it because I want to 
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prevent it (the Holocaust) from happening again.”  It is the desire for “being to take on its 
just meaning” that drives survivors to speak, share testimony etc.  It is a plea to the world 
to be more just, to remember and not repeat the events of the Holocaust.  The “proximity 
of one to another” happens in this sharing of story.    
But this initial sense of writing as testimony is parsed in the discussions of the 
survivor writers as I ask them to describe the differences between giving testimony and 
their writing.  Gideon says:   
There’s no parallel between presentation and this (writing).  Presentation is 
partially assertive but mostly responsive.  You look at your audience, you hear 
what they say, you evaluate it . . . and you react.  Writing, you don’t have an 
audience.   
 
This sense that in the writing there is no audience may be similar to the sense Louise 
describes when she says, in response or rebuttal to Gideon, “You are your own 
audience.”  But, it is Esther who articulates a sense of audience as describing a purpose 
for speaking which is different from that of writing, when she says:  
Testimony is public, writing is a very private kind of thing.  It’s expanding, it’s 
expanding your knowledge for what it means to you.  It’s much more of an 
expanding kind of thing.  
 
Here, in these differing descriptions of audience, we may see the ways in which 
testimony and writing are so shaped by a sense of audience.  Even in Gideon’s sense that 
there is no audience for his writing, we can see the writing as conversation that the writer 
carries on for his or her own fuller understanding of the past.   
His sense, though, that his speaking is to keep the Holocaust from ever happening 
again is contrasted with his sense that in his writing that purpose is secondary; his 
writing, for a different audience, is informed by a very different purpose.  It is in this 
purpose that Gideon is, in some sense, freed from the triangulation he describes 
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undertaking to impact an audience when he speaks.  He is able to think about his 
experience through the writing, without reacting in any way to an audience he has 
evaluated.   
This echoes an earlier conversation with Esther (from p. 72 ) where she says of 
speaking, “But it is a very public kind of thing, which is very different from the writing.  
I think in the writing, often things come up that I didn’t realize I’m saying. I might not 
say it, if I knew I was saying it.”  Survivors and victims of the Holocaust have felt 
compelled, since before the hidden milk cans in the Warsaw Ghetto, cans filled with 
letters, diaries and written accounts of life, to bear witness to the atrocities (Langer, 
1995), but these participants cast life writing as somehow different than this.  The 
purpose for writing may have begun with the responsibility of “never again,” but 
survivors are, through their life writing with “no audience,” able to say things they 
“might not say” otherwise.  
The Empty House: Detachment in Fact 
In what ways is life writing experienced differently from giving testimony?  In 
what ways are the different purposes for each experienced, and how are these purposes 
informed by a sense of audience? The word “testimony” can be a noun or a verb; the verb 
means “to bear witness, testify (to)” (“testimony,” 2014).  The noun is defined as 
“personal or documentary evidence or attestation in support of a fact or statement; hence, 
any form of evidence or proof” (“testimony,” 2014).  In this context, testimony can be 
understood as evidence, attesting to the fact that the Holocaust happened.  If we 
understand “testimony” to mean to “declare that something exists or is the case,” then it 
is understood as providing more evidence that the Holocaust happened.  But does the 
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giving of evidence in support of the fact of the Holocaust cancel out the necessity of the 
personal story, the human experience of the Holocaust?  How do we understand a 
testimony of experience, and what does it mean to our understanding of the Holocaust?  
Beyond providing evidence of the fact of the Holocaust, how can we know the Holocaust, 
how can survivors understand experience differently when they are not required to 
“testify,” and are instead able to just tell.  
Eaglestone (2004) writes that testimony, unlike other texts, does not encourage 
identification, that it instead, “aims to prohibit identification” (p. 42).  Without this 
identification by the reader, what may be attested to through testimony is the experience 
lived by the survivor, the fact of the Holocaust.  But if testimony just chronicles these 
terrible events, what is unable to be told through the use of this new genre Eaglestone 
describes?  How can a survivor create the proximity that Levinas explains as an ethical 
relationship, without an audience’s identification?  What if instead of identification, the 
goal of the writing, the work of the writer is intersubjectivity?  What if, in moving away 
from testimony through the writing process, the personal story is being told and told 
again?  That kind of writing would require an audience to move closer.  That kind of 
writing calls out for identification.  It seeks an audience that moves closer, that lives in 
the questioning stance of one to another.  It would allow for identification on a human 
scale, but would never suppose to know the experience of another.    
How is the objectivity described in the definition of testimony above, different 
from the writing of personal experience, different from intersubjectivity that I have 
described as a questioning of lived-experience?  Levin (1989) writes: 
At the same time that the rule of objectivity is subjectifying the Self by detaching 
us from our body of lived experience, nullifying the validity of personal 
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experience, and undermining our trust in what we actually experience, the rule of 
objectivity also objectifies the Self, reducing it to a machine and subjecting the 
once all-too-human subject to the terror of machines out of control. (p. 14, italics 
in the original) 
 
When testimony, defined for the most part, as “attestation” or agreement that something 
happened, is the only purpose for the written works of the survivors of the Holocaust, the 
human experience becomes dangerously detached from the historical event.  This can 
happen from two directions, both through identification and in objectifying experience; 
we lose the opportunity for readers and writers, hearers and speakers to create community 
intersubjectively.  This intersubjectivity that Levinas (1981/1997) calls “sociality” exists 
in “the-one-for-the-other structure characteristic of proximity” (p. 26).  Our being for 
another means gathering to hear, not in order to “identify,” and not in order to hear 
objective experience stripped of its beings, but to share, to listen.  Bachelard (2004) 
writes, “We are never real historians, but always near poets” which puts us either in 
proximity with poets or means we are nearly poets ourselves in our telling of our personal 
story (p. 6).  In either meaning, and in the dual meaning, the effect is the same.  It is only 
through our ability to listen (as a poet listens) and move closer to the writer (as a poet 
moves closer), while knowing our limitations in sharing experience, (as a poet feels the 
weight of uttering) that the goal of justice sought by testimony can happen.      
It is not until the third definition given for “testify” in the Oxford English 
Dictionary that the idea of sharing a belief or a feeling comes up.  This definition, “To 
profess and openly acknowledge (a fact, belief, object of faith or devotion, etc.); to 
proclaim as something that one knows or believes,” allows for testifying to be a mode of 
sharing a belief, a felt truth, as opposed to reiterating fact, verifying the existence of a 
historical event.  In this meaning, testimony is an affirmation of faith, a story meant to 
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change the mind, or feelings of the listener.  In this understanding of testimony, which 
aligns with Gideon’s description above of appraising an audience, the speaker gauges 
how he might best impact that audience’s feelings about the Holocaust.  It also aligns 
with the idea, put forth also by Gideon, that by not forgetting the Holocaust, through 
testifying, he may help to ensure it “never happens again.”  This is impossible without the 
intersubjective nature of sharing the story of his own survival.     
The personal writing does not allow for the detachment described by Levin (1989) 
as the danger of putting forth objective fact about personal experience.  This sense that 
what is shared in writing is different from testimony was expressed by Halina when I 
asked about the difference between the ID cards given to visitors at the museum which 
tell the biographical facts of an actual person’s life.  I ask what the difference is between 
those recorded facts and her story.  She says, “Well these are just facts and the stories are 
also your emotions and your, your what you felt about it.”  I ask why it is important to 
share those things, those things that are beyond the facts, and Halina says, “Well I think 
the audience is more interested, it gives them more.  It shows much more who I was, 
when this was happening.”   
Through the use of her personal story, and through the description of her feelings, 
Halina conveys something less detached, possibly less “objective,” while it is more 
meaningful. What she describes is intersubjectivity; the audience is given more, she says, 
because she shows “who she was.”  An audience can never fully understand what Halina 
experienced, can never fully “identify,” but through being in proximity, there is an 
approach toward intersubjectivity.   What she conveys through her writing, she sees as 
giving “more” to an audience.  This sense may be one of the important reasons that these 
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survivor writers describe the audience for their work primarily as family, our group, and 
others closely related to them.  These are the people they wish to share more of 
themselves with.  By moving beyond the attestation that the Holocaust happened which is 
the goal when speaking to an audience of school children, or police officers in training, 
survivors describe through personal story what the Holocaust was like for them.  Through 
the writing, they are able to describe what it means and has meant through time, to them.    
“Transformation Into Structure:” The Reciprocal Building of Story 
Marty describes his sense of the writing process as an opening and expanding of his own 
experience, as he contrasts it with his experience of speaking in the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Oral History program entitled First Person: 
You’re sort of guided and your response goes to what the questions are asked and 
what happens is that your scope is very limited to what he asks you, OK? And 
you have a certain amount, only a few sentences, and then he goes on to the next 
statement. It’s only one hour.  
  
Now what happens with writing, I think, you have a chance to think about it and 
correct yourself, or you can expand on it, so the expression is different than just a 
recording, a spontaneous recording, even though you may get the same 
information, but it’s different. 
 
Marty here describes that what is conveyed in the writing may contain the same 
information as in his speaking, but that in the writing he is able to convey something 
more.  In a similar way, Gadamer (1975/2006) describes the movement of “play” in its 
becoming a work of art as “transformation into structure.”  He writes, “It has the 
character of a work, of an ergon and not only of energeia.  In this sense I call it a 
structure (Gebilde)” (p. 110).  While Marty is telling about the events of his life during 
the Holocaust in either mode, the writing, as he describes it, allows for the making of an 
“ergon,” allows for the story to become a work of art.  “A Gebilde” writes Arthos (2011) 
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“is a world that is closed in the sense that it never loses its context, or better, creates its 
own (expanding) context” (p. 130).  Here Marty’s, and previously Esther’s, sense of the 
expanding process of their written work is one way that the writing, the story of a life, 
begins a conversation between writer and first reader, the “Me” that Levinas (1981/1997) 
describes.  Through the craft Marty says he employs, there is a making of personal 
experience into structure, into a work.   
In the margin of my copy of Gadamer’s (1975/2006) Truth and Method, next to 
the passage quoted above, I wrote, “It becomes to have a life of its own.”  In my 
understanding, the making is a continuation of experience; it is “being” made in(to) a 
work.  This way of describing the “work” of art is particularly important in that it is 
through each author conceiving of, choosing what to share as story (transformation into 
structure), that a conversation with and through the work may begin.   
Just as Louise names herself as her own audience for her work, the sense is one of 
moving closer to her own voice, through the writing.  As Heidegger (1993c) describes, 
“The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist” (p. 143).  
Through the thinking about it, the self-correction, Marty describes doing with his own 
work, this dialogue, this expansion, has already begun. 
   As Levin (1985) writes, “To move with compassion is to move in response to the 
calling - the suffering and needs - of other sentient beings.  But when deep compassion is 
the motivation, to move and to be moved are one and the same” (p. 98).  It is through this 
dialogue, the expanding process of the writing that this can happen.  It brings the writer 
simultaneously closer to herself, and in that way, closer to the world, as Levin calls it 
“being moved by grace of Being as a whole” (p. 98).  Here, where audience is the self 
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first (the “Me” Levinas describes), the expanding process of “transformation into 
structure” is the continuation of narrative consciousness made in (and into) a written 
work.  
 In sharing this experience to impact an audience, or to express their own being, 
these writers desire to create resonance.  This resonance is the “proximity” Levinas writes 
about, and it is the purpose of the “being of a poetic image” (Bachelard, 2004, p. xvi).  
Bachelard takes this further in describing the “real measure of the being of a poetic 
image” as its “reverberation.”  In his sense that “The poet speaks on the threshold of 
being,” we see how the “being of a poetic image” is part of making something wholly 
new, which in that making re-makes the world.       
It is also important to describe this sense of making as a “transformation into 
structure” because of the sense communicated in our conversations, that the survivor 
writers of The Memory Project do not see themselves as making a work of “art” at all.  In 
the same way that Gadamer (1975/2006) describes chamber music as attempting to 
escape, at least originally, the requirements of “art,” no survivor in our conversations, 
describes the work he or she makes as art.  Further though, not one person, in any of our 
conversations, would even describe him or herself as a writer.  I think of this as a 
definition, employed here by these survivors, of art as a finished product.  These writers 
don’t see their writing as the questioning alive within the tension between “ergon” and 
“energeia” as Gadamer describes the “transformation into structure.”  They certainly 
would not say that their writing was creating “the being of a poetic image,” though they 
seek resonance, and call out for proximity.  How is it that ideals of form, perceptions of 
“history,” and notions of craft keep these writers from naming themselves as writers?   
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Building On: The Stifling Structure of Form 
It might be that we are all tattooed savages since Sophocles.  But there is more to 
Art than the straightness of lines and the perfections of surfaces.  Plasticity of 
style is not as large as the entire idea . . . We have too many things and not 
enough forms. (Flaubert, as cited in Derridas, 1963/1978, p. 3) 
 
I ask the survivors about their experience of themselves as writers.  The answer, 
where not one group member calls him or herself a writer, leads to more questions about 
what it means to these survivors to articulate personal experience through their own 
writing.  Further this conversation asks us, I think, to expand and question our sense of 
how the work of art is related to the maker and to the making of art.  It ask us to question 
also the purpose of producting a work of art.   
When I express surprise that no one in the group names him or herself a writer, 
Gideon says, “I think you pointed it out correctly, none of us thinks of ourselves as 
writers.  We write, but I don't think we are writers.”  This denial of naming themselves as 
writers is tied to a belief that emerged in an earlier conversation that writing is experience 
“set down” and that forms are fixed and immutable – in some sense impenetrable, for 
these writers.   
When I began our conversation by asking how participants describe their writing, 
I was told by Harry, “I certainly don’t call it autobiography.”  In this answer he wants to 
be clear that the writing he is doing is not an autobiography, though it may be 
autobiographical.  Others chime in that they also are not writing an autobiography. Here 
for the first time, this phrase “snippets of memory” is invoked to describe the writing 
done for the group, and eventually it gets repeated several times, until it is changed by 
Gideon and becomes “snippets of life.”   
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When I ask what it would mean to write an autobiography, a particular sense of a 
fixed form is described through the conversation that ensues.  Marcel says:  
It would have to be more structured, it would have to be, I was born in 1934 and 
then go through the whole thing.  I pick stories as they come to me.  Oh, oh, first 
all from what I talk (speak about) and now I am going back to stories and now 
I’m talking about life in Poland and talking about how I came to America and 
talking about that.  And these are just individual stories and they are not the time, 
they are not time . . . 
 
Gideon chimes in to supply the word Marcel is searching for.  He says, “They are not 
chronological – Exactly!” Several others agree, and Gideon provides a definition of 
biography.  He says, “The phrase biography happens to be chronological, has to be 
structured, exactly what Marcel said.” 
In this exchange, the refusal to describe the writing as biography or autobiography 
seems tied to the refusal to call themselves writers, for what would it mean if they were 
writers?  What would it mean if they wrote within this fixed form they think of as 
autobiography? What is the responsibility of creating, as writers of autobiography would, 
a literature of the Holocaust?  
This reluctance, on the part of these writers, to call themselves writers, to name 
their work as autobiographical, to take on the telling of the Holocaust, exposes a way of 
thinking about historical events as objects, which might be able to be known 
“scientifically,” chronologically, objectively.  Carr (1986) writes, in critique of this way 
of viewing “society” as an object: 
Individuals, so the argument goes, only represent so many fleeting, changing 
perspectives or subjective impressions.  But to know scientifically is to attain to a 
single world, to arrive at nature as a set of universal and necessary laws.  When 
you and I know a scientific or mathematical truth it is the same thing we know 
and thus the same thought we think. (p. 125) 
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Survivors, in our conversations, describe writing as expanding their individual voice, as 
Carr calls it, “an investigation which is methodologically anchored in the first person” (p. 
124), but they still  refuse to name themselves as writers.  While they are telling 
individual and personal experiences, they are still concerned with the notion that “in 
individuality lies error; when we think the truth we are all one” (Carr, 1986, p. 125). 
Even without thinking that there can be “the truth” when survivors speak and write about 
the Holocaust, there is still the perception, expressed in these conversations, of the 
writing as a product that must fit the constraints of a fixed form and as produced through 
the proscribed steps of a uniform process.     
Marty answers the question of what to call his own writing, with more questions: 
In the beginning I tried to go, sort of, in terms of years, umm but I don’t know if it 
is a biography, I think it’s more of an experience of your life and I guess if you 
call it a biography it’s more  . . . reason what I wrote it’s more experience and 
naturally it would have to be about me since I’m involved in it, it’s my 
background.  So, I don’t know what, what would you call it?  It’s more about 
experience, or life you live . . . you live through. 
 
In Marty’s seeking to name his own writing, he describes it as being a departure from 
what he “tried” to do. These participants feel a call to describe their lives, to share what 
they have made with an audience, but feel separated from “writers” because of the 
perceived constraints of a “form,” and a prescription for writing that does not match the 
way in which personal writing from memory happens for them.  Inherent here, too, is a 
rebuttal of the idea that the writing they do utilizes craft or technique.  Instead, it is put 
forward again and again, as Marty implies above, that experience is simply recorded and 
put down on paper to be viewed, as in the multiple characterizations of writing as 
“snippets of memory” or “snippets of life.”  
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Ruth describes her sense of her writing process in this way.  She says, “So, it’s 
here (points to her head) and I put it down so my family can read it.”  With this 
conception of the writing as being simply ripped from memory and made visible for an 
audience, I think we see a description of life writing expressed through the groups’ sense 
of rejecting, or at least ignoring, how memory and language are part of the work they 
make.  Here also is the sense that Ruth wishes to claim that her writing might somehow 
escape the human work of memory and writing, which is knowing in narrative and 
experiencing history as an ever-moving horizon.   
Carr writes, “The world (was reduced to the contents of mind(s) . . . of having the 
status of a mental construct” (p. 125).  In this same way, these writers may describe 
themselves as simply recording the facts of their experience, denying the interpretive, 
meaning-making processes of remembering and writing, and relying on the contents of a 
mind as memory stored and objectively retrieved.   
 Susan, though, does describe a view of her work as being made by her as she 
arranges the pieces she has written over the years.  She says:  
You have all these snippets, and after you have done maybe twenty and thirty of 
them and you are going to look at them, and this is what I did . . . So what I’ve 
done is, I’ve taken all these snippets and I got my granddaughter to help me, put 
them in chronological order, even though now they weren’t in chronological order 
when I wrote them. 
 
So, in this sense through her own finished pieces, through a writer’s process, Susan 
begins to discern themes for herself, to describe a structure of a work of, if not art, 
something.  She interprets the work she has made, discerning a pattern, which she sees as 
autobiographical, though she says she is still “not ready” to call it autobiography, and 
might instead title it simply, “Susan’s Stories.”   
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Harry also begins to describe a writer’s process as less prescribed, as individual 
crafting and making of life experience, when he references a former Memory Project 
group member who has recently published her memoir.  He says:  
I was talking to Estelle and she asked me if I was going to write a book and I said 
no, no, I’m just writing little texts, or I don’t know what word I used.  But she 
said, well that is what I did.  She said she never intended to write an 
autobiography; it just came to a point where it was an autobiography.  
 
This way of describing writing, separate from a stilted form or an established set of steps 
for making something, belies a greater sense of some in the group, of writing as the 
“expanding” process that Esther describes above.  But even within this description of 
writing as discovery, as uncovering – there is still no shared sense among the writers that 
they are writers or that what they are making are works of art or literature.  This sense of 
measuring themselves and finding a deficit as writers is related to a belief in the 
Holocaust as un-writeable, un-knowable individually, even by its survivors, but it is also 
related to the ways in these survivors describe their own experiences of the Holocaust.  
The Blueprint of the One Holocaust Story 
There are people who were in the concentration camps, or people like Charlene 
who lived in the forest for two years.  I was a sheltered child. My parents were 
alive. They tried to keep me away from all that.  I suffered, I was hungry and so 
forth, but I did not have these terrible, terrible stories that the people who have, 
that were in the march and those things.  But it (my story) is interesting, to me. 
(Marcel) 
 
This description, defining a Holocaust experience according to what did not 
happen to him, is common in my interactions with survivors.  The museum’s definition of 
a Holocaust survivor describes a survivor “as a person who was displaced, persecuted, 
and/or discriminated against by the racial, religious, ethnic, social, and political policies 
of the Nazis and their allies between 1933 and 1945” (Who is a survivor? section, ¶1) 
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But the Holocaust story may always be seen as the story of the concentration camps. The 
story of survival itself is not the story we know of the Holocaust, though it was first from 
survivors, that we know the history at all.  (Also if we did not know the Holocaust from 
its victims and survivors, who would tell that history, the perpetrators?)  So completely 
have the horrors of the death camps, the death marches, the gas chambers invaded our 
collective consciousness of the Holocaust that other stories, lived by survivors, may be 
crowded out - even in the minds of those survivors. The millions who experienced the 
Holocaust, but were not interned in concentration camps, help us sound the scope of that 
whole history.  It is the survivors’ stories that help what we know about the Holocaust to 
grow and change over time.   
Still, this one history of the Holocaust is the history against which survivors 
describe their own experience. Survivors of the Holocaust, even some who were in 
concentration camps, feel their stories dwarfed by the enormity of that history. Ruth says 
of her own writing, “I'm sure people who read it absorb it, different perspectives, but 
they're nothing, they wouldn't be interested in knowing me. Maybe they are interested in 
learning about history, but that's it.”  Auschwitz is a part of Ruth’s own story, yet her 
description is that she is not that history, that her story is separate.  Expressed by Ruth 
though, is a sense that her story, her individual story, is less “interesting” to an audience 
wanting to know more about the Holocaust.  Articulated here is this awful sense that it is 
the camps themselves that hold the interest of an audience, and not the story of those 
individuals held and killed in them.  This returns us to Carr’s statements that when we 
know something scientifically, through the science of history, we all know the same 
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thing, and in this case it is the one story of the Holocaust we hold in our popular 
consciousness.     
 The one story of the Holocaust, the images that present themselves when we think 
of the Holocaust, the striped uniforms of Auschwitz, the lines of prisoners, cup in hand, 
photographs of stacks of bodies, are incomprehensible, and if we think of the six million 
who were killed, it is un-understandable.  This is the importance of the individual story, 
but may also be why survivors find it difficult to see the importance of writing and 
crafting a unique story, beyond testifying to attest that the Holocaust happened.    
 This tension is described by Gideon and Marty and expressed through the 
importance each of them places on impacting an audience through giving testimony.  It 
contrasts with Susan’s portrayal of life writing, as a mode of self-understanding, as 
possibly more powerfully moving than the experience of hearing a speech designed to 
“impact” an audience.  Susan says:   
When you are writing the story you can go into much more detail, you can write 
and you can use words that you might not have thought of while you are talking.  
So, it is a piece that is more thought out than if you are just talking to an audience. 
. . When we are writing our stories I think they are more thought out and they are 
more poetic and they are more vivid. 
 
This idea of the “poetic” as unrelated to the Holocaust is immediately taken up by Ruth 
who says, “But that’s not what people want, the poetic is beautiful.”  In this exchange the 
personal story that Susan describes as more “vivid” and “poetic,” is refuted as an 
acceptable way of communicating a Holocaust experience.  The famously mis-
understood and often quoted, and echoed statement by Adorno (1967/1983) that “poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric,” is still present in the thinking of these survivor writers.  
Weisel’s (1989) complaints after the Holocaust mini-series that fictional representations 
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of the Holocaust were “insulting the dead” are present certainly when even survivors feel 
unfit to craft experience of the Holocaust in personal writing, beyond testifying, though 
they do.   
There is a responsibility, survivors feel, to attest to the fact of the Holocaust, as a 
means to ensure that “it never happens again” as Gideon expresses, as well as the 
conflicting desire to tell the personal story of their own experiences.  In this dichotomy, 
described by Gideon and Marty, a certain kind of testimony is named.  Here the written 
personal story is described as both lacking in its ability to impact an audience and as 
being an unacceptable way to do so.    
It is a relationship with an audience that a speaker can see, an audience that shares 
the room with a speaker, that becomes necessary through Gideon’s and Marty’s 
descriptions of how an audience might be impacted - to ensure that the Holocaust never 
happens again.  Marty describes the importance of the “feedback” he gets from an 
audience and Gideon says, “But everything you said, you have it in writing, you have it 
in writing but what you DO NOT have in writing, is the facial expression, the pausing 
between the sentences, the tone.”  Marty adds that what is missing in the writing is, “the 
emotion.” This sense that there is a responsibility to tell not the “poetic” but instead to 
tell, as Ruth says, the story that “people want” illustrates how the one story of the 
Holocaust is one that stands in the way, somehow, of the individual story.  More than that 
is the sense, shared by these survivors that the poetic image is merely beautiful.  Gideon 
says, “I am changing according to the audience, because my duty is to get the audience to 
understand, not to (for) me.” The purpose Gideon describes for his speaking shows that 
the responsibility he feels is to make his audience understand, and in this way to attest to 
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the fact that the Holocaust happened. His purpose for speaking, he says, is not to add to 
his own understanding of his experience.  Yet it is in this wish for understanding, this 
desire to be heard and understood, and Gideon’s desire to produce action, that the “poetic 
image” Bachelard (2004) describes lives.  Bachelard writes, “The poet does not confer 
the past of his image upon me, and yet his image immediately takes root in me” (p. xvii).  
He describes the poetic image’s “being” existing between hearer and speaker, reader and 
writer and as the relationship of resonance, the very thing Gideon conceives to be the 
purpose of his speaking.      
How, then, does the story that Susan describes, the one that is more “thought out” 
and more “vivid,” fail to convey the “emotion” that Marty and Gideon say is missing 
without the physical presence, the reciprocity of a speaker before an audience?  Certainly, 
the physical body of a narrator makes a difference to an audience hearing a speech, but 
what about the body’s presence in the written work? 
From Door to Door: The Body Telling 
We were all sitting outside, numb with despair, when Lili stood up and started to 
sing a beautiful aria.  At first her voice was unsure from lack of use, but as she 
continued to sing, her voice became more confident and strong.  It was hard to 
believe that such a beautiful and powerful voice could emerge from such a tiny, 
frail young woman. 
 
Our bodies had been pushed to their limits. We were all starving, our heads were 
shaved bald, and we were weak from exhaustion, but when Lili sang she seemed 
powerful, strong, and beautiful. Words cannot describe how her simple act 
affected me so deeply.  I was mesmerized by the music.  It replenished my supply 
of hope, the most precious commodity one could have in Auschwitz. (Geva, 2008, 
p. 13) 
 
Geva’s description is one that could never be understood without the body’s own 
understanding.  Even “hope” is itself embodied as we say we feel it.  The living vibration 
of singing, we feel not only with our ears; we feel it with our skin, the breath made 
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resonant moves through us.  Geva’s story is one we feel through and from description of 
the experience, our own body’s experience of singing or of hearing song.  In what ways is 
this different from hearing a survivor pause while telling, as Gideon and Marty describe 
above, from seeing a survivor’s face when he tells, from hearing and seeing the tears that 
come when a survivor speaks? In both Geva’s story of a song in Auschwitz and in 
Gideon’s description of speaking to an audience – the facial expression, the tone, the 
emotion, in each the body is the medium and mode of the communication. 
Merleau-Ponty (1955/1964) who describes the body as the locus and generator of 
perception, writes, “It is thus necessary that, in the perception of another, I find myself in 
relation with another ‘myself,’ who is, in principle, open to the same truths as I am, in 
relation to the same being that I am” (p. 17).  Just as Levinas (1981/1997) describes 
audience as always “Me,” Merleau-Ponty here switches the point of view to the person 
who perceives.  Still the relationship is the same.  There is communication when there is 
a sharing of what is common (human) in the understanding of perceived and perceiver – 
this is intersubjectivity.  This is true whether it occurs with an audience of listeners or 
with a writer imagining, and writing for, an audience of readers.  In other words, the 
proximity Levinas describes exists even without the speaker’s body physically standing 
before an audience.          
Merleau-Ponty (1955/1964) writes, “Associated bodies must be brought along 
with my body. The ‘others,’ not merely as my congeners, but the others who haunt me 
and whom I haunt” (p. 161).  These “others” Merleau-Ponty describes are not those who 
are merely like us, who share our genus, they are those who inhabit us, whom we inhabit 
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– as haunt is understood as both an action and a place.  And it is a sharing in common, 
inhabitation that is sought by each “associated body.”   
The Oxford English Dictionary describes the parallel nature of haunt: “From the 
uncertainty of the derivation, it is not clear whether the earliest sense in French and 
English was to practise (sic) habitually (an action, etc.) or to frequent habitually (a place) 
(“haunt,” 2013).  Further, a haunted house is inhabited by spirits, spirits that are 
disembodied, but for the structure of a building they haunt, or through other body’s 
noticing of them.  In this way, the “associated bodies” of the phenomenon of life writing 
the Holocaust are all manner of audience. 
Survivors tell of the response they get when they speak to an audience, the letters 
they receive thanking them for sharing their experience.  I have been surprised to see 
scenes of adulation when I accompanied a survivor as she spoke to high school students; 
audience members clasped her hands, wanted to hug her, cried about her experience in 
front of her.  Marty describes his experience of speaking publicly: 
It is unbelievable, unbelievable the response you get from the kids and they could 
be young kids, like early high school or into college.  What amazes me . . . is 
places where they never met a Jewish person in their lives, and they could go 
through their whole lives and never meet a Jewish person – yet they care! And 
that is what spurs you on, that is the humanity of it and it is really what comes 
across for me and that is why speaking is so important.  
 
 Yet, Harry describes, as others have, his sense of his speaking, in contrast to the 
writing he does for the group:  
Well, I think it’s very different, very different. One reason is that when you are 
talking, I’m sure most of us don’t say, won’t talk about, certain things that are too 
painful or you know would trigger you to lose your composure. So you avoid 
those things and you just talk in general terms.  When you write, you can be more 
intimate, express feelings that you don’t normally.  
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Notice the purposes illustrated here.  Each man is talking about sharing something with 
an audience. Each is translating the Holocaust he experienced, to an audience.  In each 
expression, the audience defines the purpose of the work.  For his writing, Harry 
describes translating his feelings.  When he speaks, he chooses not to share his feelings, 
talking “in general terms,” he says, for a live audience.  He describes intimacy in his 
writing for an audience that, while imagined, is closer to him than people he may speak to 
in the same room.  Marty describes the response, the audience’s “care” for his 
experience, his surprise that they seem to care.  
In each communication there is a body telling; in each there is a language shared 
from body to body.  It is the purpose of both of these modes of communicating to enact a 
haunting of these “associated bodies,” and it is the nature of the word “haunting” that it 
be habitual, an experience of continuation.  
Built or Building: Process As Product 
‘To bear’ means ‘to give,’ to ‘bring forth,’ ‘to make appear.’  Thus the bearing of 
thought must be understood in relation of our skillfulness (technē), and our 
capacity for practical activity in general (phrōnesis), but also, and more deeply, in 
relation to the primary experience of truth as an event of disclosing (alētheia). 
(Levin, 1985, p. 91) 
 
What would it mean for the survivors of the Holocaust to have written, rather than 
to be writing? The answer depends on the purpose we choose for a “literature” of the 
Holocaust.  If survivors are writing as a mode of self-discovery, when then, does the 
process become the product? Inherent in Gadamer’s (1975/2006) description of the work 
of art as “transformation into structure” is the dual sense of art.  It can mean that a 
person’s transformation becomes a piece of art, as in a product, or it may mean that the 
transformation itself becomes the art, where the process is the art.  
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In some sense it, the work of art, has a rich life of its own in the “disclosing” 
described, through the process, the making, the being-in the making of writing.  This 
work is brought forth through technique, which is always growing, and honed in the 
impetus of “bearing” witness, which is living on the earth in a “poetizing way” (Levin, 
1985, p. 91).  The work, the final product, from my point of view as pedagogue, for my 
purposes as facilitator of story, may be just the latest incarnation of process, Carr’s 
(1986) “continuation” of experience. And if resonance is the expanding experience of the 
work of life writing, the audience, both real and imagined, are those whom writers seek to 
effect, the “associated bodies” they haunt.  Though even with no audience, the disclosing 
process itself, the uncovering of being, is resonant.   
Levinas (1969/1991) describes language from one to another as “the incessant 
surpassing of the Sinngebung by the signification” (p. 296), writing here that the meaning 
of what we convey is always surpassed by what we mean.  Levinas’ description is that in 
speaking to another we reveal our own being, our own meaning.  In this same way, in 
conceiving of audience, in sharing with an audience, in planning to tell or write personal 
experience each writer is, in disclosing being, opening being to others.  This is 
intersubjectivity and comes through the writing as questioning, which spurs Carr’s 
“investigation which is methodologically anchored in the first person” (p. 124).  Bruner 
(2004) also describes this process, and the importance of examining how it works. He 
writes:  
Autobiography (formal or informal) should be viewed as a set of procedures for 
“life making.”  And just as it is worthwhile examining in minute detail how 
physics or history go about their world making, might we not be well advised to 
explore in equal detail what we do when we construct ourselves 
autobiographically?  Even if the exercise should produce some obdurate 
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dilemmas, it might nonetheless cast some light on what we might mean by such 
expressions as “a life.” (p. 692) 
 
What we can know from studying the construction of autobiography translates to what 
we can know about “a life” illustrates how Bruner sees these processes as intertwined.  In 
his illustration, the construction of one mirrors the construction of the other.   
 “In the Unity of Geschicte”      
What is it, though, that is “allowed,” according to these survivors, when it comes 
to describing a history, anchored in the “first person?” What is allowed when we describe 
autobiography of the Holocaust as “life making?” How do these participants deal with the 
telling of history in which personal story is enmeshed?  Esther and Gideon explore their 
perceptions of audience and reveal further questions about how what they write is often 
guided by for whom they are writing.  Each describes their hopes to affect an audience, 
albeit different kinds of audiences.  
Esther asks, “But, are you writing a book to give factual history or are you writing 
for your family to know your reactions, your experiences, and how you remember it?”  
Gideon responds to Esther’s conception of her writing:  
Let us take your approach, you are writing for your family, what you remember 
and what you say is totally subjective and therefore, by definition, correct, but if 
you do mention facts like . . . Vlasovci, that's not your personal part, that's part of 
the background. 
  
Esther goes on to say that she doesn’t write “factual history.”  She says, “I never write a 
fact. Ever!”  Here Esther reveals several questions related to this writing: how does an 
audience you “gauge,” as Gideon describes in an earlier conversation, require a story 
very different from the story required by “no audience” or by an audience of friends and 
family? This desire to tell personal experience separate from the responsibility of 
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verifiable fact, from telling “factual history” as Esther describes it, impact the writing she 
does.  These forces outline, in many ways, what survivor writers may feel they can make 
of and through their writing. 
But how is it that the Holocaust as “background,” as Gideon describes it, is 
separate from the “personal” story Esther is writing; how could they ever be separable?  
The “background” of the Holocaust is part of the time, space, body and community that 
shaped her experience, and it is most certainly “personal.”  The loss of her family, the 
town she fled on the Kindertransport, are these not all background?  And what about the 
facts she disavows writing?  She has written of her voyage to the United States on a 
certain boat, her experience of living in a certain town; are these “facts?”  Are these facts 
part of a “factual history?”   
In this tension between what is personal and what is background or factual, the 
importance of these writers’ sense of audience is seen.  What is written by survivors, is 
tied irrevocably to whom each writer imagines might read their stories.  Esther describes 
her audience as her family, and claims there are no facts in what she writes, freeing her 
writing from the necessity, the responsibility, of telling the facts of the Holocaust, 
allowing her to tell her own story as person and survivor.   
Still, how is the “background,” both the background of the Holocaust and the 
background of lives before and after, always enmeshed with the personal story of these 
survivors?  Merleau-Ponty (1968/1975) writes: “We situate ourselves in ourselves and in 
the things, in ourselves and in the other, at the point where by a sort of chiasm we 
become the others and we become world” (p. 160).  These “things,” these “others,” are 
context, or “background” of experience, but don’t stand in back of the writer, the 
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survivor, or any audience.  The conversation, dialogues carried on with these “things,” 
these “others,” is always already part of the experience of “being” and certainly already 
part of the experience of writing.    
Carr (1986), writes, “Yet Husserl himself wrote that the ego, ‘constitutes itself for 
itself, so to speak in the unity of Geschichte’; or as one could say, in one possible 
translation of Geschischte, the unity of story” (p. 74).  The personal story is somehow 
more allowable to Esther if she is writing for her family, and if she says she is not 
writing a “factual history.”  Others look for resources, historians and others, to lend 
credence to the personal story enmeshed in the “background” of the Holocaust.  The 
process of this writing in both cases, is this important making of a recursively more 
coherent self, a more coherent understanding of a terrible past.  It is to seek 
communication of a self, while working toward impacting an audience.  It is memory’s 
project, happening in the unity of Geschicte. 
Returning to the participants’ refusal to call themselves writers, this beautifully 
describes the importance of the on-going process I’ve described.  When Gideon says, “I 
think you pointed it out correctly, none of us thinks of ourselves as writers.  We write, but 
I don't think we are writers,” he names this.  Here he describes the process of writing and 
eschews the title, the final naming, of writer.  In what he says, it is the writing, the 
continuation, the project of memory, which is affirmed. This, too, is the “expanding” 
Esther describes her writing as being.  This work is the balancing of part to whole; 
present, past and future; self and audience (other) and is “expanding” in its reflexivity.  It 
is as Levinas (1981/1999) writes, “The relationship with a past that is on the hither side 
of every present and every re-presentable . . . is included in the extraordinary and 
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everyday event of my responsibility for others” (p. 10).  It is this “relationship” where 
conversation and questioning live, and it is in these dialogues where the writing happens 
and then where resonance occurs. 
Building On: Remembering as Project 
While I’ve already begun to discuss the dialogue that these writers carry on with 
the facts, details and historical record of the Holocaust, these are only some of the 
important dialogues that describe this phenomenon.  In the phenomenon of life writing 
the Holocaust, the dialogue of memory, the conversation with history, the always 
emerging narrative that is written and experienced recursively is carried on without end 
and begins in conversation with lived-experience.  This conversation begins with 
questions that these survivor writers have about their own personal histories, their 
“backgrounds” and with stories that ask to be told.  
Also, as I’ve described, often life writing the Holocaust begins with the purpose 
of “never again.”  Participants describe the questions that present themselves when they 
try to write about personal experience.  They describe the process of seeking information 
or talking about those experiences with others, as a means of remembering, as a means of 
crafting coherent life stories.  
It is this process, writing’s (or the writer’s) dialogue with memory, which I ask 
about when Ruth describes her writing.  The answer she gives, “It gets out your memory; 
it sparks a memory” helps me to see the discursive relationship of writing and memory 
within the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  This description is one where the 
writing acts as both impetus for remembering and as mode of memory.  Is it the memory 
getting “out” that “sparks” memory, or the other way around? It is both, as it is 
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reciprocal.  It describes a phenomenology, a conversation with lived-experience and 
echoes Merleau-Ponty’s (1955/1964) description: 
A phenomenology therefore has a double purpose.  It will gather together all the 
concrete experiences of man which are found in history – not only those of 
knowledge but also those of life and of civilization.  But at the same time it must 
discover in this unrolling of facts a spontaneous order, a meaning, an intrinsic 
truth, an orientation of such a kind that the different events do not appear as a 
mere succession. (p. 52) 
It is in this double purpose, also the purpose of life writing, that the dialogue is able to 
happen between the “concrete experiences of history,” “the unrolling of facts” and the 
meanings, “the order” made from that history.  In this sense, Ruth’s conception of writing 
as getting a memory “out” and as sparking a memory become steps in a building, 
meaning-making process.  And whether it is the “facts” that call for a writer’s attention 
first, or the questions of meaning that call for the “facts,” these survivor writers, through 
the questioning and writing of personal experience, seek out both the facts and multiple 
ways to make meaning of and through them. 
Getting It Out: A Project Complete         
Some participants, though, do seem to describe writing as putting memory to rest, 
of getting it “out” without the returning spark, the meaning making.  For example, Albert 
says, “It is a great satisfaction.” Halina says,  “It feels like I have never been able to talk 
about it and now it’s coming out.”  And Louise says, “the relief is that you finally write it 
down and you make sure that . . . it will not die with you, because it’s written.”  But even 
in this description where the writing is “out” of the writer, it is not the end of anything.  
Marcel describes his own process in this way. 
When I write, it usually takes me awhile and sometimes I can’t sleep because 
things are coming to me.  Then I write it and my wife reads it and says, is this 
true?  And I say, of course it is true and then she says well you never told me that 
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and I say, well I just didn’t tell you that. By writing you also bring certain facts 
you never talked about, you never told anybody about.  
Through the process of writing, what Marcel describes as “things . . . coming to him,” 
happens here in dialogue with memory.  The conversation with memory, then, spurs the 
conversation that he has with his wife.  This conversation is only one example of how 
memory may be “out” of a survivor, yet never put away, never done with. Through 
sharing the memories he has uncovered in order to share, they come back to the world 
through his writing, expanding Marcel’s experience of them. 
Other participants describe writing’s conversation with memory also.  Gideon 
says, “Probably the first things you write are the kinds of things which . . . burn in your 
heart the most.”  This kind of memory may be the impetus for writing in the first place, 
but it is not ever the final step of the process.  Still it recalls a spark turning to a fire, 
burning to be written about – gotten out, but not put out.  Others in the group echo this 
feeling of being unburdened by writing.  Jacqueline describes writing as, “It’s a relief! 
It’s a relief, a relief! When you write something down and you think . . . yeah! That’s 
right, that’s what I lived, that’s what I felt.  It’s a relief!”  This sense she describes is of 
making herself understood, as having made herself understandable, of saying what she 
meant to say, and the feeling of relief it brings. 
Levinas (1981/1997) describes this process also.  He writes, “In all cases, in 
asking ourselves, with regard to truth: ‘who is looking at being manifesting itself in 
truth?’ (p. 28), the welcoming of manifestation of being could not take place outside of 
the being that manifests itself.”  He means also that the writer is made in the writing; the 
rememberer made in remembering, through the “regard to truth.”  This experience of 
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saying what she meant to say is what Jacqueline describes as her being, being 
communicated.  
This regenerative process is one where memory acts as a reason for writing and as 
the place where writing, in its requiring of memory, makes remembering happen.  It is a 
building on, a furthering of understanding, but it is not the final word. As Marty says: 
I just write it because I started in the class, but a lot of times I hear people say that 
it’s euphoric for them, it’s like you know you write down what you think or what 
you say (as if) it’s supposed to help you.  And I don’t find that, I don’t find that it 
cleanses me more now, it’s not a release.  You know my memory is still my 
memory, ok?  I don’t dwell in my memory, because in order to do this, once you 
pass it you have to go on with life so I’m a big believer in that, but at the same 
time, I don’t forget.  
Even in Louise’s description of “getting out” a memory, so it “will not die with 
her,” she names a way in which memory may continue to live beyond her, to have a life 
of its own in the expanding process of remembering, writing and sharing with others.  
Levinas (1981/1997) calls this “hollowing out the fold of inwardness, in which 
knowledge is deposited, accumulates and is formulated” (p. 27).  The questions that bring 
about dialogue with memory are the beginning of many other dialogues as well, and it is 
to these dialogues I turn now.  
Constructing The Past: Gathering Necessary Members 
First, I turn to describe the dialogues survivor writers of The Memory Project 
carry on with the historical record of the Holocaust and with historians.  Next, I discuss 
conversations participants describe having with family members and friends as part of 
their process for writing and remembering.  Finally, I discuss being in dialogue with our 
group, The Memory Project writers and myself, as an important aspect of building, 
writing and remembering.    
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Morter and Brick: Re-membering and History 
O.K. So, if you are . . . um . . . why does it matter to know the date that the paper 
happened? And how is it that the story is also . . . so it is not just a story of a boy 
sitting on his father's lap reading the paper. There are complications that are there 
that have to do with the facts that you want to find out.  It's not really a question, 
it is more of a  . . . I can't really form it into what I am asking.  But, why is it 
different, how is it different from writing . . . another person writing about their 
experiences, how is it that the facts have so much to do with it? (Maggie, personal 
reflection) 
To return to the theme of the Holocaust as a site of demolition, as a breach in 
knowing and understanding, for those who experienced it, the breach, the incoherence of 
when there is “no occasion for knowing,” becomes the questioning stance of these 
writers.  The important questions of understanding, of knowing, of remembering, lead 
these participants back to the experiences themselves.  This is described by Marcel: 
When I am writing about Drohobycz, I want to know how many people lived 
there in '39. I don't remember these things.  I want to know the exact date when 
the Germans came in. I want to know the exact date when we were liberated.  I 
know it was August 1944.  Now I know it was Aug. 5th.  I just, I read and also I 
read some and translate some memoirs about people that wrote about life in the 
Holocaust. 
Albert also describes the process of returning to the place where he was hidden as a child: 
You know, I was in hiding in a Catholic boarding school and I remember the 
headmistress. I was the youngest, and she – I was her protégé.  And I suspect 68 
years later, that she was probably the one that accepted me in this school as a 
hidden child.  But I don't know her name.   
I went, about ten years ago, I went.  I was in Paris, and I rented a car, and it was in 
a suburb of Paris.  And I went and I found the school, but all the people there, 
there were young people there, in their thirties and I said, you know I was here as 
a child, as a boy, and they looked at me like I was coming from another planet.   
And they had no idea, you know?  And I would love, I would have loved, . . . you 
know I had recognized two families as Righteous Among the Nations; I would 
have loved to have been able to recognize the name of that headmistress, but to 
tell them . . . You know, we have a lot of blanks like that, you know it is very hard 
to fill them.   
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Albert describes not knowing the name of the headmistress instrumental in saving his 
life; he describes also, not being able to praise her, to recognize what she did.  He stresses 
the word “love” here, suggesting that his loss of this woman’s name does something 
important to his experience.  But, along with the “loss” of the headmistress, there is a 
further loss he describes.  He talks about how foreign he seems to the thirty year-olds to 
whom he speaks, when he returns to the school in the suburbs of Paris.  
The Holocaust experience understood in this way is not just a child hoping to 
remember the past.  It expresses his distance from understanding, a loss of shared culture 
and experience, a shifting identity, a loss of memory – where memory acts as the 
“coherence of life.”  The writing both requires a return to context and becomes that return 
to context, through his continued questioning, an attempt to describe the facts within 
which personal experience unfolds.  It is the search for the headmistress’ name that 
returns Albert to the Catholic boarding school; it is the questions about his own past that 
bring him, bodily to the school where he was hidden as a boy. 
Carr describes this search for understanding of the past as autobiographical, in the 
sense that the search itself defines us.  He writes: 
We may think of autobiographical reflection as being conducted in the present 
and being directed entirely toward the past . . . however, it is concerned with the 
past in order to render it coherent with or comprehensible in terms of a present 
and future. (p. 75) 
This expression that what is searched for is an understanding for the present and the 
future, casts this backward look as a way of moving forward, in questioning.  If the 
writing is one of the ways this questioning is fostered, it happens through the desire these 
writers have to “fill in the blanks” of memory.  Through searching for the places they 
have been, returning to them, they seek to know them again.  Through the questioning 
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aspect, the active seeking, survivors are working to answer questions about their pasts, 
for their present and future and for their writing.  
For Marcel, knowing the exact date of his liberation, the experience of others 
from his former town, is a return to context, as well.  It is a return that helps him to 
understand the events of his life better, and yet provides more questions.  He seeks to 
learn the details of that town, reads and translates letters from the people of that town.  It 
is the context he seeks in these records to help him understand and describe his own 
personal experience more fully. 
In being in the things of his own memory, Marcel is able to be again in that 
background.  This recalling of the past is, as Casey (1987) writes, not “merely 
‘translating’ private memories into public artifacts” (p. 113).  The experience of recall is 
already enmeshed in the background of facts, language, things and others.  Casey writes 
that while we often think of memory as “pre-linguistic and pre-social,” we are always in 
remembering with others, things and language.  “We sense ourselves to be fully engaged 
in the autonomous activity having its own formative, indeed transformative, power” 
(Casey, p. 113).  And it is in this, often social, experience of recalling the past that we 
make the past clearer and more coherent for our present and future.  
What may be returned to, then, in their need to fill in the blanks of memory, for 
the project of writing?  What can be recovered; what may be uncovered in this search? 
Albert begins with the idea of doing research to “fill” in the “blanks” in his memory, but 
eventually he seems to question what he may be able to find. He seems to understand that 
there are only certain “things” that might be found in a historical record.  He says:   
You know that is one of the reasons, you know my children always tell me, Dad 
you should write a book about your story.  I said, I don't know how to write a 
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book, because I have a lot of blanks that I could not fill.  You know, how would I 
do that?  I could conduct some research, but it would take years and I am not sure 
I would find the answers.  
Still, it is the questioning of his being, along with the facts, details and things of his life 
from which the questions continue to spring, whether there are ever answers, or not.  But 
in the questioning of his being he is in dialogue with the facts, details and things of his 
life; it is these dialogues that keep experience open, that supply more questions.  As Ruth 
says, “It gets out your memory; it sparks a memory.” The process is continuous.  
This reflexivity is described clearly in Harry’s description of his writing process: 
I feel I'm just putting down memories. But then after I do, there's always, most of 
the time, there is a discovery . . . I talk about my experience.  The result is more 
than just a memory, but it starts that I am just putting down a memory.  
This sense, described by Harry where he begins by just “putting down” a memory, but 
ends with “discovery” describes a process that is the building process of the project of 
memory.  
Carr (1986) writes that in our ongoing personal narrative we are invited “to look 
in it for principles of unity, coherence and structure” (p. 75).  This deciphering process, 
this process of meaning making, begins in questioning and clarifying the past for 
communication and continues through the writing and the reading by others.  But this 
seeking of coherence is not just a way of ordering the past.  In the deciphering, 
remembering and writing processes, a projecting toward the future is the project of 
memory where remembering the past is not only a “projection of the world and my 
surroundings” but are instead “projections of my own being.” The writing, the discovery 
in writing, is a description of continuation of experience, a resonance of remembering, 
made in dialogue with language facts, things and others of a personal history. 
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The Story of the Wheat: Personal History  
These participants describe the dialogue personal experience carries on with the 
historical record and with historians.  It is in this dialogue where the historical record 
intersects with personal history, where survivors both ask for clarification from the 
historical record and where they add to it.  Marcel describes his experience in this 
conversation: 
I wrote that there was an Aktion that was August 1942 and gave it to one of the 
people here, one of the people upstairs that wanted that, that needed it (a museum 
historian).  She calls me back and says, that Aktion was in March.  And I said that 
we hid in the wheat field and it was brown, it was ripe wheat when we were 
hiding there, it must have been August . . . I am telling you right now that the 
wheat was high and it was the color of the, you know it was the color of ripe 
wheat, so I Googled that and obviously there was an Aktion in August where 600 
people were killed and two and a half thousand people were taken to Belzec . . . 
But I remember what happened to us . . . you want to put the proper date that 
happened because it has something to do with your story . . . Because I am writing 
that mother had a coat that she covered us [with] and it was the color of the wheat 
and it was August, when the wheat was ripe.  
How could Marcel tell the story of this Aktion where his mother hid his sister, and him in 
a field of ripe wheat, without the lived time, place, body and relationship of that 
experience?  Contextualized, not simply as a date, but as the season, where a coat and a 
field of ripe wheat allows Marcel, his mother and sister to go undetected; the time, place, 
the season are vital to the story.  In this case, the date of the Aktion suggested by the 
historian does not make sense in the clear memory Marcel has of his own experience.  
Here, as I have also discussed in Chapter Two, we see Heidegger’s  “Historie” 
and “Geschicte” or as translated, the “science of history” and “to happen in a historical 
way” (Macquarrie & Robinson, 2008, footnote p. 41) in dialogue with one another.  The 
German word Geschicte means “story,” “story line” and “history” (Geschicte, 2013), as 
Carr (1986) describes, “Geschicte” and “life story” are enmeshed (p. 74).  How is the 
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history that happens to Marcel, his “life story,” experienced within these dialogues with 
history and historians, and what does the writing have to do with it?  Here the historian, 
to whom Marcel speaks, suggests to him that the date of the Aktion he describes could be 
in March, but Marcel knows the experience differently.  
While the context found in and through the “science of history” is important to 
survivors when they are looking for information to “fill in the blanks” of memory, the 
“life story,” lived by these survivors makes up the coherence, the lived history of their 
own lives, and it is in the writing.  Marcel knows the experience of his life within the 
context of the seasons, the town where he lived, the changing color of the wheat.  It is 
this context that makes another date impossible and unfathomable to him.  It is his lived 
contexts that help him to understand and know the story that happened.  
Again it is context or background, the things and facts, the others and language of 
the remembering which make the memory possible and understandable to Marcel.  
Levinas (1981/1997) writes, “Truth is rediscovery, recall, reminiscence, reuniting, under 
the unity of apperception” (p. 29).  He calls this “precisely re-presentation” where “the 
present of truth is already or still is. This understanding of remembering makes the whole 
of his perception (including his memory), the coat, the field, the wheat, the season, the 
hiding; all of these are the present of “truth is already or still is.”  There is no past 
separable from context, no past communicable separate from the background it is. 
For Harry’s memories a bit of background provides more confusion for him when 
trying to answer questions of when, where and how.  He seeks answers to questions 
where memory doesn’t contain enough of the past’s context to be fully coherent to him 
now:
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I'd like to give you an example of where I do research.  I have a memory, uh we 
went into hiding in '42.  I have a memory of sitting on my father's lap, I don't 
know what I was doing there, I was already in hiding - and he's holding a 
newspaper and there is a picture, a map and he's telling me uh, the Allies, I don't 
know what I understood by that, had landed there in Italy and he said, see looks 
like a boot. So, I always remembered that about Italy.  So that's my memory.  So 
then, I wanted to make sense of this, why was I there and when was this? So I 
look it up, when did the Allies land in Italy? In 1943. But why was I at my 
parents, with my parents at that time?  I was already at the Vanderlindens, in 
hiding, but did something happen? I don't know.  I have no idea.  
Knowledge of the date the Allies landed in Italy only provides more questions for Harry.  
He is not sure how he could have been sitting on his father’s lap, knowing that he was 
separated from his parents, in hiding, by 1943.  
This useful dialogue between the facts, dates and information of the Holocaust, 
and the life story of survivors, call up questions that for Harry, with no one alive to ask, 
lead back to life story and to the writing that both asks about it and tells it.  Through 
attempts to make coherent events of a lived-life, survivors work within both “Geschichte” 
and “Historie,” but it is, of course, personal history from which they make meaning and 
through which they experience the historical record of the Holocaust.  
Further, the writing itself is a return to place and time; it is a return to background.  
How else could survivors return to places and people who are lost through any mode 
other than memory?  Even questions about the past are a return, of sorts, a dwelling there.  
When asking a question of those who don’t answer, there is a turn toward the past, the 
people who inhabit it.  The writing both requires and allows for the question, as it allows 
an author to dwell in that questioning.  Carr describes his concept of narrative as involved 
in both “a series of (human) events unfolding in time” and “a prospective-retrospective 
grasp which holds together that unfolding and constitutes its structure” (p. 85).  The 
“prospective-retrospective grasp” is how we are able to describe the unfolding and 
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constitute its structure.  In seeking to name the past, to know it, we dwell in it, 
interrogating it again and again. 
Here, the past is Harry sitting on his father’s lap looking at the newspaper.  This is 
experience he dwells in through the questioning.  It is experience he is able to share with 
readers, who in a smaller measure are able to dwell within their own understanding of 
this memory. Does a reader remember the feeling of another body, the feel of a lap 
beneath her?  The memory experienced by Harry is dwelled in, in questioning it, in 
calling it back again and again.  The questions it evokes calls for Harry to write about it, 
to research it, dwelling in that experience further.  In this way the experience remains 
open and openable. 
This is different from the work of historians.  In Halina’s case, personal history 
from survivors changes what is known by historians and becomes a part of the historical 
record itself.  Halina says: 
I argued with a historian here, because he did not believe that my father escaped 
from Russia, which he misunderstood because I said he escaped from the prison 
to join the General Anders Army.  He said it was impossible to escape Russia.  
And I said no, he didn't escape Russia, he escaped the prison.  
In this relationship between the historical record and life story, might there be an 
expansion of what is known about survivors’ lives after the war, from what Halina tells? 
When a true dialogue happens, there is discovery for Historie as well as for those who 
lived it.  In this conversation, survivors describe the play between the knowledge they 
have of the Holocaust and history’s changing perspectives.    
But what you said about historians, if it is a really good historian, they say – for 
the moment this is what we know, but we learn something every day.  But if they 
talk about Halina's story, they said well it was not possible.  Then all of a sudden 
they come across something that there was somebody who did escape from Russia 
and a good historian will always pull back a little bit and say, this is what we 
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know now, but tomorrow we might have some more information.  It is not a cut; 
you know it all depends on what they know and hear. (Louise) 
The point of view changes too.  I mean if you read old history, American history . 
. . you know, but now it is different. (Esther) 
This description of a changeable knowing and understanding of “Historie” is 
echoed in Heidegger’s (1927/1962) description of historical being.  He writes, concerning 
the relationship of time and being, that being is known through time and vice versa: 
Only on the basis of such ‘historizing’ is anything like ‘world history’ possible or 
can anything belong historically to world-history.  In its factical Being, any 
Dasein is as it already was, and is what it already was. It is its past, whether 
explicitly or not.  And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing 
itself along behind it and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is 
still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after effects upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its 
past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of its 
future on each occasion. (p. 20) 
In this sense, without the life story or personal history of each being, the idea of a shared 
“world history” could not be possible.  The sense that “beings” “historize” meaning “to 
happen in a historical way” is how life story, and life writing remain in dialogue with the 
historical record.  This allows for a representation of a whole, and describes a pattern 
from the sum of personal experience.  
The personal experience of survivors is not separate from the “science of history;” 
their knowing is informed also by the work of historians of the Holocaust, as many of 
them began reading these historical accounts, because they concerned events through 
which they had lived.  Jacqueline describes working for the Foreign Service and reading 
many books on the Holocaust as she began to think of herself as a “survivor.”  Her 
research into the historical record helped her to learn more about her own experiences. It, 
too, helped to provide missing context.  
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In this way, the historical record is one of the places in which these participants 
seek coherence, meaning for the personal histories they have lived.  The note from the 
translators, in my edition of Being and Time (1927/1964), describes the word “historize” 
to help to understand that it, too, is a meaning making experience, in conversation with 
the past, for the future.  The translators write: 
‘Weltgeschichtliches Geschehen.’ While the verb ‘geschehen’ ordinarily means to 
‘happen’, and will often be so translated, Heidegger stresses its etymological 
kinship to ‘Geschichte’ or ‘history’.  To bring out this connection we have coined 
the verb ‘historize’ which might be paraphrased as to ‘happen in a historical way’; 
we shall usually translate ‘geschehen’ this way in contexts where history is being 
discussed.  We trust that the reader will keep in mind that such ‘historizing’ is 
characteristic of all historical entities, and is not the sort of thing that is done 
primarily by historians. (Macquarie & Robinson, p. 41) 
To paraphrase Heidegger’s sense of our own historical selves, he describes that we are 
our pasts, whether explicitly or not.  It is the questioning of personal history, the dialogue 
with the historical record, among other dialogues, that aids in making personal history 
explicit.  Life writing aids in our understanding of our standing, within the horizon 
comprised of past, present and future.  Earlier I have discussed the translation of 
Heidegger’s Geschichte as both history and story, and here geschehen carries this dual 
meaning as well.  It is not simply “historizing,” that may happen, but “storying” of lived 
experience that lends coherence to, that makes explicit ways in which dasein is its past. 
This was made clear to me through the answers these survivors gave to the question of 
what personal experiences they choose to speak about when speaking to an audience.  I 
was interested in what details would be shared in a speech that might be different from 
what could be written about.  In each answer to the question, what do you tell about your 
own life in every speech, the answers were based on a personal historical consciousness.  
Gideon wanted the audience to know that the Holocaust could happen again and about 
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the important role of collaborators.  Fred wanted an audience to learn that Great Britain 
took in 10,000 children and that no other countries were doing that at the time.  Agi said 
she wanted the audience to “believe that it happened” and that, she said, was “the most 
difficult.”  Each of these answers, what I took at first, to be misunderstandings of my 
question, show further the ways in which the “Historie” and the “Geschicte” are 
intertwined in personal experience of the Holocaust and they inform one another.  Fred 
was one of the 10,000 children saved by Great Britain through the Kindertransport 
program; Gideon experienced the role of Ukrainian collaborators, hidden during the war 
in Slovakia.  This sense of being, being its past, allows us to see life writing further as 
continuation of knowing, as understanding from and through experience, as dialogue with 
communities present and past for continuation of knowing.  
Further, it allows us to see, once again, how important the conception of audience 
is to the speaking and writing of these survivors.  Each audience, as conceived by these 
writers, is comprised of some who may be “moved” by hearing personal experience, who 
might act differently if they can be moved.      
The Community Built of Asking 
Dialogue with others, apart from historians and the historical record add to the 
making explicit of understanding that happens in life writing of personal experience.  
Dialogues described by participants are those that happen with family, friends and others 
who ask about their lives, or with those whom survivors ask to help “fill in the blanks” of 
their own personal history.  
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In each case, questions about personal history become a stimulus for writing.  In 
this description from Jacqueline, the close relationship of the processes of conversation 
with her sister, her memory and her writing are:   
I am lucky that I have a sister that is twenty months older than I am and she and I, 
I have been talking to her for six years.  She doesn't live near, but we talk on the 
phone and on the computer almost every day.  Do you remember that? Do you 
remember that? And she remembers or I remember.  Anyway, I have almost 200 
pages, I have lots of photos and documents from the archives and in a month or 
two my book is going to be published . . . And so, I've been reconstructing. 
When I ask her if it is the writing that spurs the conversation or the conversation that 
spurs the writing she says: 
Both ways.  Sometimes she remembers something. Sometimes I remember 
something.  I remember my mother saying she had cyanide for us and she was 
going to kill us, the family.  But we both had forgotten that and it was only by 
going back to the village and seeing those little kids that are my age now.  And 
saying, you know Jacqueline, what you told me . . . and my sister and I have been 
discussing it.  Do we remember, do we think we remember, nah, nah, nah. It is a 
difficult process to remember.  
Jacqueline describes her process here in reference to her memory and her writing and the 
process she and her sister are involved in together.  She also highlights the process of 
writing, when she says at the end of this statement, “I am not a writer, but I am writing.”  
The processes described here cast memory, writing and the questioning through 
conversation with others as important to the phenomenon of life writing.  Beyond this is 
the relationship strengthened and maintained through this daily conversation Jacqueline 
describes.  She and her sister work together to make the memoir of the Holocaust she 
writes.  
Others in our group describe the importance of audience for the writing they do, 
and describe audience more fully as those who respond to the writing they read with 
more questions for the writers.  Often this audience is family.  Survivors are spurred on 
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by the questions from family to write, to create a record.  Susan describes the questions 
from her granddaughter who is helping her to organize the pieces she has written. She 
says,  “Grandma what are going to call all this?  And I said, I really don't know and she 
said, well call it Susan's Stories.  So that is what it is called now.”  Even in asking for a 
title to the pieces of writing Susan is compiling; her granddaughter is asking for 
information from her, asking to know more about the meaning she makes from her life 
story.  
Through the writing there is dialogue, too, with family and loved ones who’ve 
died.  Jacqueline has written about her love of music, her appreciation to her mother for 
finding cello lessons for her just as the war was ending.  Here she describes how wishing 
to speak to her mother spurs on her writing; the dialogue furthers the writing, the writing 
spurs on this dialogue.  She says: 
For me it’s about music, because music is such a big part of my life and I think 
one of the first pieces I wrote, it was about my mother.  And Uh I’m sorry I start 
to cry, because I wish my mother were alive so I could thank her for letting me 
learn to play the cello at the time when it was just after the war and she said . . . 
you know it means so much in my life.  
Even through her wishing to thank her mother, and through her writing, she has 
communicated something she might not have been able to do otherwise.  This dialogue 
with friends and family continues from and through the writing, but still marks the 
Holocaust as a breach in knowing.  
Esther describes her role as, “I’m writing for my extended family, my grandkids 
and my nieces and nephews; I am the collector of all the information for the family.”  
This role falls to Esther because she and her sisters survived the Holocaust, while none of 
the older generation of her immediate family did.  But beyond that, Esther has many 
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questions she employs in her writing, and her writing is seeking to address these 
questions.  Through research, through conversations with family, and a friend who is a 
German historian she is guided to more questions and further writing and interpreting of 
the past.  
 Within the community of family and friends, these writers share remembering, 
collaborate in the meaning making process of life writing the Holocaust.  Through the 
questioning process, the interplay of memory, the role of having to remember, these 
survivors are within the making of the work of art that begins to have a life of its own 
through what is shared and written.  They make, whether they will call it this or not, a 
“poetic image.”  Bachelard (2004) describes this as “a direct product of the heart, soul 
and being of a man apprehended in his actuality” (p. xviii).  Harry describes this when I 
ask whom he envisions as the audience for his writing: 
You, everybody here, um, my friend Robert, a few relatives who ask for copies. I 
don’t know why I write, but it’s a way of affirming or validating my experience, 
when people react to it, which makes me feel great, and when I can express it, 
when I can write clearly or in the way that I think communicates.  
Harry finishes this thought by addressing another community, the community I turn to 
describe now, when he says, “and I, I wouldn’t do it, if I wasn’t in this class.” 
The Dwelling of Writers 
Marcel says that he will self publish whatever he writes and says, “I don't 
consider myself a writer worthy of real publishing on somebody else's money. I'm going 
to publish, you know, maybe a hundred, maybe two hundred-fifty copies to give it away 
to whoever wants to take it.”  When I ask who he will give these copies to, Ruth chimes 
in, saying “us, us.”  The “us” Ruth names is our group of writers.  The time, body, place 
and relationship of this group is named in multiple ways within the research 
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conversations and is, of course inseparable from the phenomenon.  This group meets 10 
times a year, each month, for four hours.  Within that time and space, the group has been 
shaped by the writers who convene each month and by my own evolving sense of my role 
as a writing instructor, facilitator, workshop leader.  My presence as this group’s 
facilitator, since its inception, has affected the writing produced by participants, the 
people who have chosen to persist as members, and my own view of the purpose of the 
writing and the group.  
During one of our conversations Susan asks about advice I had given years 
before.  In this conversation, my own purpose for the writing made by these survivors 
emerges.  Susan asks why I questioned her use of a reference to the ship that brought her 
to America being as long as a “football field.”  I don’t know that I made my own thinking 
clear to her then, but I know that I felt that comparison came from a different part of 
Susan’s life.  Did she know, I wondered, how long an American football field was as she 
left her childhood home in Germany?  The comparison seemed, and seems, not simply 
anachronistic.  It seems not apt for Susan’s own experience.  The Susan I know from her 
writing would not measure the ship that will reunite her with her parents in football 
fields.  The phrase she employed lacks the ability to convey something more about her, or 
it conveys nothing about her.  My own goal as a teacher has been to ask each writer to 
get, as close as she is able to communicate, to the heart of personal experience in ways 
that convey that experience to a reader.   I answered, in part, that what I want from each 
of the stories written by survivors is more personal.  
This desire on my part has been mostly ahistorical, in terms of addressing the 
science of history.  As a teacher, I have this motivation because it seems the only and best 
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way to foster the questioning aspect of the writer, but also because I’m drawn in to a 
community where I want to know, as the students who come to the information desk in 
the museum, to ask the survivors, “how WAS it?”  
Louise describes this interaction: 
Kids go through the permanent exhibit and if there is a survivor in the museum 
they go downstairs in front of the big desk and they want to ask questions, and the 
biggest question is how WAS it? And I look at them.  They have just gone through 
the permanent exhibit and I have learned to turn it around to them and say, Oh 
right, you've just gone through the permanent exhibit, how do you think it was? 
Because they see a face and they want that interaction, and I think it is the same as 
reading a story, if you have seen the face and you have spoken to a person the rest 
will stick with you.  
This question, clumsily as I, and the school children may have been asking it, is what I 
have wondered from the beginning.  Though Louise may be annoyed at what she 
perceives, I believe, as an intellectual laziness on the part of the children who ask this 
question, to me it is the most important question they could ask.  They have seen the 
striped pajamas, they have seen the replica of the gates of Auschwitz, models of the 
camps, sacred scrolls thrown out on the ground, but the highly personal question they ask 
is, “how WAS it?”  Implied in this question is the unspoken; what they want to know, to 
understand better is how WAS it, for you?  This question has been the pedagogical goal 
of my work as a “writing instructor” at the museum and is, I believe, one of the reasons 
our group has continued, why the writers keep writing, even as their work veers now 
from the subject of the Holocaust, to what it means to survive the Holocaust and to live a 
long time after it. 
This dialogue, begun in a question, is as much pedagogical as it is personal.  It is 
one of the conversations that happen in, and because of, our group.  This dialogue occurs 
in our group, is made of the people of this group, is made from the frequency, the 
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longevity, the relationships of this group of people.  The community is one where those 
who have a desire to write about personal experience gather to read and share their 
writing with one another.  It is the questions, their own and mine, that bring the writing 
out.    
In order to be a part of the community, each member contributes to the writing 
being made and feels a sense that they must contribute through their questions and 
through their bringing work to be shared.  The meetings themselves become a reason to 
write.  Fred describes the groups’ meeting as his impulse to sit down and write 
something.  He says: 
I don’t have anything that I need to get out on paper.  I have the feeling, that I’ve 
got lots of memories in my head, but it’s like Thursday’s coming up, I haven’t 
written anything for a long time. I’ve got to sit down and I pick something out 
from . . . my memory and just write it.  
In this sense the community of writers, the fact of an impending meeting, are the reason 
that Fred sits down to pick something from his memory to write about.  This echoes 
Harry’s sense that his participation in the class, the meetings themselves, are necessary 
for the writing, that he “wouldn’t do it” if there were no group.  
The shared experience of the group, their commonalities even before the group 
was formed (all are Jewish, all are Holocaust survivors, all are immigrants to the United 
States) allow for a sort of short hand of reference between the members.  Our meetings 
are punctuated by side conversations in French or Polish; often translations are offered 
for English expressions or idioms.  Only I must ask, and request clarification in the 
writing, for terms I don’t understand, for history I don’t know and haven’t experienced.  
My status as always outside the experience of these writers is one that allows me to ask 
for clarification, to act as an audience for their writing that won’t know what it means to 
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be Amcha.  It is part of the dialogue of our group, me as its instructor, the fact of the 
group, the shared experience of the members, which help to describe more fully the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust for these survivors.  It is one of the many 
questions, asked of and by these writers, which inspires the writing to continue, that 
requires the ongoing making of meaning through and because of the writing. 
The Expanding Thing: Building On and On 
Through the conversations with the members of the Memory Project writing 
group, through the multiple voices and thoughts of the participants, a description of the 
phenomenon emerges.  Writing after the breach of understanding that was the Holocaust 
acts as a way of making more coherent the events of a lived life for these survivors.  The 
phenomenological process of compiling through memory and interpreting through 
writing happens within and because of the writing process.  The work of making, the 
dialogues of the process, dialogues that happen within the multiple communities made by 
these survivors are the “expanding” Esther describes her writing as.  These dialogues, 
these texts made from and through dialogue, are personal knowing and they are 
pedagogical, as described by van Manen (1997): 
Dialogically constructed texts allow us to recognize our lives in the mimicry of 
stories and conversational anecdotes.  Thus dialogic texts allow for a certain 
space, a voice, which teaches by its textuality what the sheer content of the text 
only manages to make problematic. (p. 144) 
It is to these pedagogical meanings I turn in the next chapter, to ask what can be learned 
and understood through the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  What might we 
learn more fully through the dialogues occurring within the phenomenon of life writing 
the Holocaust?  What can we learn from the opening of this phenomenon that might help 
us to better know the expanding processes of history, memory, writing and story? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
BRINGING IT HOME: TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF QUESTIONING 
Being in Question 
I think the audience when it reads or hears it, the audience, the people 
think of questions. (Esther) 
The questions that Esther describes are those that continue our dialogue with the 
survivors of the Holocaust, and in that way, continue conversation with and about the 
Holocaust.  The texts made by survivors are work made in dialogue, where dialogue is 
continuous, where interpretation may be ongoing.  The texts are made from questioning, 
and ask questions that may add to our understanding of history, of memory, and of story.  
How may the “questions” Esther describes survivor’s stories eliciting, add to 
ongoing understanding of the Holocaust?  In what ways do these questions allow the 
Holocaust to remain open, not filed away as history? Most importantly, what does it 
mean for the stories to cause a continuation of understanding toward a more humane, 
more just future, as van Manen (1997) describes Human Science research as “critically 
oriented action research?”  
As van Manen (1997) states, pedagogy is “an ongoing project of renewal in a 
world that is constantly changing around us and that is continually being changed by us” 
(p. 3).  It is in this reflexive relationship that we see the dialogic texts of life writing the 
Holocaust as pedagogical texts.  These written works, as well as the doing of the writing, 
further a continuation of life experience, and of surviving the Holocaust.  The crafted, 
individual stories from these survivors of the Holocaust allow us a conversation that 
teaches about the Holocaust in ways that cannot be done through the themes on which a 
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science of history is focused, or through the dates and figures upon which testimony as 
evidence relies. 
What can we learn from the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust about the 
importance of the individual, personal story, about the importance of writing because of 
and through the questioning aspect?  What are we able to know about being 
pedagogically in life stories of survival? Van Manen (1997) describes “learning to 
understand the essence of pedagogy as it manifests itself in particular life circumstances” 
and the way in which that understanding “contributes to a more hermeneutic type of 
competence: a pedagogic thoughtfulness and tact” (p. 143).  This sense of pedagogic 
thoughtfulness “may be grasped,” van Manen writes, “through the dialogic type of text of 
human science discourse” (p. 143).  In this chapter I describe the texts made by these 
survivors as dialogic texts, that ask for an intersubjective reading, and intend to teach 
toward justice.  I describe these texts and the writers’ descriptions of their writing process 
as providing the pedagogical implications that lead us toward a pedagogy built on 
questioning.  
Stands For: Opening the Phenomenon Through Story 
I have focused on one group of Holocaust survivor writers and have written from 
conversations with them.  These writers create crafted writing in a writing workshop 
setting; this workshop is designed around the survivorship of its participants and happens 
in the context of a memorial museum that has as part of its mission, remembrance.  While 
the work they have done is a re-membering, what can their work, the ways in which they 
describe it, add to our understanding of writing and remembering?  What can we learn 
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from this one group?  What greater understanding of writing from life, from engaging in 
memory in this way, can we glean? 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is not research meant to be generalizable to other 
populations, but rather to give us understandings that can be applied to the ways in which 
we understand related phenomena, ways in which we understand related work, ways in 
which we can understand our own being in the world better.  So, what meaning can be 
made from knowing the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust in the ways we are 
able to know it?  We are able to know this phenomenon through story, through the 
descriptions of it and through the texts produced by the survivor writers. 
We could not know this phenomenon, or what it means, through an objective 
questioning, where we might ask what the writers learned through writing.  Objective 
questions might lead us to ask if writing had improved through the workshop process, 
utilizing one kind of measure or another.  A positivistic approach to the questions 
surrounding life writing might ask how much more often the writers write after being 
members of the group, or if they report feeling happier after writing.  None of these 
questions, or the answers they might yield, could describe the phenomenon or provide us 
with pedagogic implications of any use.  None could approach the complexity of opening 
the phenomenon through narrative.  And each objective answer hoping to categorize or 
name for all time a part of the phenomenon, brings us to tell only a small bit of a larger 
story, while allowing that small bit to stand in for the whole.  To stand in for the whole 
and larger story means to characterize it, to represent it.  To stand for something means to 
stand up for it, to defend it or bring it forward.  Intersubjective understanding happens 
through this standing-for, as what they tell stands for their experience; it is not the 
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experience itself but stands for it.  As Carr (1986) writes, “It seems that their 
accomplishment (literary narratives) is but a recapitulation of the structure of everyday 
experience and action” (p. 65).  He writes further, “Narrative form is . . . the structure 
inherent in human experience and action” (p. 65).  Since we know our being through 
narrative, as we are narrative beings, we are able to take meaning from the phenomenon 
only in story and from story.  In Carr’s conception knowing in and from story “is the 
organizing principle not only of experiences and actions but of the self who experiences 
and acts” (p. 73).  Our narrative, intersubjective knowing does not stand in as an 
objective naming of experience would; it stands for our own being, making being more 
comprehensible, allowing us to make meaning.  
Built Better: In Questioning 
The writing done by the survivors of our group is forged in questioning and the 
texts produced are dialogic in the space they afford for questions.  Further, these texts are 
made from questioning, created through dialogue with others, written and re-written 
through dialogue and understood as being in dialogue with history.  They contribute to “a 
pedagogic thoughtfulness and tact.”  They do this through the dialogues they are forged 
from and through, the dialogues they prompt.  They are written, as the participants have 
described, with the desire to translate experience, to tell about life through telling the 
particulars of an individual life story.  We are meant to understand something about 
living through our reading of them.  
Through questioning, through being in dialogue with history, these texts allow a 
better building of our historical knowing.  Gadamer (1976/2006) writes, “Time is no 
longer primarily a gulf to be bridged because it separates; it is actually the supportive 
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ground of the course of events in which the present is rooted” (p. 297).  Gadamer refutes 
“historicism” which assumes that only through removing ourselves (impossible as this 
certainly is) from our own times might we be able to understand the past.  Gadamer 
writes that the naïve assumption of historical studies, 
Has led to the idea that objective knowledge can be achieved only if there has 
been a certain historical distance . . . that the permanent significance of something 
can first be known objectively only when it belongs to a closed context – in other 
words when it is dead enough to have only historical interest. (p. 297) 
Without the open context necessary for opening being, the phenomenon in question and 
being in dialogue with the texts made by survivors would be impossible.  What makes 
these writers’ writing important is the questioning aspect, the dialogue begun, the 
“expanding” process the writing facilitates.  A finished text does not end this dialogue; it 
continues it, asking for a mimetic reading.  
Through this dialogue and through the habitual dialogue of these texts and 
through being in this questioning, there is a pedagogic knowing brought forth through the 
phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  These are all described by these survivor 
writers.  Each of these illustrates van Manen’s (1997) sense that “poetic texts” “practice a 
certain textuality that asks for a mimetic reading.  Dialogic text can teach indirectly what 
monologic text fails to achieve” (p. 144). 
Further, pedagogic implications, what we might learn through uncovering a 
phenomenon are meant to move us toward an understanding that does something.  We are 
meant to learn, what Levin (1988) calls a “recollection” toward “deep experiential 
change” (p. 350).  This change is at the heart of what makes hermeneutic 
phenomenological research, action sensitive and lies in the writers’ expression that they 
are writing to remember the Holocaust, so that it will never happen again. 
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In order to describe the pedagogic implications of the phenomenon as it is opened 
here, I describe some of the questions brought forth in dialogue.  These questions ask us 
to trouble accepted meanings of history, story, memory and narrative and the interplay of 
each. It is my sense that these questions lead to a greater understanding of what it means 
to write memory, and of what it means to write history, while working in narrative within 
and against an objective paradigm of history.  
These descriptions, as dialogic texts, are meant to further the questions that keep 
the phenomenon “worthy of questioning” and “worthy of thought” (Heidegger, 1993a, p. 
362).  Continuation of questioning defies the finality implied in words like Holocaust or 
Shoah that literally translates as “the catastrophe,” which is defined as “the final event of 
the dramatic action especially of a tragedy” (my emphasis, Webster online). These names 
seek to express the scope and horror of the Holocaust, but belie the kinds of continuation 
through reverberation that makes the Holocaust unfinished and unfinishable.  The idea 
that the Holocaust was the “final act” belies the continuation defined by and described by 
these survivors, as does the continuing creation of texts and scholarly work about the 
Holocaust.  
More than this, the Holocaust was not the final act in human endeavors toward 
genocide, not the last instance of mass murder of innocents.  What we may learn about 
the Holocaust from the questions surrounding life writing the Holocaust have more to do 
with how we may learn to understand ourselves as humans in light of, and in the face of, 
catastrophe.  This learning happens in conversation with one another, with conversation 
brought about by texts, and through questioning. 
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Amidst Our Dwelling: Intersubjectivity 
It belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, 
truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to 
such an extent that he understand not the particular individual but what he says. 
What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be 
at one with each other on the subject. Thus we do not relate the other’s opinion to 
him but to our own opinions and views. (Gadamer, 1989, p. 385) 
What Gadamer describes is not agreement between people; it is intersubjectivity.  
As I describe it in Chapter Two, intersubjectivity is, at the very least, the first step toward 
a more just future.  Gadamer’s description here lives fully in the relationship he provides 
as an example.  He describes taking the “other’s opinion” and relating it to ourselves.  
Intersubjectivity might be described as empathy, but Gadamer describes seeing the 
“substantive rightness” of the other’s view.  Again, this does not describe agreement with 
the ideas or thoughts of others, but in valuing fully the “substantive rightness” of their 
knowing.  This view of intersubjectivity is expressed in each of the dialogues that 
describe the phenomenon of life writing the Holocaust.  The conversations between 
memory and writing, writer and audience, memoir and history, are comprised of 
relationships of intersubjectivity.  Gadamer also describes being “at one with each other 
on the subject.”  It is within a shared space for understanding a subject where being is 
questioned and brought into being.  In this way, it is the texts written by survivors and the 
questions they bring forth, in dialogue with memory, in dialogue with others and in 
dialogue with history that provide us with the pedagogic implications of this study.  It is 
to these texts I turn now.  
What Does it Mean to Write Memory? Building The Home We Grow Up In 
Writing this piece has provided an occasion for my sisters to try to remember 
things about Adolf Rosenfeld, our father.  I have to depend on their memories 
because I was just two years old when I was separated from our parents.  I never 
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saw them again after I went to England on the Kindertransport.  Bertl spoke to a 
cousin in Florida to ask her some questions.  I have e-mailed Reinhart Lochmann, 
the man who has been collecting information about the Jews of Adelsheim and 
the surrounding area, to ask if he can find answers to some of the questions that 
have arisen in my writing of this piece.  I don’t think I have found my lost father 
yet. (Starobin, 2006, p. 47) 
What does it mean to write memory in the ways it is described through this text 
by Esther Starobin?  Starobin describes memory in ways that once again ask us to expand 
on the notion of memory as an objective process of collecting and “storing” information.  
In this one excerpt, Starobin describes memory as being made collectively and shared.  
She describes relying on the memory of others.  She also asks questions of others in order 
to come to answers that will help to create a clearer shared memory of her father.  Carr 
(1986) names memory as collective and important for furthering a group identity.  He 
writes, “Such a story can be told by an individual or individuals on behalf of a we . . . by 
placing it in a story with a past and future, a myth of origin or foundation, a glimpse of a 
future” is seen (p. 156).  
Starobin (2006) describes memory as narrative, when earlier in this same text she 
describes trying to know her father through the stories she has heard about him.  He made 
the bread for the family; once he pulled a phone from the wall when it rang at an 
inopportune time. She tells these stories as a means of describing/knowing him (p. 46).  
We as readers, even without knowing it explicitly, experience as she does, that each story 
means more than the sum of its parts.  We are aware that the story stands for Starobin’s 
knowing of her father, helping her to expand her understanding, helping her to continue 
learning through questioning.  These are dialogic texts she is working from; they are 
leading her toward something, as well.  As Carr (1986) describes this, it is “in the relation 
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between formulating and communicating” that a “reflexive self-awareness” happens (p. 
156).  It is in the narrative of memory that understanding emerges.   
Memory here is narrative also in that she seeks out this information, in dialogue, 
in order to write a clearer story of her father.  She seeks out information to write a 
narrative that makes sense to her, one that will describe her father more clearly.  Finally, 
she treats memory within this text as something to make toward the future.  She describes 
that she has “not found” her lost father “yet.”  Through this phrase, she infers that by 
having a whole sense of him, it will help her in the future to make sense of him as her 
parent and as a person related to her now.  Heidegger (1962/2008) opens this further.  He 
writes, “Primoridal and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic 
future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present” 
(p. 378).  
This one text helps me to describe memory in ways that provide pedagogic use.  
Understanding memory as an objective process lessens the richness and simplifies the 
complexity of the way memory lives in humans, the way humans live in memory.  
Understanding memory within an understanding of human knowing, casts memory as a 
process for having and building understanding for the future.  In the sections that follow I 
open the description begun here in Starobin’s (2006) text further, of memory as narrative, 
memory as collective and memory as future making.  Within each section I describe the 
pedagogic implication of knowing memory in each way.  
Memory as Narrative 
Recollection is a search in something bodily for an image. (Aristotle, 1972/2007, 
p. 15) 
The memory that Starobin (2006) seeks in the text above is one that will help her 
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create an image of her “lost father.”  It is the signification, an image that stands for him 
that she seeks through her writing and remembering.  And while she describes trying to 
recollect a person she did not know, memory is always seeking an image, a signification 
that narrates.  Carr (1986) writes that perception is narrative and that we understand 
history (our own and others) narratively.  In this way if memory is narrative, we see that 
we not only structure perception after the fact, but understand in new and emerging ways 
through changing and growing story.  Carr writes:   
The concept of narrative involves not only a series of (human) events unfolding in 
time, according to a structure, but also a prospective-retrospective grasp which 
holds together that unfolding and constitutes its structure.  It is this grasp which 
lends to the various phases of action and experience their status of beginning, 
middle, or end, and thus constitutes a whole from which the parts receive their 
significance. (p. 84) 
Our knowing in story is not merely a sequencing of events to make a narrative structure; 
it is how we come to understand the meaning of experiences we live through.  Our 
narrative knowing is how we come to understand the significance of experience.  
“Significance” means also what the story we have perceived and lived signifies – how it 
means. 
In memory, we are making and re-making an understandable narrative, one that 
allows us to maintain coherence for the present and future, and we are doing it within a 
narrative structure, as well as with the signs that tell stories.  These things, or symbols, 
that inhabit and help us describe our memories are also narrative in that they mean far 
more to us than they merely are. 
The Stuff of Memory 
In Starobin’s (2006) text cited above she gathers stories about her father that she 
hopes will help her to understand/describe who he was.  She writes, “If my siblings were 
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playing away from the house, he would stand in the front and whistle for them to come 
home.  The entire neighborhood knew that whistle” (p. 48).  The whistle itself stands for 
something, and in Starobin’s text, she does not come to a definitive answer about what.  
Still, the questions about what it means to her are in the text as she describes not having 
found her “lost father.”     
 My own father used to be able to whistle so loudly he could be heard all over the 
neighborhood.  In my own perception it marked him as the only male in our family of 
five daughters.  He was the only one of us who could whistle like that, a jarring sound 
that meant come home right now.  The whistle, in my memory, stands now as a sign that 
my father has grown older; he can’t whistle the way he did then.  Also, he has no children 
that need calling in that immediate way.  The whistle means differently to me now.  My 
father has lost his ability for such immediate action; he moves slowly, and I don’t think 
he could summon the breath to make that sound now.  The whistle, once the sign of his 
power to summon me, has come to mean something else to me, now.   
 Starobin’s father’s whistle didn’t have this chance to change over time for her.  
She summons it in story to know something about him, through remembering that 
signifying thing about him.  It acts as less of a signifier in the story than it might in her 
own memory, which describes meaning for itself.  Still in story, the symbol tells about 
this man in ways that signify him, which stand for our own knowing of him.  The story 
itself, brought forth through the narrative of memory, attaches to our own experience, our 




Pedagogic Implications of Memory as Narrative 
What does it mean for a pedagogical knowing to understand memory as narrative?  
Bruner (2004) writes that narrative alone can communicate “lived time,” and that we 
create implicitly and sometimes explicitly the narratives that structure or “purpose-build” 
our “life story,” by which he means, our life (p. 694).  Bruner goes further in describing 
the narrative and sense making processes that guide our perception and our memory.  He 
writes, “Autobiography (formal or informal) should be viewed as a set of procedures for 
‘life making’” (p. 692).  
Pedagogically, this means that in the space where we are in the “project of 
renewal” as van Manen calls pedagogy, we must act within a questioning stance toward 
our own story and toward the autobiography told to us by others.  Taken for granted, the 
symbols and signifiers in the life story of others can come to a closed meaning, a singular 
owning of meaning.  They can, as Steeves (2006) describes, move away from 
intersubjectivity and “put too much me in the we” (p. 4).  So, the whistle of Starobin’s 
father is not my father’s whistle; I know it through my own experience. But it is through 
my own always beginning understanding of the other, Heidegger’s notion of “concern” 
(Besorgen), that in questioning I begin to wonder what it means to her. 
Memory as Collective 
Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein its Being towards the 
world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 84) 
Heidegger describes our questioning (among other ways of Being-in the world) as 
one of the ways we are “towards the world” in “concern.”  He writes, “Dasein happens to 
be proximally” (p. 83).  Through the ways of Being-in-the-world Heidegger describes 
what this means: 
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Having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining. (p. 83) 
 We commit ourselves to the world by asking what it is.  This understanding of 
questioning (concern) as pedagogic knowing also aligns us with the world as our 
memory; understanding of ourselves is collective.  Made in and with others, in concern 
for what others are, memory understood in this way commits us to (toward) the world. 
In Starobin’s (2006) text above she describes an effort through friends and family, 
made in questioning, to find and describe “something” about her father.  She writes that 
she asked her sisters what they could remember, that one of her sisters spoke to a cousin, 
and that she contacted a German historian.  In this example, and in the conversations with 
the group of survivor writers, this describing of memory’s collective nature is prevalent.  
If memory is our perception over time, layered with our evolving knowing, how 
could it not be made from the interactions and conversations, the new experiences and 
knowledge with which we continually add and edit memory’s narrative knowing? 
Narrative memory is made for (and in) communication. 
Starobin (2006) writes that she uses the community of friends and family to 
answer “questions that have arisen in my writing of this piece” as I describe in Chapter 
Four.  Here again, the impetus of questioning is the writing.  The written piece is not the 
end of the questioning, not the answer.  The reason to seek community, to share 
collectively in memory, happens so that Starobin can share her story, in the making and 
once it is written. 
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Sharing Memory 
The beyond being, being’s other or the otherwise than being, here situated in 
diachrony, here expressed as infinity, has been recognized as the Good by Plato. 
(Levinas, 1981/1997, p. 19) 
If memory is a sense making process for an individual, done through the 
community of others, it is also for the others and by the others that this sense making 
happens.  It is memory’s calling up the multiple and shared pasts that make it collective.  
The stories of her father Starobin (2006) is able to relate are those that come from others’ 
understanding of him.  They are passed down as story from memory and create story that 
can influence memory.  How will the author’s children, who will at some point have no 
one living to ask about their grandfather, know him except from the stories Starobin has 
related and written?  
It is this “Being-towards-the-world” that commits us to the world, that moves 
between past and future.  Through the shared memory, present also as tradition and 
historical consciousness, we share in the “life-making” Bruner (2004) describes, and 
more than that, toward the making of a world.  It is this remaking of the world     
that van Manen describes as pedagogical; it happens through the shared sense, the being 
for another that Levinas puts at the heart of his ethical stance.  
Pedagogic Implication of Memory Making as Collective 
What does it mean for pedagogic knowing to understand memory as collective, as 
shared as a shared sense of the world?  Steeves (2006) writes: 
The ‘we’ behind ‘our story’ is richer and more complex than some may wish to 
believe.  Within this ‘we’ lives a multitude of subjects – the ‘human’ and the 
‘animal,’ the familiar Other and the feral Selves of our collective experiences.  
Unpacking the ‘we’ is telling a new story – a new chapter in an old tale. (p. 47) 
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It is to this complexity that our pedagogy of questioning must turn, our “unpacking the 
we” that Steeves describes is a motion toward what he would call “intersubjectivity,” 
toward what Levinas (1981/1997) would call the being for “being’s other.”  Levinas sees 
this experience not as one where the other is subsumed to be like us, but where the other 
retains “otherness” and in that otherness creates responsibility.  Levinas writes, 
“It is not because the neighbor would be recognized as belonging to the same genus as 
me that he concerns me.  He is precisely other.  The community with him begins in my 
obligation to him” (p. 87).  Pedagogically being with others, our responsibility for others 
means doing justice to those others in the narrative, collective memory that stands for 
tradition, history and our making of a world. 
Carr (1986) describes the collective nature of memory as necessary for communal 
action, for world making.  He writes, “In our view such existence would require that a 
‘story’ be shared by the members of the group, such that its formulation and eventual 
reformulation would be constitutive of the group and its common undertakings” (pp. 155-
156).  Carr’s shared memory is described as a mode for “group stock-taking” where 
individuals as group members and as constitutive of that group decide what they stand 
for, what they will build.  This collective world making through writing is memory’s 
making of a future.  
Memory as Future Making 
Memory itself is already in the advance position.  Not only because remembering 
is at all times presupposed, but also because it is always at work: it is continually 
going on. (Casey, 1987, p. ix) 
In writing that memory is “continually going on,” Casey evokes that it is always 
happening, as well as that it is always moving forward.  It is both of these ways of 
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thinking about memory that allow us to understand memory as making the future.  Along 
with understanding memory as narrative and collective sense making, memory is always 
making sense of our past and present toward our future. 
In Starobin’s (2006) text above, she describes the “lost father” she has not “found 
yet.”  She engages in the writing through memory, the storying of her own past, as a way 
of providing an image of this father for her future understanding.  She describes memory 
as future making.  She knows precious little about her father, Adolf Rosenfeld.  She 
writes, “Bread-baking was done by our father.  He prepared the dough, which then had to 
be taken to the communal oven to be baked.  Ruth remembers having individual small 
challah made by our father” (p. 48).  In the world of the text each detail becomes 
important, significant, even if the author is not sure what each signifies to her.  
But why try to remember?  The question makes no sense to us, or it seems 
ridiculous, because it is so common to human experience that we would try to reclaim 
these memories, to piece together a part of the past lost to us.  The question is important 
because this work to re-assemble bits of the past causes, and is caused by, the world-
making we engage in, always toward the future. 
Memory: Building the World 
Memory, related to forgetting, as I discuss in Chapter Two is cast by Bernard-
Donals (2009) as the connection that Levinas (1981/1997) makes from the 
“irrecuperative, immemorial event,” (p. 19) the Holocaust, and Levinas’ description of 
ethical being.  Levinas’ sense of our ethical responsibility, Bernard-Donals argues, comes 
from the attempt to share a memory, that through saying, memory becomes “the said,” 
and then is not a memory at all, but something separate, and in that separateness, 
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communicable.  This illustrates further the play between “saying” and “the said” that both 
makes us responsible for the other and keeps him/her always other.  
It is this tension/play between “saying” and “said,” between “Self” and “Other,” 
that makes memory narrative and collective.  It is in this tension that we are also able to 
understand memory as future building.  Bernard-Donals (2009) describes this: “What 
Levinas offers is an idea of memory in which the moment of saying – of the event prior 
to knowledge and immemorial – compels human activity and discourse and founds 
ethics” (p. 19). 
The way I am able to understand this relationship is through the use of a metaphor 
of a game my father, my sister and I used to play.  My father would put his hand, palm 
down, on a table, and I, or my sister would put our hand on top of his.  Then he would put 
his other hand on top, until we had made a stack of all of our hands.  Then, whoevers’ 
hand was on the bottom of the pile would move his or her hand to the top and so on.  We 
were building and rebuilding the structure of our hands, and that action helps me to 
understand the relationship of ethics (future building) to memory that Bernard-Donals 
(2009) ascribes to Levinas.  
Each hand represents how we are always other. No hand looks the same; my 
father’s brown hand, my sister’s bitten fingernails are separate hands, always other.  Each 
hand represents otherness.  In our proximity, our hands touching, a desire to be touching, 
we “approach” the other, as Levinas writes (1981/1997, p. 5).  In each of us trying to 
cover the other’s hand, to be the one, in effect, holding all the hands of the others, we 
enact a motion representative of ethics through that intention, through our care.  Memory 
is the movement of each hand, as it slips from the pile and returns to cover it, 
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restructuring as it goes and returns.  The pile of our hands seem to grow as the bottom 
hand became the top hand.  In this same way we see how memory builds a future. 
Heidegger (1968/2004) describes the hand and its uniquely human and embodied 
work.  He writes: 
But the craft of the hand is richer than we commonly imagine.  The hand does not 
only grasp and catch, or push and pull.  The hand reaches and extends, receives 
and welcomes – and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives is own 
welcome in the hand of others.  The hand holds.  The hand carries. The hand 
designs and signs, presumably because man is a sign.  Two hands fold into one, a 
gesture meant to carry man into the great oneness.  (p. 16) 
This is what we mean when we say that memory is handed down, that tradition and 
history are handed from generation to generation.  The metaphor of the simple game I 
played with my father and sister is, as all metaphors, bigger than the image of it.  The 
sign means that I have a father who played games with his daughters, a father who 
wanted to be present with us. It all happened in specific time, at a time in the history of 
the world, in spaces, in our relationships and through the bodily experience of our hands 
together on a table.  
Memory understood in this way becomes a future building of a world through the 
ethical intention to the other.  It may be, as many have argued (Davis, 1996; Meskin, 
2000; Eaglestone, 2004), that Levinas’ philosophy of ethics comes from the disaster of 
the Holocaust.  But wherever it came from it is moving and building a future made from 
memory, constructed with others, narrative in its making and in first perceiving.  It is an 
ethical care for the world handed down through memory. 
Pedagogic Implication of Memory as Future Making 
It is this ethical building of the future as responsibility to the other that makes 
memory, as a making of the future, pedagogical.  The implication of a pedagogy of 
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questioning means that in making this future through memory of the past, there must be 
memory as intersubjectivity, not a general or monolithic history (not objective memory), 
but memory which builds a future that “does justice to the whole” (Steeves, 2006, p. 7). 
This way of seeing memory, knowing memory as narrative, as collective, and as 
future making resides within a pedagogy of questioning where the opening of an 
understanding happens in questions that wonder about the nature of knowing our lives, 
our selves and our time through memory.  As Carr (1986) writes, “The present is only 
possible for us if it is framed and set off against a retained past and a protentionally 
envisaged future” (p. 60). 
What Carr describes is a being-in process.  This way of knowing our being, and 
questioning the process of being and becoming, is certainly pedagogical, as van Manen 
(1997) describes it as “pedagogic thoughtfulness and pedagogic tact” (p. 154).  Its 
implication for learning is the expression of our knowledge of learning and being as ever 
in process.  The word tact is related to the word tactile, and in one sense means “the act 
of touching or handling.”  Tact also means to have a "ready and delicate sense of what is 
fitting and proper in dealing with others” (“tact,” 2014).  This describes being with 
humans in human ways that allow for us to learn through and for one another. This 
implication, brought forth in the writing and remembering processes of the survivor 
writers, I turn to now, as I describe the pedagogical implications of being-in process as 
historical beings writing the Holocaust. 
What Does It Mean to Write Personal History? Narrative Within 
History’s Paradigm and Context  
Historians, scholars of the Holocaust, and the world in general consider them 
among the six million Jews murdered in Europe.  To me, they were my uncle (my 
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father’s oldest brother), my aunt and my cousins.  Each one of them had a name, 
and each had a face, which I recall often among my haunting memories. 
After my memory is gone, and I can say kaddish no more, do not forget them. 
(Friedman, 2011, p. 17) 
Through this excerpt from Freidman’s (2011) text entitled “Do Not Forget 
Them,” we see the author describing differing ways that the dead of the Holocaust may 
be known.  She describes a historical sense of her family members and then a personal 
one, and finally she asks the reader to continue her remembrance.  This remembrance is 
an ongoing process, in that in this text Friedman names some of her family members 
murdered during the Holocaust more than seventy years after the fact.  The process of 
memory is ongoing in this text, as well, in that Friedman mentions that she will not 
always be able to remember them and instructs the reader to take over saying kaddish, 
extending the remembrance of her relatives into a future beyond her.  In what ways is 
writing a personal history, where memory of the Holocaust is enmeshed with knowledge 
of the study of history and the historical record itself, understood by these survivors?  
This personal history becomes part of the historical record of the Holocaust, just as 
Friedman names it as personal history.  What does it mean to write personal history from 
memory within the context and paradigm of a science of history? 
The description here is of personal history as a building process toward the future 
as it is enmeshed in the process of writing and knowing the past.  It is only through 
knowing memory and writing as process, the on-going project, that a pedagogy of 
questioning can act as “world-making” toward a more just future.  And if Friedman’s 
(2011) request that we, as readers, say kaddish means nothing else, it is a call that our 
remembering her murdered family might be for some use toward building a better world.  
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It names her personal history as memory, but calls for a kind of historical knowledge that 
will remain open and openable. 
This is related to a pedagogy of questioning, in that for historical knowledge to 
remain open, the writing of history must remain in-process.  This allows for a questioning 
that is on-going.  A pedagogy of questioning happens only in thoughtful, question filled 
movement forward.  This way of being allows for the building process involved in 
writing and remembrance as knowing the past in always emerging ways.  Indeed, if we 
view writing and remembering as determinate functions, we put a stop to the possibility 
for pedagogical processes of renewal.  Through what would amount to a view of the 
world, a view of history as an object, and as therefore finished, we could only view the 
product of writing and remembering the past as finite and unchangeable things.  For a 
pedagogy of questions, as pedagogical implication for this study, we must describe being-
in process as the only space for historical learning.  As Lyotard (1983/2002) describes 
this, “Reality is not a matter of the absolute eyewitness, but a matter of the future” (p. 
53). 
In Friedman’s (2011) text too, where she asks for the reader’s action toward the 
future, she connects herself and the story of her murdered family members to that future, 
as well.  She reminds the reader, the six million killed in the Holocaust are comprised of 
unique individuals, and some of these are her family.  She writes that “historians” know 
them in one way and argues for their specificity.  Her wish, expressed in this text, is that 
her family members not be subsumed by a general “historical” sense.  She projects her 
personal historical writing toward a better world, a more just world than the one they 
knew.  
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Through the next sections, I describe being-in process through writing and 
remembering personal history as pedagogical.  I will evoke again van Manen’s 
conception that pedagogy is “an ongoing project of renewal in a world that is constantly 
changing around us and that is continually being changed by us” (p. 3). Process, as I 
describe it here, is the act of being in questioning and is imperative for being 
pedagogically with, and for, others.  
Building In: History as Both Paradigm and Context 
Whether personal or collective, memory refers back by definition to the past that 
continues to be living by virtue of the transmission from generation to generation; 
this is the source of a resistance of memory to its historiographical treatment. 
(Ricouer, 2004, p. 398) 
The “historiographical treatment” that Ricouer describes here is one that he sees 
as an attempt to resist memory, a way that disallows memory’s “living.”  But even 
history, seen as Heidegger’s “science of history,” or this “historigraphical treatment,” 
remains constantly useful to the participants of this research and interacts with memory 
of the Holocaust in integral ways.  Remembering personal experience of the Holocaust, 
for these survivors, happens in deep connection with its “historiographical treatment.”  
Still, a “historiographical treatment” is often experienced by these participants as 
objective, as a truer truth than memory, even by those who live that history.  This tension 
casts a science of history for these survivors, as both a paradigm in which memory is less 
valued, and as a context in which memory is informed and remade by the still growing 
historical record.  What does this mean for a pedagogy of questioning, for our learning 
from and through this phenomenon? 
Gadamer (1976/2006) writes, “Historical coherence must, in the end, be 
understood as coherence of meaning that wholly transcends the horizon of the 
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individual’s experience” (p. 508).  His meaning, that a historical consciousness connects 
past and present, self and others, individual and community, means that what may be 
known through a science of history comprises one aspect of this coherence.  In what ways 
may historiography inform our pedagogy of questioning? 
Pedagogical Implication of History as Paradigm and Context 
Heidegger (1962/2008) writes presaging Ricouer’s (2004) description above, 
“Only because it is ‘historical’ can an era be unhistoriological” (p. 42).  He works here to 
describe a sense of “tradition,” as a better knowing of being than to know a 
“historiography” or his own “science of history” would allow.   Heidegger sees 
“historiography” as outside of “Being” in that, “it has no ground to stand on” (p. 42). And 
he describes a science of history’s interpretation as “phililogically ‘objective’ 
[‘sachliche’]” (p. 42).  His meaning here is that historical interpretation means nothing to 
being and does nothing to help us better understand being.  In fact, it does the opposite in 
that it stands in for our real conversation with the past through memory and tradition.  A 
“histiorographical” knowing is one that can never be an understanding that helps us to 
understand our own being in the past, or one through which we might discover meaning 
from that past.  
Heidegger (1962/2008), though, also writes that when we do not examine or 
question traditions that “come down to us,” what tradition “transmits is made so 
inaccessible that it rather becomes concealed” (p. 43).  When either historiography or 
tradition 
block our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and 
concepts . . . have been . . . quite genuinely drawn.  Indeed it makes us forget that 
they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going 
back to these sources is something which we need not even understand. (p. 43) 
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As a pedagogical implication for the phenomenon, a questioning of what we are able to 
know within the “science of history,” as well as seeking sources for our understanding of 
tradition, is necessary to keep meaning of the past possible.  This possibility means that 
both memory and any useful historical knowledge, must be, as Ricoeur describes, “living 
by virtue of the transmission from generation to generation” (p. 398).  If we can name 
what this living transmission is, it must be – if it is to be pedagogic – intersubjective; it 
must remain a human communication. 
Gadamer writes, “Historical knowledge is interwoven with historical events” (p. 
508).  Gadamer’s sense is that understanding of one is necessary for knowledge of the 
other.  This is at the heart of how we may understand the relationship between historical 
events and historical knowledge, or a historical consciousness that may be pedagogical.  
Gadamer writes that we must move away from an objective sense of history that “defends 
its methodological clarity by a classificatory system . . . and leads to a great systematic 
survey of the world of historical experience” (p. 509).  Nothing general, nothing that 
takes human experience of history as established, can lead us to greater knowing of the 
historical contexts in which our being is immersed.    
Taken together, the pedagogical implications for this phenomenon have described 
a pedagogy that “lives” in questioning.  It is a pedagogy that asks what memory does and 
is for as a mode of human knowing.  It queries what kinds of meaning might be made 
from thinking of writing or historical knowing as finished.  This pedagogy of questioning 
asks how we might learn from our knowing of the past, and what use that knowledge has 
for constructing a world for the future.  Finally, I turn to compare how being in-process 
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as in the writing process, the building process, is useful to help us understand how 
historical knowledge must be always in-process. 
Being-In Process: Personal History 
I think that in the writing process you discover a lot of things that you are not 
necessarily aware of, or you make connections, things come up through the 
writing process itself. (Harry) 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines process, as a noun, as “the passing or 
lapsing of time, years, seasons etc.” and “the fact of going on or being carried on, as an 
action or series of actions; progress, course” (“process,” 2014).  Process helps to describe 
one of the ways we may be in time, and therefore in history, as well as how we may 
know historically.  It describes forward action, doing something. 
The definition the Oxford English Dictionary gives for process as it relates to 
philosophy helps to define historical knowledge as being-in process more aptly, “the 
course of becoming as opposed to static being” (“process,” 2014).  This definition, 
though I could not even begin to imagine what a “static being” might be, helps us to 
understand that when Harry describes writing as a process of discovery, he is describing 
the process as an act of “becoming.”  It is this emphasis on the movement inherent in 
process toward something that Harry names discovery.  It is only in being forward 
looking that historical knowledge can come to have a human use. 
Heidegger (1962/2008) describes our being as “essentially futural,” and describes 
that being in the present, “in the sense of making present” happens only through our 
“taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence” (p. 374). This, he 
writes, “is possible only by making such an entity present” (p. 374).  In “making” 
something “present” Heidegger says that we have “anticipatory resoluteness.”  This is the 
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meaning he ascribes to time, which is care.  Heidegger writes, “Temporality reveals itself 
as the meaning of authentic care” (p. 374).  This “making present” or caring, being 
concerned toward the future is, in Heidegger’s conception, the way that we are able to 
experience time.  This is, it seems, a being-in process, a concern that is also a “becoming” 
and is also for the future. 
In this same way, care for the future with knowledge of historical events allows a 
historical event to have “presence.”  Carr (1986) calls the “presence” of historical events 
a knowledge of history that is “pre-theoretical,” as in theorizing we may name and be 
done with history.  Carr writes that when historical knowledge is reduced to an 
understanding of the “‘big subject,’ it is necessary for us to drop back to individual 
experience and interrogate it” (pp. 153-154).  A pedagogy of questioning, then, allows 
any historical knowledge to remain alive, to be brought to “presence” through this 
interrogation of personal and particular lived experience.   
Heidegger’s (1962/2008) sense that time, known in this way through lived 
experience, is “primordial and authentic.” He describes this as the way we experience 
human time, through “care.”  It is how we, and our historical knowing, are always in the 
process of “becoming.” And it is in this sense of time as care that we may understand that 
our historical being is always in-process. As a pedagogical implication of this work, we 
are able to know being in-process historically, as identical to the always becoming of 
memory and writing. 
Always Becoming: Personal History 
Memory, writing and historical knowing, understood here as processes, are for the 
future, and happen in an always happening present.  Only if we understand memory, 
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writing and history in this way, can they be pedagogical. The past tense of these 
processes is not possible, as it provides no possibility.  So, even when these particular 
rememberers and writers are gone, remembering and writing and historical knowing may 
remain in-process through communication with others. As in Friedman’s (2011) piece 
above where the author asks for a reader to pray for the dead that they may “meet” only 
through her story, the process continues through communication.  
 This illustrates though, once again, the constant problem of telling anything about 
the Holocaust.  The memory of Friedman’s (2011) family, even our remembering of 
them, does not approach them. We are able to approach through the story she tells of 
them, through the story she tells of their loss.  Still, it is being-in process toward a future 
that every survivor of the memory project describes as his or her reason for writing.  The 
reason to tell, they repeat, is for the future.  Our own being in questioning, where our 
questions are focused on world making is pedagogical.  It is the prayer that Friedman 
asks for us to continue.          
This focus on process, on questioning that is ongoing, defies a closing down of 
being, or a closing down of history as finished, as object.  If we are able to see being-in 
process as always becoming, as toward an always emerging world, it is necessary to 
describe knowledge of our past as also always in-process. 
In What Ways Must a Pedagogy of Questioning Trouble the Pedagogical 
House? 
 
In Chapter One, I referenced the biblical quote, “He that troubleth his own house 
shall inherit the wind,” and began to open the notion that a house, a structure, a paradigm 
that stands “untroubled” is a house that requires more questioning through dwelling in.  
As in Heidegger’s sense, we dwell in questions.  I return to trouble the house of 
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pedagogy; to begin to describe a pedagogy of questioning and the ways in which it must 
trouble and interrogate any pedagogical dwelling.  Palmer (1997) writes:  
If we want to grow as teachers – we must do something alien to academic culture: 
we must talk to each other about our inner lives – risky stuff in a profession that 
fears the personal and seeks safety in the technical, the distant, the abstract. (p. 3) 
   
It is only in refuting the abstract and the distant, that we can begin with our pedagogy of 
questioning.  And if it is to be truly pedagogical, it must be made of questioning that 
moves toward intersubjectivity.  So, while Palmer may have meant that teachers must 
speak about their inner lives, he writes that they must “talk to each other;” inherent in this 
directive is that in order to do this, talk must ask and answer.   
In this questioning, in order to be intersubjectively with one another, pedagogues 
must ask the questions most rooted in the personal.  A pedagogy of questions asks about 
being, seeks existential nature of being together, concerns being and furthers it 
collectively.  A pedagogy of questioning interrogates being through temporality, 
spatiality, corporeality and, most importantly, through relationality (where an ethical 
being for another begins).  I turn to open pedagogical questioning and to the tensions that 
help to describe it.   
Dwelling Pedagogically  
To dwell pedagogically must mean to dwell intersubjectively.  The questions of 
what it means to have a body, to experience space, to be in relation, are pedagogical 
questions in that they seek to understand experience, through asking about experience.   
Heidegger (1962/2008) applies questioning to being.  He writes, “In formulating 
the question about the meaning of being” through knowing something about being, we 
are “laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting” it (p. 28).  He writes further, that there 
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is a “remarkable ‘relatedness backward or forward’ which what we are asking about 
(Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being an entity” (p. 28).  He means that 
we are able to wonder about being when we are able to formulate questions that ask about 
it.  Heidegger conceives of our questioning of being as an enterprise that brings us closer 
to our own being and in that way closer to all being.  In a pedagogy of questioning, we 
must dwell in questions that ask about being and the beings we teach.   
After Heidegger, Levinas (1972/1996) describes that there is “a lag between the 
fact of being themetized and the fact of being made manifest in intelligibility” (p. 98).  
The difference between these ways of knowing another is where teaching and learning 
begin.  In the same way that Heidegger sees that in simply formulating the questions of 
being we are bringing being to light in questioning, Levinas sees that in asking we are 
able to manifest being “in intelligibility.”  In merely coming up with the questions, each 
of these philosophers brings forth, we are already in the process of learning about being.   
Through “being made manifest in intelligibility,” a pedagogy of questioning seeks 
to gather together “the truth correlative to being” (Levinas, 1972/1996, p. 99).  Levinas 
describes this truth as that:  
in which the subject, a pure welcome reserved for the nudity of disclosed being, 
effaces itself before that which manifests itself, and in which effort, inventiveness, 
and genius are all just the means, ways, and detours by which being is dis-
covered, by which its phases come together and its structures are secured. (p. 99) 
 
In a pedagogy of questioning we seek to teach in ways in which being is “dis-covered.”  
Already in that seeking, we move closer to our own being through which we experience 
all being. 
 In pedagogical settings this disclosing of being happens when we take up the 
questions that engage our being in bodies, in space, in time and with and for one another.  
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This means, most simply, that when we question experience, the questions already 
suppose the shared human experience.  Levinas writes: 
The truth resulting from the subject’s engagement in the world and history 
through labor, cultural creation and political organization, whereby the 
subjectivity of the subject shows itself to be humanity, finitude, care for its being 
thrown in anticipation of its end - this truth remains the truth of disclosed being. 
(p. 99) 
 
This way of conscientiously moving toward the disclosure of being is a pedagogical 
move that I see happening in teaching reciprocally and through interrogation of being.  It 
calls for dwelling thinking and requires being in dwelling with others.  
The Project of Memory 
 Recently Susan wrote about the oldest relative she remembers knowing.  This 
resulted from an in-class writing prompt where I asked each writer to describe as much as 
he or she could remember about the oldest family member that they’d met, or were told 
about by someone who knew her/him.  Susan describes her great-aunt, “Tante Anna” and 
her great-grandmother, Hulda.  She writes: 
We called her “die Hexe” because she had such a witchlike appearance.  She was 
a quiet witch and allowed us to stare at her in amazement.  She never reprimanded 
or scolded us for such behavior.  She was Tante Anna’s mother and my 
grandmother’s mother.  Her name was Hulda.  She was always there in the 
morning when we got up for breakfast and still there when we went to bed.   
 
Susan goes on to describe the cooking of bulbenick.  During the conversation several of 
the members of our group described how delicious the bulbenick they remembered eating 
was.  When I expressed my ignorance of the dish, Gideon described that the flavor was 
like dying and going to heaven.  Susan remembers the ingredients and names them in her 
writing: potatoes, “eggs, yeast, oil and flour.”  I wondered if bulbenick was potato bread 
or a kind of kugel.  There was considerable discussion about this in the group.  I thought 
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that there should be some translation of bulbenick, so that an audience of readers, 
unfamiliar as I was, could have more of a sense of the dish.  I wanted to know, was it 
sweet, savory?  Was it eaten on special occasions?   
 Later, when I got home there was an e-mail from Marcel, saying that he had 
Googled bulbenick and that it was actually “potato kugel.”  I haven’t yet heard from 
Susan to know if she agrees with this description.  There are so many aspects of this 
experience that help me to describe my sense of the writing made by these survivors and 
what we are able to learn from their doing it.   
 We will never eat the bulbenick Susan describes.  Even if we were able to find the 
exact recipe, we could not cook it in the large cast iron oven that “die Hexe” guarded in 
that kitchen.  We will never sit in that kitchen, before the Holocaust, with the family that 
Susan describes, the women peeling “huge piles” of potatoes.  Even as members of our 
group describe eating bulbenick in other places, differences in the belbenick itself 
emerge.  Now, there is no way to tell whether what Marcel’s family ate in Poland was the 
same; certainly it was not, as the bulbenick Gideon remembers.  
 Along with this is the fact that Susan’s Tante Anna and her great-grandmother, 
along with many of her other family members, were killed in the Riga Concentration 
Camps. She found the record of this at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.  
Susan never learned to cook bulbenick herself and came to the United States where her 
children were raised never eating bulbenick and without an extended family. 
 In our meeting, as I asked what bulbenick was.  I searched for something in my 
own memory that would approximate what Susan describes, made with potatoes but 
crispy on top, made with yeast and flour.  Nothing came close.  Susan’s memory, written 
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and shared now with me, and with the other readers of Susan’s writing, will not ever get 
us closer to eating the bulbenick made in that kitchen by German Jews before the 
Holocaust.   
 But our knowing the story Susan writes, and indeed Susan’s writing of it, helps us 
to know the Holocaust in ways that without this story would be as impossible as getting 
to taste the bulbenick made that day.  This story, how the women in her family cooked 
together is only just now a topic that a historian of the Holocaust might seek to learn 
about.  And if history as a discipline sought to know, its goal is still most often to 
thematize these experiences, to show how people lived.  What Susan tells is how her 
people lived.  She does this with specific details, specific language, because we have 
talked often about the ways in which these personal details, the cast iron oven heated by 
wood, the old woman sitting next to it, make her memory of that time resonant.  These 
details connect us to the story; they allow us as readers, a place to stand, so to speak, 
among these things Susan describes.   
What does it mean that Susan, who was there, writes her own remembrance of her 
aunt and great-grandmother as they lived then, in that house?  Susan recalls those times 
and describes them in her writing.  Maybe she has a conversation with her brother and 
asks for confirmation of what they had called their great-grandmother as children.  She 
writes this memory as a story, choosing what is important to include.  She reads it to our 
group and later she will read it to her children; it may be published on the museum’s 
website. Others in our group, who hear what she has written, remember eating bulbenick, 
remember those who made it for them, share the memory in conversation with one 
another.  Bulbenick and the people who made it, the rooms where it was made and eaten, 
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the taste of it, even the time when it was made, is in the room with us, for just a moment.  
For one instant, we all share our sense of it, dissonant as those senses may be.   
Without Susan writing, how many of these interactions would not happen?  In 
what different ways would the world know the Holocaust, without these stories? In what 
other ways would they remember those who were murdered, the cultures that were 
destroyed?  These personal stories, authored by these writers, expand what we are able to 
know, add to what we can feel.  They, in first person voice, give us a more whole view of 
the past, and allow us to feel more fully, more acutely, what was lost.  Through the 
individual story, through the particularity of loss, each writer’s project of memory allows 
us to move closer and petitions us to move forward.   
Dwelling In: Further In 
Being in the work of asking about the lived experience of life writing the 
Holocaust, in ways similar to the survivor’s writing about the past, has allowed me a way 
to dwell with these writers and with their work.  It has allowed me a space in which to 
dwell with them and to question that dwelling.  In trying to open the phenomenon of the 
experience lived by these survivor writers I have engaged with them, and the texts that 
surround the phenomenon, and I have engaged through my own writing.  The writing of 
this work has caused me to do what being engaged in writing does.  Writing, as impetus, 
as desire to communicate, has helped me to move closer in questioning.  Writing has 
allowed me to seek to show “being made manifest in intelligibility” (Levinas, 1972/1996)  
These meanings I have tried to know, and I have tried to articulate our being together in 
order to share this meaning making with others.   
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This is also the work the survivors do through writing their own stories. Through 
communicating a past, they enable that past to continue to live amongst us. And it is in 
this narrative human act that they continue also to be in the making of story, this thing we 
have of/for the future.  These writers help to call up a prospective world and describe our 
better action toward it.  This is the project of memory, and as I’ve tried to capture 
poetically here, it is the powerful work of making a world.    
The Dream of America 
 
Hidden in a chateau in France, 
each child dreams the dream of America 
tells the younger ones they will all eat candy there. 
 
When these children perish  
the oven's smoke fills with that dream, 
other hunted children  
fill lungs with it, breathe it in, 
speak it 
 
exhale the dream in the form of stories, 
their smoke breath taking the shape  
of the silver Chrysler Building, the shining Empire State. 
 
When the Statue of Liberty’s golden torch burns –   
there is America,   
there are the lights, they say. 
 
These lights are powered by this, you know. 
Maybe by nothing but this. 
  








Initial Letter Soliciting Permission 
 
 
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 4:10 PM, <magpete@comcast.net> wrote: 
Hi Diane and Rachel, 
 
I hope your week is starting well.  I am getting to a point in my graduate career, 
finally, where it seems that they may actually let me do the research for my 
dissertation.  Since my research concerns survivors, my work at the museum and 
therefore, Survivor Affairs, I thought I would lay out what I am hoping to do and 
ask for your guidance and permission moving forward. 
 
Being aware, that I am employed by the museum for the purpose of running The 
Memory Project, (and happy about that fact) I would like to ask for permission to 
use the first hour of two class sessions to have survivors (in lieu of in-class 
writing) describe their writing process.  I would ask them questions about the 
impact of the group on their writing and their sense of what their writing means 
for a history of the Holocaust, as well.  As a teacher, I see this as being beneficial 
to the participants as they think through what the writing means to them.  As a 
museum employee, I can see it as being beneficial to an understanding of the 
program, as well as providing insights into what a person can learn from writing 
about his or her own life experiences after the Holocaust.  I would provide 
transcripts of the conversation, so they might help provide insight into the value 
of the program for the museum's mission, if you think they might be valuable 
too.  This research would be read by the members of my committee but I don't 
have plans to publish it,  and I  would ask to use survivor's actual names.   
   
Thinking through the research I'm hoping to conduct, I decided against meeting 
with survivors one on one, because I feel the nature of the group is so important 
to the kind of discussion I want to have with survivors.  How the survivors interact 
with one another is at the heart of our "writing group" and seems important to 
capture for my research.  I can't imagine another way that I would be able to 
assemble the survivors in a separate setting, given the logistics of getting 
everyone together, transportation etc.  So, I'm asking for permission to: 
 
1. Spend about ten minutes of our December 20th meeting explaining the 
methods and purpose of my research. 
2. Provide consent forms so that they can agree to being recorded during the 
hour-long conversation.  These forms would be anonymously collected and 
anyone not consenting to the use of his or her name would have his/her voice 
removed from the audio files when they are downloaded to computer.  It would 
be made clear in the consent forms that their participation, in the research, is 
completely voluntary and that their non-participation would have absolutely no 
effect on their membership in The Memory Project. 
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3. Conduct the first one-hour focus-group conversation.  I would ask them 
questions such as: 
  A.  How do you describe the writing you do when you are discussing it with 
others?  Do you use the term autobiography, memoir, testimony, history 
or etc?  What does the term you use to describe your writing mean, to you?   
2 B.  Where do you get the ideas for the pieces you write?  How would you 
describe your specific impetus for writing? 
C.  Describe your process for drafting or revising the pieces you write?  Do you 
read your pieces to others before you bring them to the group?  Do you share 
them with others after you have shared them with the group?  
D.  What kind of feedback on your writing do you value most?  What kind of 
feedback is most useful to you? 
E.  Do you see the writing you do as having a role to play in the history of the 
Holocaust?  If so, how would you describe that role?  
F.  For whom do you write?  Who is your imagined audience?  How does the 
group act as an audience, how does the group effect your writing  
G.    Has the writing you have done caused you see your experiences 
differently?  If so, how would you describe the role of your writing, or the writing 
of others, in this change? 
9.       H.  Are there topics that you choose not to write about? Why?   
I.   What do you hope readers who do not know you will understand about you 
from your writing?  What do you hope readers will understand about the 
Holocaust from your writing? 
4     4. Conduct the second focus-group conversation during our January 31st 
class, following up with any of the questions we did not address in the first focus 
group. 
 
      I don't believe that these discussions are separate from the work the 
survivors usually do in our group, but I know that you have to put the needs of 
the survivors and the museum first in any decision you make, so I appreciate you 
considering the possibility. Let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
 I'm happy to come in and talk to you in person, if that would make it easier for 
you to ask questions you might have. 
 
Thanks so much, 
















Letter of Conditional Permission  
 
From: "Diane Saltzman" <dsaltzman@ushmm.org> 
To: "Maggie" <magpete@comcast.net> 
Cc: "Rachel Wagner" <rwagner@ushmm.org> 
Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2012 3:05:21 PM 




I spoke with our lawyer and, in general, your request is fine, with a couple of comments: 
 
1. Because we're paying you to conduct the class, we cannot pay you to conduct your own 
research during class time. Either, we/you can ask the survivors to come in at 10:00, stay 
until 4:00 or they can be asked if they're willing to have the discussion over lunch. 
 
2. We'd like to review the release form that you will ask them to sign. 
 
3. Once you have written up the parts of your work that reference the Museum,.we'd like to 
review it, as we do with anyone who wishes to use the Museum's name in their work.  
 
4. Once you have a completed project, can we receive a copy? 
 
5. It's important to reiterate the "opt out" option and also to give the survivors advance notice. 
A note should come from me informing them about this project and letting them know this is 
for your research and not an official project of the Museum's.  
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  of	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Project Title 
 
The	  Project	  of	  Memory:	  The	  Lived	  Experience	  of	  Life	  Writing	  The	  
Holocaust	  
	  





This	  research	  is	  being	  conducted	  by	  Francine	  Hultgren	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Maryland,	  College	  Park.	  	  We	  are	  inviting	  you	  to	  
participate	  in	  this	  research	  project	  because	  you	  are	  a	  member	  of	  The	  
Memory	  Project	  writing	  workshop.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  





The	  procedure	  involves	  two,	  one-­‐hour	  discussions	  in	  our	  regularly	  
scheduled	  group	  meetings	  at	  the	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  
Museum	  on	  December	  20th	  and	  January	  30th	  2012	  that	  will	  be	  audio	  
taped	  and	  transcribed.	  The	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum	  is	  
not	  conducting	  these	  discussions	  and	  is	  no	  way	  affiliated	  with	  this	  
research. 
If	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  study,	  your	  contribution	  to	  the	  
conversation	  will	  be	  audio	  taped	  but	  will	  not	  be	  transcribed	  to	  be	  used	  in	  
the	  research.	  	  Your	  voice	  will	  be	  removed	  when	  the	  audio	  files	  are	  
uploaded	  to	  computer.	  Examples	  of	  the	  types	  of	  questions	  that	  will	  be	  
asked	  include:	  How	  do	  you	  describe	  the	  writing	  you	  do	  when	  talking	  
about	  it	  with	  others?	  
	  
If	  permission	  is	  given,	  follow-­‐up	  conversations	  may	  be	  scheduled	  at	  the	  
mutual	  convenience	  of	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  participant.	  	  These	  
conversations	  will	  also	  be	  recorded	  and	  transcribed.	  	  In	  addition,	  you	  
may	  be	  asked	  to	  give	  further	  written	  permission,	  for	  the	  credited	  use	  of	  
your	  unpublished	  written	  work,	  including	  e-­‐mail	  correspondence.	  	  	  
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
	  
There are no known risks for this study.  Participants will describe their 
practices and experience of writing about surviving the Holocaust and so 
doing may require introspection that may cause participants to experience 
unpleasant memories.  As members of a group of writers who describe 
memory of the Holocaust regularly, these risks are not a product of the 
research. The researcher will encourage participants to ask questions at 
any time during the process as well as maintain their awareness of the 
option to drop out of the study at any time. 
	  	  	  
Potential Benefits 	   There	  are	  no	  direct	  benefits	  to	  participants.	  However,	  possible	  benefits	  
include	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  how	  personal	  writing	  impacts	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  Holocaust.	  We	  hope	  that,	  in	  the	  future,	  other	  people	  
might	  benefit	  from	  this	  study	  through	  improved	  understanding	  of	  







If	  you	  consent	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  study,	  your	  real	  name	  will	  be	  used;	  
the	  actual	  name	  and	  purpose	  of	  The	  Memory	  Project	  will	  be	  described	  
through	  the	  research.	  	  As	  information	  about	  participants	  and	  the	  group	  
exists	  in	  several	  public	  formats,	  anonymity	  will	  not	  be	  possible.	  	  The	  
audio	  tape	  files	  and	  transcripts	  will	  be	  stored	  in	  password	  protected	  files	  




The	  University	  of	  Maryland	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  medical,	  hospitalization	  
or	  other	  insurance	  for	  participants	  in	  this	  research	  study,	  nor	  will	  the	  
University	  of	  Maryland	  provide	  any	  medical	  treatment	  or	  compensation	  
for	  any	  injury	  sustained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  participation	  in	  this	  research	  
study,	  except	  as	  required	  by	  law.	  
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your	  participation	  in	  this	  research	  is	  completely	  voluntary.	  	  You	  may	  
choose	  not	  to	  take	  part	  at	  all.	  	  If	  you	  decide	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  
research,	  you	  may	  stop	  participating	  at	  any	  time.	  	  If	  you	  decide	  not	  to	  
participate	  in	  this	  study	  or	  if	  you	  stop	  participating	  at	  any	  time,	  you	  will	  
not	  be	  penalized	  or	  lose	  any	  benefits	  to	  which	  you	  otherwise	  qualify.	  	  
	  
If	  you	  decide	  to	  stop	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  study,	  if	  you	  have	  questions,	  
concerns,	  or	  complaints,	  or	  if	  you	  need	  to	  report	  an	  injury	  related	  to	  the	  
research,	  please	  contact	  the	  investigators:	  	  
Dr.	  Francine	  Hultgren	  	  
2311	  Benjamin	  Bldng.	  





3061	  Shad	  Place	  
Riva,	  MD	  21140	  
443.744.0773	  
magpete@umd.edu	  
Participant Rights  
	  
If	  you	  have	  questions	  about	  your	  rights	  as	  a	  research	  participant	  or	  wish	  
to	  report	  a	  research-­‐related	  injury,	  please	  contact:	  	  
	  
University	  of	  Maryland	  College	  Park	  	  
Institutional	  Review	  Board	  Office	  
1204	  Marie	  Mount	  Hall	  
College	  Park,	  Maryland,	  20742	  
	  E-­‐mail:	  irb@umd.edu	  	  	  
Telephone:	  301-­‐405-­‐0678	  
	  
This	  research	  has	  been	  reviewed	  according	  to	  the	  University	  of	  




Statement of Consent 
 
Your	  signature	  indicates	  that	  you	  are	  at	  least	  18	  years	  of	  age;	  you	  have	  
read	  this	  consent	  form	  or	  have	  had	  it	  read	  to	  you;	  your	  questions	  have	  
been	  answered	  to	  your	  satisfaction	  and	  you	  voluntarily	  agree	  to	  
participate	  in	  this	  research	  study.	  You	  will	  receive	  a	  copy	  of	  this	  signed	  
consent	  form.	  
	  
If	  you	  agree	  to	  participate,	  please	  sign	  your	  name	  below.	  
Signature and Date 
	  
NAME	  OF	  SUBJECT	  
[Please	  Print]	  
	  








































Letter	  of	  Invitation	  
	  
Dear	  Memory	  Project	  Writers,	  
	  
	   It	  has	  finally	  come	  to	  the	  point	  in	  my	  graduate	  school	  program	  for	  me	  to	  
begin	  my	  doctoral	  research.	  	  As	  most	  of	  you	  know,	  my	  research	  will	  focus	  on	  what	  it	  
means,	  what	  it	  feels	  like	  to	  you,	  to	  engage	  in	  personal	  writing,	  as	  Holocaust	  
survivors.	  	  The	  research	  questions	  I	  have	  posed	  wonder	  about	  the	  role	  of	  memory,	  
writing,	  narrative	  and	  history	  in	  the	  way	  you	  perceive	  the	  writing	  you	  do.	  I	  have	  
questions	  about	  your	  sense	  of	  the	  group	  we	  have	  made,	  your	  sense	  of	  the	  way	  your	  
writing	  impacts	  an	  understanding	  of	  history	  and	  how	  you	  experience	  it	  all.	  	  	  
	   I	  am	  asking	  each	  of	  you	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  research	  study.	  	  If	  you	  consent	  to	  
participate,	  we	  will	  engage	  in	  2-­‐3,	  one-­‐hour	  discussions	  during	  the	  lunch	  break	  of	  
our	  meetings	  in	  January	  and	  February.	  	  During	  these	  discussions	  I	  will	  ask	  
questions,	  that	  I	  hope	  will	  elicit	  discussion	  in	  our	  group	  around	  the	  themes	  I	  
mentioned	  above.	  	  Secondly,	  I	  may	  ask	  several	  individuals	  to	  meet	  for	  follow-­‐up	  
conversations,	  one	  on	  one,	  or	  in	  smaller	  groups.	  	  I	  may	  also	  ask	  that	  you	  give	  written	  
permission	  for	  me	  to	  use	  your	  unpublished	  written	  work	  and	  cite	  it	  in	  my	  
dissertation.	  	  	  	  	  
	   You	  are	  not	  obligated,	  in	  any	  way,	  to	  participate	  in	  answering	  questions,	  or	  in	  
being	  recorded.	  If	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  research,	  you	  might	  decide	  to	  
leave	  the	  room	  during	  the	  discussion	  section,	  though	  I	  believe	  the	  discussion	  will	  be	  
similar	  to	  many	  we	  have	  had	  before	  in	  our	  group.	  	  Or,	  if	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  research,	  and	  you	  still	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  our	  discussion,	  I	  will	  not	  
transcribe	  your	  contribution	  to	  the	  discussion	  for	  my	  research	  and	  your	  voice	  can	  
be	  removed	  from	  the	  audio	  recordings.	  	  	  
	   I	  am	  conducting	  this	  research	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  my	  advisor,	  Dr.	  Francine	  
Hultgren.	  	  The	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum	  is	  not	  conducting	  the	  
research.	  	  The	  museum	  has	  kindly	  allowed	  me	  to	  use	  the	  space,	  during	  the	  time	  we	  
normally	  meet,	  during	  a	  lunch	  break,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  whole	  group	  assembled.	  	  	  
	   I	  look	  forward	  to	  describing	  the	  research	  and	  discussing	  it	  with	  you,	  should	  
you	  have	  questions	  or	  concerns.	  	  I	  am	  excited	  to	  begin	  to	  explore	  my	  research	  
questions	  with	  all	  of	  you.	  
	  
Sincerely,	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